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Abstract 
This thesis explores the structure of Christian apologetics in a pluralist society. Twc 
major objections to the possibility of apologetics are considered. The first objection i~ 
the non-foundationalist challenge to knowledge and we consider a number of forms ir 
which this objection has been raised with particular focus on the work of Malcolm 
and Kuhn. The second objection arises with the reality of religious diversity and it~ 
attendant difficulties for such apologetic requirements as commensurability and 
criteria for assessing truth claims. The work of Hick is examined in some detail to 
assess his response to this problem. It will be shown that despite his claims, Hick's 
work remains foundationalist and a connection will be made between adopting a 
foundationalist epistemology and the pluralist hypothesis. The failure of such an 
epistemology is explored further by assessing the background assumptions of the 
Enlightenment particularly as they were embodied in the work of Kant and adopted by 
Hick. In contrast the claims of some critics of the Enlightenment, particularly 
MacIntyre and Lindbeck, are considered and their central charges agains1 
foundationalism are applied to Hick and upheld. A constructive proposal for 
apologetics will be made in which a particular critique of the Enlightenment is 
granted and the concepts of shared standards and translatability utilised in order to 
overcome the anti-foundationalist challenge to apologetics. The suggestions of 
Plantinga and Frame are considered in the light of this proposal but a further element 
of narrative is developed as a basic component of knowledge. In contrast to some 
narrativist thinking it will be argued that the narrative structure of knowledge i~ 
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The aim of this thesis will be to discuss the nature of Christian apologetics with 
particular attention to the pressing problem of developing a Christian theology of 
religions. Apologetics is defined and discussed in Chapter 1 (a). It is used in this 
thesis to identify any attempt to provide justification for religious belief in the face of 
some perceived challenge. Much attention has been given to the role and nature of 
dialogue in response to pluralism. 1 Dialogue certainly includes apologetic encounter 
but is a broader term. In some recent literature it implies an attempt to suspend 
evaluation in favour of hearing and providing self-description of religious traditions.2 
For reasons that will become clear in the course of this thesis this latter implication is 
understood to raise complex difficulties. Therefore, the term will be avoided in 
favour of the narrower practice of apologetics. 
We begin with a brief consideration of what apologetics entails particularly in relation 
to inter-religious encounter [l(a)]. The following sections survey a central problem in 
apologetics; namely, the existence or non-existence of grounds for belief. Malcolm 
provides representative criticism of the possibility of grounds [1 (b )]. Kuhn's work in 
the philosophy of science provides a framework for both apologetic encounter and 
groundless belief [l(c)]. Various recent attempts to maintain foundationalist 
apologetics are given brief consideration and also found wanting [led)]. 
Extended consideration will then be given to the work of Hick who has attempted to 
provide an apologetic for Christianity but also developed a formulation of Christian 
thought in which it has no superior claim to express reality than any other religion. 
1 Such as Hick 1974a, Lochhead 1988, Milbank 1990b, Newbigin 1977. 
2 Particularly in Swidler (ef. af.) 1990. 
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This account will focus on his work in epistemology [2(a),(b)] rather than theology of 
religions because it will be argued that it is here that Hick's work is decisively flawed. 
Various problems in Hick's pluralist hypothesis have been detailed elsewhere but the 
present argument will be that his pluralist conclusions are already implicit in his 
account of the rationality of religious knowledge. 3 It is at the level of epistemology 
that Hick's work is faulted. Brief consideration of the early form of his pluralist 
hypothesis [2( c)] will also demand discussion of the continuity of Hick's work [2( d)]. 
It has been argued that the revolutions within his thinking rule out the possibility of 
treating it as a coherent whole. In contrast we shall argue for the clear continuity of 
Hick's work based on his epistemology which has remained a constant. 
We shall consider Hick's apologetic for faith in the context of religious pluralism 
particularly as it is stated in his major articulation of the pluralist thesis: An 
Interpretation of Religion.4 Here Hick develops an important distinction between 
faith as a general category and Christian faith [3(a)]. Hick is committed to developing 
an account of the former at the expense of the latter. Underlying the shift to a 
pluralist theology is Hick's epistemic assumption that this universe is ambiguous and 
that one should exercise scepticism towards religious belief [3(b )]. Hick's scepticism 
is a foundational assumption in his position which relativises the extent to which he 
may be committed to any particular beliefs. Therefore, the basic apologetic offered by 
3 The basic claims of pluralism are not subjected to significant criticism in this thesis. 
Extended treatments of Hick's pluralist theology of religions include Carruthers 1990. 
D'Costa 1987, Gillis 1989, Loughlin 1986a, Sinkinson 1995a, Stinnett 1987. 
Loughlin draws attention to the basic failure running through Hick's work as his 
attempt to distinguish theology and experience. It is this central problem that is 
analysed in our present treatment of apologetics. 
4 Hick 1989a 
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Hick is one in defence of the reasonableness of the religious perspective in general 
against naturalism or materialism [3(c)]. 
Having outlined these major contours of Hick's epistemology we shall move to 
identifying the larger movement of which his is a part. The first stage of this will 
involve a consideration of Hick's dualist epistemology [4(a)] and its connections to 
the work of Kant. Two relevant aspects of Kant's work will be brought into 
consideration. Firstly, his epistemology as expressed primarily in The Critique of 
Pure Reason5 [4(b)] and, secondly, his philosophy of religion from Religion Within 
the Limits of Religion Alone6 [4( c)]. Having established this Kantian background we 
will consider the extent to which Hick is indebted to Kant's wider project [4(d)]. It 
might be objected that Hick only utilises Kant's work as illustrative of his own but we 
will seek to demonstrate that Hick's whole pluralist project rests upon a thoroughly 
Kantian epistemology. 
Kant was a founding figure of the Modernist period in western intellectual history 
otherwise known as the Enlightenment. The nature of the Enlightenment will be 
identified [5(a)] and Hick's position located within it. The reason for this description 
of Hick is to provide a basis for an evaluation of the kind of apologetic strategy his 
position commends. We shall outline Hick's reductionist treatment of language [5(b)] 
coupled with his mistaken unravelling of the relationship between experience and 
language [5( c)]. Both of these failings are direct consequences of his Enlightenment 
inheritance. In contrast, a much more positive account of the role of religious 
5 Kant 1993 [1781]. Of the two further critiques, Kant 1978 [1788] and Kant 1973 
[1790]. it it is this one that receives by far the most of Hick's attention. 
6 Kant 1960 [1793] 
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language will be considered [5(d)]. This provides a basis for an alternative apologetic 
to the dominant foundationalist model. 
The final chapter is concerned with developing the alternative apologetic. This 
alternative presents the possibility of Christian apologetics without commitment to the 
foundational role of a tradition-transcending epistemology. At this point a basic 
contrast is drawn between Hick's non-revelatory account of religious knowledge and 
apologetics based on revelation [6(a),(b)]. Various writers have offered forms of 
apologetics consistent with a non-foundational description of religious knowledge. 
Some of these suggestions will be drawn upon to present this alternative [6(c)] and in 
the final section we shall draw together the strengths of such an apologetic and 
address some of the objections that arise with respect to the empirical reality of 
religious pluralism [6(d)]. Christian apologetics presupposes God's revelation in 
Scripture as constitutional of the Christian tradition and for this reason not to be 
subjected to an independent conception of rationality. Therefore, it is the narrative of 
God's self-revelation that must form the basis for the identity of Christianity and the 
basis of apologetics. In the light of this, apologetics are communal in form not reliant 
on particular individuals, such as the philosopher, alone. The conclusion of our thesis 
is that correct apologetics are the public expression by the community of God's people 
of the story God tells in Scripture. 
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Chapter 1 Varieties of Apologetics 
(a) The Necessity of Apologetics 
Meanings 
The English word "apologetics" is derived from the Greek "apologeomai" that means 
to speak in defence. As used in 1 Peter 3: 15 it indicates the practice of making a reply 
to non-believers who question the reason for Christians adhering to the hope of the 
Christian gospel. Apologetics has become a discipline in itself and may be 
distinguished from the ad hoc sense in which apologia is used in the Biblical writings: 
Whereas the word apology denotes a particular defence of the Christian faith, 
apologetics is the working out and presentation of intellectual, scientific and 
philosophical arguments which may underlie such an apology.! 
The discipline of apologetics has held an important place in the history of Christian 
thought. Richardson describes this position as mainstream in Church history: 
Theologians of the highest rank, such as Origen, Augustine and Aquinas, are 
also the Church's leading apologists. A surprisingly large proportion of the first 
book of Calvin's Institutes is devoted to apologetic and proof from reason: the 
young humanist scholar of the Renaissance who became the leader of the 
Reformation never misses an opportunity of pointing out the errors of classical 
humanism.2 
However, as Richardson also points out, apologetics has been the target of direct 
hostility within the Church. Notable rejections of apologetics are to be found in the 
work of Luther and Barth.3 We shall consider a number of possible objections to 
apologetics from more recent philosophy in the remainder of this chapter. The 
I Brown (ed.) 1986 p.51 
2 Richardson 1960 p.22 
3 For a historical survey of the Christian assessment of apologetics see McGrath 1992. 
Dulles 1971 and Ramm 1965. 
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definition of apologetics that we may isolate here is the presentation of Christian faith, 
belief and behaviour in response to rival traditions. Griffiths provides a useful 
statement of what he terms the Necessity of Inter-religious Apologetics (NOlA) 
principle that expresses this apologetic role: 
If representative intellectuals belonging to some specific religious community 
come to judge at a particular time that some or all of their own doctrine-
expressing sentences are incompatible with some alien religious claim(s), 
then they should feel obliged to engage in both positive and negative 
apologetics vis-a-vis these alien religious claim(s) and their promulgators.4 
Griffiths distinguishes here between two forms of apologetic procedure. Positive 
apologetics is the presentation of a Christian truth claim to a non-believer. Negative 
apologetics is a defensive reply to an objection raised by a non-believer. We may 
identify three presuppositions necessary in order to practise apologetics of either form. 
These presuppositions underlie the form of doctrine-expressing sentences that 
Griffiths is concerned with. If these three presuppositions are not sustainable then 
apologetics of this form is not possible. 
Three Presuppositions of Apologetics 
The first presupposition is that it must be possible to identify at least some doctrine-
expressing sentences which are both comprehensible to and considered false by people 
not belonging to the tradition in which they are promoted. 5 Different ideas, beliefs, 
theories and statements of the nature of some shared concern (normally described as 
"reality" or some similar expression) must be in some way contradictory. After 
various cultural, linguistic and contextual factors are taken into account there must 
remain some residue of belief that genuinely represents an opposing point of view. If 
4 Griffiths 1991 p.3. See further 1990b 
5 Griffiths 1991 pp.21-26 
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conflicting truth claims cannot be comprehended then apologetics is unnecessary. 
Christian has provided a detailed discussion of the principle of non-contradiction in 
formulating religious doctrines and their implications for behaviour and practice: 
Two doctrines are opposed if they cannot be accepted jointly without absurdity. 
To accept a doctrine which recommends a course of action is to undertake to do 
what is recommended. So two such doctrines are opposed if no one could under-
take both courses of action without absurdity.6 
Christian argues that the truth value of religious claims are not solely an internal affair 
within the tradition in which they are stated and promoted. He is aware that doctrines, 
creeds and scriptures should not be treated as if their primary intention were to 
contradict rival religious truth claims. Furthermore, he notes that different doctrines or 
visions of life are not necessarily contradictory: 
On the contrary, the main point of the doctrines of a religion is to say something 
positive about the meaning of life ..... the doctrines of a religion themselves are 
generated by a certain vision of life .... Thus oppositions of doctrines are 
derivative and consequential; they are twice removed from those particular 
experiences and activities which are existentially primary in religion.7 
Contradicting rival truth claims is not the primary purpose of articulating religious 
belief. However, this does not imply that conflicting truth claims are of no 
consequence. Oppositions of religious doctrines are a profound reality despite their 
secondary rather than primary status. 8 
6 Christian 1972 p.2 (cf. Christian 1968 and 1993) 
7 Christian 1972 p.15 
8 DiNoia has argued that the very different visions of life offered by various religions 
mean that they are not necessarily in a state of opposition (DiNoia 1990b and 
developed further in DiNoia 1992). He argues that those lifestyles may be very 
different and yet not incompatible with Christian salvation. This possibility is beyond 
the scope of our present considerations but does not affect the fact of conflicting truth 
claims when a religion expresses its doctrinal framework in a conceptual form. 
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The second presupposition required to sustain the possibility of apologetics is that 
there must be doctrine-expressing sentences that have significance which extends 
beyond the bounds of the community in which they are articulated.9 This is implied 
by the first presupposition. To identify examples of conflicting truth claims some 
form of mutual understanding must be possible. The place in which this point of 
contact is to be sought will be the language in which those beliefs are expressed as it is 
in language that apologetics will be conducted. However, not only must linguistic 
elements be shared but also some sense of what constitutes a valid or invalid 
argument. This latter requirement is implicit in the possibility of any overlap in 
language use: 
And since there is an intimate link between the natural language used by a given 
religious community and the argument-forms and belief-forming practices 
used by that community, it is surely not surprising that a good deal of mutual 
comprehensibility obtains between two religious communities that use natural 
languages belonging to the same family. 10 
Where there is less common language shared by alternative communities there will be 
an increased possibility that shared rational principles will not be available. 
Contradiction IS itself a logical principle and, therefore, the ability to identify 
conflicting truth claims demands some shared logical principles in which that 
contradiction may be stated. The practice of apologetics relies upon some sense of 
shared rationality because argument itself, whether positive or negative in form, 
cannot hope to be effective without some common principles to which appeal may be 
made. 
9 Griffiths 1991 pp.27 -31 
10 Griffiths 1991 p.29 
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The third presupposition is the thread which draws the previous two together and 
provides perhaps the most controversial element of apologetics. This is the 
assumption that doctrine-expressing sentences have cognitive content concerning a 
reality that is in some way distinct from those sentences. 1 1 This presupposition 
provides the basis for sentences being declared true or false and capable of providing 
knowledge about reality. Griffiths informs us that the kind of doctrinal statements that 
necessitate apologetics are those where: "the knowledge so produced is of a universal 
kind: it must extend beyond the bounds of the community that produced it."12 
Griffiths is not claiming that all doctrine-expressing sentences must have this 
universal or objective intention. It may be that some have only an intra-systematic 
rule function but the overall impact of doctrine-expressing sentences will be to tell us 
something about the way reality is that applies to all people everywhere. 13 
The Rejection of Apologetics 
Each of these three presuppositions are characteristics of apologetics in interreligious 
dialogue. However, major difficulties have been raised with each of these 
presuppositions. These difficulties, which we shall examine in due course, do not 
seem so significant in traditional apologetic works. This is because much traditional 
apologetics is pursued on the assumption that the field of debate is the interface 
between Christians, atheists, Jews and Muslims. 14 This is an area of broad cultural, 
linguistic and rational overlap. However, in the light of religious pluralism profound 
11 Griffiths 1991 pp.31-36 
12 Griffiths 1991 p.31 
13 Griffiths 1991 p.39-44 
14 For example, Plantinga 1990, Richardson 1960, Van Til 1976 (Here, the debate is 
construed primarily as an internal dialogue between Protestantism and Roman 
Catholicism). See also D'Costa 1992 for a discussion of this as the general plight of 
systematic theology of which we may construe apologetics to be one part. 
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problems are raised for the attempt to maintain these presuppositions. Indeed, a major 
objection to apologetics has been raised by various forms of non-foundationalism. 
This thesis will propose that there is much validity in the non-foundationalist critique 
of apologetics. This will be seen most clearly when we apply the critique to the 
analysis of pluralism offered by Hick. This conclusion calls for a revision rather than a 
rejection of apologetics. 
It is noted at this point that apologetics is being considered as a branch of either 
theology or philosophy. This is simply a result of the empirical fact that something 
purporting to be apologetics has been offered either as a philosophical or as a 
theological proposal. For this reason our consideration of apologetics will demand a 
lengthy discussion of various epistemologies. This is not to determine our conclusion 
as to whether a properly Christian apologetic should construe epistemology as 
foundational. 15 
15 Recent work, generally categorised as postmodern, subverts the necessity of an 
epistemology. Bernstein surveys this work and identifies a coherent strand that argues 
for the need to go beyond the polarisation of objectivism and relativism. In order to 
make this step he argues that it is necessary to usurp the foundational status given to 
philosophy in contemporary thought (Bernstein 1983). These conclusions are now 
compelling a revision of the nature of apologetics (i.e. Kenneson 1995). Feminist 
theology has provided a sustained critique of the status given to conceptual schemes 
and epistemologies. McCarthy reviews the relevant literature in order to sustain her 
claim that the essentially male concern with conceptual thought has created a 
stumbling block for interreligious dialogue (McCarthy 1996). Though this theme is 
not our present concern it is noted that Jantzen describes the postmodern tradition of 
thought as offering a way forward in unmasking hidden assumptions and 
acknowledging the role of gender, tradition and faith in religious knowledge (Jantzen 
1996). 
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(b) The Groundlessness of Belief 
Malcolm's Argument 
Malcolm has provided an important argument for the groundlessness of religious 
belief. l Following Wirtgenstein,2 he notes that a child's knowledge rests upon trust in 
the truthfulness of adults. Trust has a primary place in the child's epistemic apparatus; 
doubt and scepticism develop later. Malcolm suggests that this relationship between 
trust and doubt remains true in the case of adult belief. For example, he argues that 
the belief "material things .... do not cease to exist without some physical explanation" 
is an example of a fundamental belief that we have no option but to trust. 3 It is not a 
belief that we arrive at through the weight of evidence. This belief is held to be true 
in spite of the fact that for everyone some material things do seem to disappear out of 
existence from time to time. We describe this eventuality as mislaying or losing an 
item but, according to Malcolm, there would be no evidence to prevent another 
culture believing that objects really do cease to exist without physical cause: 
If we compare their view that material things do sometimes go out of 
existence, inexplicably, with our own rejection of that view, it does not 
appear to me that one position is supported by better evidence than 
is the other. Each position is compatible with ordinary experience.4 
The belief Malcolm is using as an example is, therefore, not a belief arrived at by 
experiment and open to refutation by experiment. Rather, it is described by Malcolm 
as "an unreflective part of the framework within which physical investigations are 
made."s We shall describe these assumptions as "presuppositions" because they are 
I Malcolm 1977 
2 Particularly Wittgenstein 1958 and 1975. 
3 Malcolm 1977 p.144 
4 Malcolm 1977 p.145 
S Malcolm 1977 p.145 
1 1 
beliefs presupposed in a framework or world VIew. According to Malcolm, the 
process of apologetic debate only occurs within a framework: 
Verification, justification, the search for evidence, occur within a system. 
The framework propositions of the system are not put to the test, not backed 
up by the evidence.6 
This suggests an important set of limitations for apologetics. Malcolm claims that 
rational justification can only occur within the framework created by presuppositions. 
It then follows that the presuppositions would not themselves be open to justification 
or proof because they are the system in which justification and proof is made possible. 
Implications for Apologetics 
If Malcolm is correct then presuppositions cannot be adopted on the grounds that they 
have evidential warrant or are rationally persuasive. This raises the question of how, 
then, one does come to regard certain presuppositions as correct or true: 
We grow into a framework. We don't question it .... We accept 
it trustingly. But this acceptance is not a consequence of reflection. 
We do not decide to accept framework propositions.7 
According to Malcolm, holding a presupposition to be true is not the result of reason 
or will. Rather, it is the passive result from being part of a community. Being a part 
of a community means believing framework presuppositions and this is "pressed upon 
us" by our circumstances, not chosen by our will. 8 
Malcolm objects to the dominant evidentialist epistemology of western culture. The 
basic tenet of evidentialism is that one is only justified in holding a particular belief to 
6 Malcolm 1977 p.146 
7 Malcolm 1977 p.147 
8 Malcolm 1977 p.147 
12 
be true if one does so on the basis of evidence. Malcolm marshals a number of 
examples demonstrating that we do not always believe something because of 
something else. For example, people do not infer that they are in pain from previous 
occasions of being in pain. Evidentialism proposes reasons or rules for behaviour and 
thought. These "intermediaries" connect something we believe or do with something 
that prompts us to believe or behave as we do. Rules of logic or inference, 
deductivism and inductivism, are proposed intermediaries between the two. But, 
Malcolm urges, such an intermediary cannot do the job it is designed for: 
It cannot fill the epistemological gap. It cannot provide the bridge of 
justification. It cannot put to rest the How-do-we-know? question. Why 
not? Because it cannot tell us how it itselfis to be taken, understood.9 
Rules or principles of rationality are neither self-justifying nor self-interpreting. 
Therefore, the process of appealing to another principle in order to perform epistemic 
justification or hermeneutic interpretation leads to an infinite regress. Malcolm 
argues that a point must be reached when the thinker will "have to do something on 
his own, without guidance." 1 0 This is the point of groundlessness where behaviour or 
belief are adopted without grounds. 11 
The implications of Malcolm's argument are that the possibilities for justification 
must be limited to a framework of thought. It is impossible to justify the framework 
9 Malcolm 1977 p.15l 
10 Malcolm 1977 p.15l 
11 Bartley is right to note that in Malcolm's work "Scientific and religious frameworks 
are on a par here" but it is unfair for him to draw the implication that "Malcolm says 
nothing of the critical examination of frameworks, and clearly believes it to be 
impossible" (Bartley 1984 p.l 03 n.53). The point Malcolm is making is not that such 
a critical examination is impossible but that it is not a critical examination that can be 
undertaken by theoretical, philosophical appraisal. Bartley is too confident of the 
range to which philosophy can apply. Malcolm is taking seriously knowledge in its 
sociological, psychological and historical perspective. 
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itself. Religion is, in this sense, groundless - something we grow into rather than 
something we believe on the grounds of something else. Nonetheless, people do 
attempt to offer evidences for Christian belief designed to appeal beyond the Christian 
framework. Malcolm describes this as a kind of prejudice - we mask beliefs that we 
are persuaded of through non-rational sources with an unwarranted universal, rational 
validity. This mask "obscures from us the human aspect of our concepts - the fact 
that what we call 'a reason', 'evidence', 'explanation', 'justification', is what appeals to 
and satisfies us." 12 
Malcolm is proposing the radical thesis that there can be no apologetic between 
frameworks, only within them. Because presuppositions have no grounds, no grounds 
need be appealed to in order to justify them. In responding to Malcolm, Lyas points 
out an important ambiguity in Malcolm's essay. Is Malcolm arguing that religious 
frameworks need not be justified or, the more radical thesis, that such frameworks 
cannot be justified? 13 There is an ambiguity in Malcolm's work but his actual 
argument on this point is clear: presuppositions are not possible subjects for 
justification because they themselves provide the framework in which any 
justification must occur. 
The implications of Malcolm's argument certainly undermine the NOlA principle. If 
justification is not related to evidence of any sort then one may question whether the 
beliefs in question are related to an objective, independent reality of any sort. In other 
words, the realist conception of knowing is at stake. 14 
12 Malcolm 1977 p.154 
13 Lyas 1977 p.l61 
Furthermore, if 
14 However, it does not follow that the non-realist conclusion must follow. Keightley 
seems to think that, following the work of D.Z.Phillips, Wittgenstein's position does 
imply this (Keightley 1976). However, Thiselton notes approvingly that Keightley 
14 
presuppositions are non-realist in status and arrived at through living in a community 
rather than on the basis of grounds then this suggests that framework beliefs are the 
product of culture. These two implications suggest the redundancy of apologetics. 
Not only is it impossible to rationally persuade someone of the truth of a 
presupposition that they do not already hold but, also, such a practice is strictly 
pointless. There is nothing at issue between frameworks other than belonging to 
different communities. 15 Attempts at such persuasion would be the epistemic 
equivalent of persuading someone that their favourite colour was less 'correct' than 
one's own. No one can choose between them, they are constitutive of what we are. 
Such an argument leads to the conclusion that apologetics is both impossible and 
pointless. 16 
This radical conclusion need not follow this argument. We shall now consider 
another theoretical account of the role of a framework and of presuppositions in 
knowledge which does not exclude the possibility of apologetics. 
also recognises that the Wittgensteinian approach "moves back beyond the distinction 
between the wholly 'objective' and the purely 'subjective'." (Thiselton 1980 p.379). 
Malcolm's argument brings the realist conception into doubt but does not necessarily 
leave us with epistemic ignorance or scepticism. 
15 This is why Phillips criticises VanTil for claiming that Christianity must have "a 
religious explanation" of rival moralities (Phillips 1988 p.1 06). Phillips endorses the 
recognition of difference between traditions but denies that any tradition should apply 
its differences as if they were universally valid. 
16 Kung, in a work that offers one of the most substantial traditional apologetics for 
Christianity, seems to share affinities with the Wittgensteinian tradition in his 
treatment of fundamental trust in religious knowledge (Kung 1991 pp.569-583). 
However, he rebukes the neo-Wittgensteinians such as Malcolm for using the 
language games model for religious traditions as a fait accompli. It settles the 
apologetic questions too easily. 
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(c) Paradigm Shifts and Paradigm Truth 
Paradigms 
In the philosophy of science Kuhn has charted the history of scientific research in a 
way that complements the anti-foundationalist thought of Malcolm. 1 Kuhn has argued 
that the development of science cannot be accurately pictured in terms of the gradual 
accumulation of discoveries. Instead, science undergoes revolutions as one picture of 
the world is replaced by another. These revolutions are characterised by Kuhn as 
paradigm shifts. They have become increasingly recognisable features of western 
intellectual history since the seventeenth century: "the successive transition from one 
paradigm to another via revolution is the usual developmental pattern of mature 
science".2 The very process of becoming a scientist involves coming to adopt the 
dominant paradigm of thought as one's own: 
[Scientists] never learn concepts, laws, and theories in the abstract and 
by themselves. Instead, these intellectual tools are from the start encountered 
in a historically and pedagogically prior unit that displays them with and 
through their applications.3 
The rules and laws that scientists use along with their tools are all dependent on the 
prior paradigm from which they are derived. This paradigm involves a network of 
commitments to which the scientist must adhere. Only through a paradigm is anyone 
able to encounter and describe the world. Consequently, even our knowledge of and 
relationship to the world is dependent upon a paradigm: "though the world does not 
1 Reference will be to the second edition of The Structures of Scientific Revolutions 
which includes the postscript (Kuhn 1970a). The challenge of anti-foundationalism 
has been felt across all disciplines in recent years. This broad movement has been 
carefully charted in Bernstein 1983. 
2 Kuhn 1970a p12 
3 Kuhn 1970a p.46 
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change with a change of paradigm, the scientist afterward works in a different 
world. "4 However, in another sense, Kuhn means that the world really does change 
when a paradigm changes because he argues that there is no neutral language in which 
"the world" could be described. This may be demonstrated in Kuhn's description of 
what occurs when a community undergoes a paradigm change. 
Paradigm Choice 
Kuhn underlines the 'total' character of a paradigm change. Aspects of a new 
paradigm are not incorporated into the old: "Like the choice between competing 
political institutions, that between competing paradigms proves to be a choice 
between incompatible modes of community life. ,,5 The incompatibility of paradigms 
is deeply significant. It implies that there can be no logical system, no rules, no 
language, no "reality" and no foundations that provide continuity between paradigms. 
This suggests that apologetics cannot be used with regard to paradigm choice: 
When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice, 
their role is necessarily circular. Each group uses its own paradigm to argue 
in that paradigm's defense.6 
These kinds of arguments are circular because, as we have noted, paradigms are prior 
to rules or laws concerning the justification of belief. Therefore, both the nature of 
rationality and what counts as evidence is determined by the paradigm in which 
arguments are put forward. There is no neutral court of appeal. There is no common 
element in thought or experience to which a practitioner of one paradigm might 
appeal in the paradigm of another: "Practising in different worlds, the two groups of 
scientists see different things when they look from the same point in the same 
4 Kuhn 1970a p.121 
5 Kuhn 1970a p.94 
6 Kuhn 1970a p.94 
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direction. ,,7 According to Kuhn there are no simple rational principles that arbitrate 
between disputants in the great scientific debates. When it is paradigms that are at 
stake a host of non-rational factors must be taken into account. Consequently, Kuhn 
does not see the process of paradigm choice being conducted through simple rational 
argument: 
Just because it is a transition between incommensurables, the transition 
between competing paradigms cannot be made a step at a time, forced 
by logic and neutral experience. Like the gestalt switch, it must occur all 
at once .... or not at all.8 
The process of paradigm choice leading to a change of paradigm is characterised as 
conversion. Such a description is entirely in keeping with Kuhn's general thesis that 
the history of science is a history of revolutions, not of progress. The process of 
transition from one paradigm to another will involve a number of conversions but will 
also depend upon older, more resistant adherents of the previous paradigm dying out. 
Paradigm change involves this act of the will and for those unwilling to change only 
their death will see the end of their paradigm. 
Implications for Apologetics 
It would seem that if Kuhn's description of paradigm shifts is true for the history of 
science, and true for the history of intellectual enquiry as a whole, then the possibility 
of apologetics is undermined. Kuhn's analysis extends a similar central theme to that 
which we have discussed in Malcolm's work. The frameworks in which people 
conduct their rational thought, even the great scientific paradigms, are not themselves 
based on explicit rational foundations. 
7 Kuhn 1970a p.150 
8 Kuhn 1970a p.150 
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Truth and Constructivism 
Trigg has made strident criticism of Kuhn's position and particularly the 
inconsistencies he identifies underlying Kuhn's notion of a paradigmY Trigg's own 
argument is that when one rejects the possibility of "theory-neutral" description the 
result is the danger that "one's grip on reality is completely broken, and there seems 
no way of rationally deciding between theories." 1 0 Trigg argues that this danger is 
ever present in Kuhn's position. He describes the fundamental problem in the 
positions of both Kuhn and Feyerabend as being the fact "that they did not have any 
clear notion of anything external to the system." 11 Trigg charges Kuhn with being a 
constructivist. Kuhn is a constructivist because he fails to distinguish between reality 
as it is in itself and social-scientific constructions of reality. However, Trigg is unable 
to consistently level this charge against Kuhn. This is partly because Kuhn is not 
entirely clear on the ontological significance of paradigm discoveries and partly 
because Trigg misunderstands Kuhn's position. This will be demonstrated with 
reference to Trigg's most extended treatment of Kuhn's work. 12 
Kuhn describes a paradigm as providing the basis for the formulation of rules and 
laws in scientific practice. 13 Because a paradigm precedes rules, adherence to it must 
9 Kuhn's work has, of course, been widely debated in the philosophy of science, a 
good selection of which is assembled in Lakatos and Musgrave 1970. A detailed 
discussion of the development of Kuhn's position is found in Bernstein 1983 pp.51-
108. Ramifications for theology are discussed in Godlove 1989 and Huyssteen 1989. 
10 Trigg 1989 p.61 
11 Trigg 1989 p.98 
12 Trigg 1973 p.99-118. See also Trigg 1983 and Trigg 1989. 
13 Huyssteen notes a development in Kuhn's use of the term paradigm. Primarily a 
paradigm is a problem solving model through which scientists approach nature but, 
more broadly, "it began to include the totality of a researcher's basic commitments and 
metaphysical premises" (Huyssteen 1989 p.50). The term "disciplinary matrix" was 
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be the result of non-rational factors. Hence, the history of science is crucial for our 
understanding of what science actually is. The history of science must be described in 
terms of sociology or psychology rather than the progressive application of universal 
rational standards. For this reason Kuhn's work is described as historicist. 14 This 
implies that the role of commitment and acts of will must precede the application of 
rules in determining the adoption of a paradigm. It is with this distinction between 
commitment and reason that Trigg takes issue. 
Reason and Reality 
Trigg is hostile to Kuhn's position because he understands him to have abandoned the 
possibility that rational standards might arbitrate between rival views: "the question 
whether to adopt the new paradigm is not one which, according to Kuhn, could be 
settled by rational considerations."lS Yet, as Trigg points out, Kuhn's work is littered 
with references to being "on the right track", scientists being "reasonable men" and 
even that there are "many reasons why there can be no criterion" that decides between 
paradigms. 16 These statements suggest that either Trigg is wrong to describe Kuhn's 
notion of paradigm choice as necessarily arbitrary or Kuhn is simply unable to 
consistently maintain such a notion. 
Trigg also highlights the connection that Kuhn severs between theory and reality. In 
effect, Kuhn's account of theory swallows up any notion of reality independent of 
theory. Therefore, truth cannot be at issue when one is choosing between paradigms. 
In fact, to understand a theory is to adhere to a theory - nothing else remains to make 
introduced to distinguish this broader meaning. For my purposes "paradign1" is used 
to denote the broader sense of Kuhn's use. 
14 Huyssteen p.49 
15 Trigg 1973 p.l04 
16 The references here are to Kuhn 1970a p.158 and p.169 respectively. 
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any further claim on our adherence (i.e. the truth of the theory): "Kuhn still hankers 
after the view that to understand a theory fully must be to subscribe to it". 17 To 
understand a concept requires an act of commitment to the paradigm on which that 
concept depends for its meaning and validity. Trigg suggests that the result is that "we 
would be in the Wittgensteinian position of not being able to understand fully (if at 
all) those who disagree with us." 18 
However, Trigg points out that neither of the radical conclusions he attributes to Kuhn 
are consistently maintained in his work. The possibility that reason only operates 
within a paradigm and the possibility that truth is only ever defined by a paradigm 
implies a loss of intercontextual objectivity that Kuhn is unwilling to dispense with in 
practice. Concerning Kuhn's description of scientists as "reasonable men" and those 
who fail to shift position from an old paradigm to a new as "unreasonable" Trigg 
demands: 
Kuhn should make up his mind. Either a change of paradigm is subject to 
reason or it is not. If it is, then it is possible to talk in terms of 'arguments', 
and of scientists being 'reasonable' .... In that case, however, some arguments 
will be better than others .... 19 
Trigg presents the problem in Kuhn's work as a clear dichotomy. Either there are 
paradigm independent criteria of reasonableness or there are not and if the latter is the 
case then one "must completely rule out all talk of reasonableness and of 
17 Trigg 1973 p.1 02 
18 Trigg 1973 p.104. This gives rIse to the problem Kuhn described as 
incommensurability (see Huyssteen 1989 pp.57-60) which is, in effect, the 
impossibility of communication and apologetic encounter between paradigms. Kuhn 
explicitly denies that incommensurability is equivalent to incomparability in Kuhn 
1972 p.195 (cf. Bernstein 1983 pp.82-86). 
19 Trigg 1973 p.1 05 
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arguments. ,,20 Clearly, Kuhn does not rule out such talk and therefore, argues Trigg. 
he is profoundly inconsistent. Trigg claims that to maintain the possibility of 
rationality depends upon the availability of objective, neutral evidence: 
What is at issue is whether it is possible to talk of scientists making a rational 
choice between theories. Unless one can conceive of nature independently 
of any theory and one can see how well or how badly a particular theory fits 
neutral data, such a choice must be logically impossible. ,,21 
Trigg's objections arise from his premiss that to maintain rationality requires that one 
maintain a form of cognitive realism. In Kuhn's work he identifies a radical critique 
of the possibility of realism and, in its place, the offer of a weak form of 
constructivism. If Trigg is accurate in his interpretation then the tradition represented 
by Kuhn and Malcolm has no place for apologetics. If rational argument with the 
intent to persuade is not possible between paradigms then the apologetic enterprise is 
not an option for those who inhabit a paradigm (and all people do inhabit paradigms). 
However, Trigg's objections impose an unhelpful dichotomy upon Kuhn's conclusions 
demanding either neutral standards or loss of objectivity. It is possible to understand 
Kuhn to be pursuing a third option that critiques the notion of neutral standards 
without adopting the non-realist or anti-realist position. It is this third option that 
does present a model for apologetics. 
20 Trigg 1973 p.1 05. Even if Kuhn were to adopt the latter position it is unclear how 
he could possibly make the rule Trigg requires. Trigg's dichotomy offers a choice 
between independent criteria and absolute relativism. Anyone adopting the latter 
option has, by definition, abdicated the right to make the kind of context independent 
rule Trigg demands. 
21 Trigg 1973 pp.1 08-1 09 
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The Sociology of Knowledge 
Kuhn emphasises the human element in all knowledge. A main aim of his work is to 
dismantle the myth of science as a progressive discipline responding by reason alone 
to the bare facts of the natural world. His notion of a paradigm presents an alternative 
picture of the history of science in which its development is revolutionary rather than 
progressive. The reason why this picture is so compelling with regard to the history 
of ideas in general and so pertinent to our treatment of religious apologetics in 
particular is that Kuhn draws our attention to the "total" nature of a paradigm in the 
scientists'life: 
All of this may seem more reasonable if we again remember that neither 
scientists nor laymen learn to see the world piecemeal or item by item. Except 
when all the conceptual and manipulative categories are prepared in advance -
e.g., for the discovery of an additional transuranic element or for catching sight 
of a new house - both scientists and laymen sort out whole areas together from 
the flux of experience.22 
Religious beliefs also exist within much wider epistemic frameworks (religions) in 
which they are given their meaning and their justification. Any religious world view 
shares these fundamental features with any scientific world view. Interestingly, Kuhn 
characterises paradigm shifts as "conversions"?3 When a Ptolemaic astronomer 
abandoned his or her previous paradigm in favour of the Copernican paradigm they 
did not simply drop a few beliefs and adopt some new ones. They underwent a 
conversion to an entirely new way of looking at the universe in which they lived. It 
was a conversion rather than a modification of opinion. Similarly, if a Christian were 
to become a Muslim it would not simply indicate that a few beliefs, however 
important, about the identity of Mohammed or Jesus had changed. Such a conversion 
22 Kuhn 1970a p.128 
23 Kuhn 1970a p.152 
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constitutes a total shift in world view. In Kuhn's tenns this conversion is a paradigm 
shift. Such a shift is nothing less than a change of 'world'. 
To describe conversion in these total tenns suggests to Trigg that the connection 
between belief and reality has been lost. In fact, even in this early work Kuhn 
maintains that it is the world, or nature, with which science deals: 
Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of scientists see different things 
when they look from the same point in the same direction. Again, that is not 
to say that they can see anything they please. Both are looking at the world, 
and what they look at has not changed.24 
Kuhn argues that the words "world" or "reality" lack meaning or relevance outside of 
a paradigm and, thus, it is pointless to state some fonn of the correspondence 
argument such as "the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigm carry 
scientists and those who learn from them closer and closer to the truth. ,,25 The 
problem in such a notion is that "the truth" lacks meaning outside of a paradigm in 
which truth is defined and described: 
There is, I think, no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like 
'really there'; the notion of a match between the ontology of a theory and 
its 'real' counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in principle.26 
Even Kuhn's own work expresses conclusions from within a particular paradigm of 
reality and truth. However, it does not follow that Kuhn would be happy with a 
distinction between "how Kuhn conceives reality" and "what reality is really like". His 
point is that such distinctions are meaningless. One's paradigm-dependent perception 
24 Kuhn 1970a p.150 
25 Kuhn 1970a p.170 
26 Kuhn 1970a p.206 
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of reality is all that one has but there is a further element in Kuhn's work which 
prevents the radical anti-realist conclusion being drawn from this.27 
Anomaly 
This further element is the motivation for scientific discovery and the force behind 
paradigm change. Problem solving is the task of science and recognising problems 
causes scientists to extend their theories. Normal science throws up anomalies that 
must be explained: 
Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the recognition 
that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern 
normal science. It then continues with a more or less extended exploration of the 
area of anomaly. 28 
The possibility of an anomaly requires that there must be an underlying distinction 
between nature and world view. The resolution of an anomaly is not complete until 
"the scientist has learned to see nature in a different way".29 Clearly, problem solving 
depends upon a form of realism in which reality is not determined by theory. Yet, 
though theory cannot determine reality, we cannot speak of reality apart from the 
paradigm in which 'reality' is identified. The existence of anomalies is only possible 
27 Rorty is critical of Kuhn on this point. He suggests that Kuhn had been misled by 
the "Kantian notion that the only substitute for a realistic account of the successful 
mirroring was an idealistic account of the malleability of the mirrored world." (Rorty 
1979 p.325) Rorty takes a step further than Kuhn to dispense with epistemology 
altogether because he considers the concept of realism (and the subjective-objective 
distinction) to be a mistake. He argues that the only meaningful criteria for truth is 
the pragmatic one (cf. Rorty 1991 p.37-41). Rorty's use of Kuhn is a plausible 
secularist extrapolation of his work but not suitable for our own interests in this 
thesis. In what follows we shall emphasise elements of Kuhn's analysis which do 
assume a form of realism. 
28 Kuhn 1970a p.53 
29 Kuhn 1970a p.53 
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if paradigms do relate to an objective order: "Paradigms provide all phenomena 
except anomalies with a theory-determined place in the scientists field of vision. ,,30 
Furthermore, anomalies cannot always be solved from within a paradigm. This 
creates the main impetus toward paradigm shift. An accumulation of crises will lead 
to the abandonment of a paradigm in favour of one that is better able to solve the 
problems. However, even this process is a shift from one paradigm to another, rather 
than a stepping back from paradigms altogether: 
The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to 
accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the 
comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other.31 
It is important to note the abiding commitment to a form of realism underlying Kuhn's 
work. He does not deny that there is a reality, a problem producing reality, to which 
paradigms are related. But the revolution involved in paradigm change is not simply 
one of seeing inadequacies in a theory and creating new, more accurate theories about 
reality. Paradigm shifts occur when a rival paradigm proves better able to respond to 
crises than another. This is an important component of Kuhn's description because it 
draws attention to the necessity of pursuing intellectual enquiry through a paradigm. 
It is not possible to reason or enquire without the framework provided by a paradigm, 
Even in the shift between paradigms there is no neutral mid-way position open for an 
interim period of thought. Paradigm shifts demand the transferral of allegiance from 
one paradigm to another. 
30 Kuhn 1970a p.97 
31 Kuhn 1970a p.77 
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Paradigm Apologetics 
Despite Trigg's objections to Kuhn's account we do see traces of an apologetic 
enterprise at work. Though Kuhn's position, like Malcolm's, rejects the possibility of 
providing foundations for belief that are not themselves dependent on belief, 
nonetheless Kuhn maintains that paradigms must be successful in problem-solving. 
A process of testing is possible in which a paradigm must deal with reality or nature 
that stands over and against the paradigm. 
Malcolm and Kuhn have both raised serious difficulties for the three presuppositions 
of apologetics. Regarding the existence of conflicting truth claims both writers lay a 
stress upon the intellectual context (scientific or religious) of such language use as 
distinct from other possible contexts in which alien languages might share common 
concerns. According to Malcolm, Christian religious discourse must be seen as sui 
generis and, as incommensurable with other language games, unable to be stated in 
the context of another discourse. Conflicting truth claims of the type significant for 
apologetic concern can only occur if Christian discourse can be stated in such wider 
contexts. Kuhn does allow for the possibility of rival scientific discourse but not for 
conflicting "truth" claims as such because, according to his thesis, there is no shared 
"truth" to cause disagreement and give rise to debate.32 The second requirement for 
apologetics was the possibility of communication. Here, Kuhn and Malcolm describe 
difficulty rather than impossibility. According to Kuhn's later response to the critics 
of his major work: "what the participants in a communication breakdown can do is 
recognise each other as members of different language communities and then become 
32 Kuhn 1970a p.206 
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translators. ,,33 Kuhn points to such features as shared everyday vocabularies and this 
clearly demonstrates that he is not propounding some form of the strong 
incommensurability thesis.34 The third presupposition finds the most strident 
rejection of all: the necessity of shared rational principles. Neither Malcolm nor Kuhn 
recognise the existence of common rational principles that are not part of distinct 
traditions of thought. However, from this brief examination we may suggest that the 
absence of common rational principles need not preclude the practice of apologetics. 
This is a contentious point and in the next section this point will be discussed further. 
33 Kuhn 1970a p.202. This resolution of incommensurability is developed in another 
context in MacIntyre 1988 especially pp.370-388. This is discussed in this present 
thesis Chapter 5 (a). 
34 Kuhn accepts the parallel Popper draws between paradigms and languages along 
with the further implication that translation is possible but describes the difficulty of 
translation resulting from the fact that "languages cut up the world in different ways, 
and we have no access to a neutral sub-linguistic means of reporting." (Kuhn 1972 
p.196). See further Masterman 1970 and Popper 1980. 
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(d) Apologetics and Foundationalism 
A basic component of apologetic engagement is some sense in which the claims of 
religious knowledge have universal validity. This component is often justified with 
reference to a realist epistemology. Realism requires that one distinguish between the 
subjective and objective poles of knowledge. As Trigg asserts: 
A fundamental distinction must be drawn between the way the world is 
and what we say about it, even if we all happen to agree .... What is true 
and what we think is true need not coincide. 1 
Conceptual relativists,2 he argues, object to this notion because it suggests that there 
must be certain truths about reality that are valid even for those among whom they are 
not known and not held. Their objection is that there is no such thing as objective 
truth because there is no universally held valid picture of reality. Instead, different 
communities inhabit different realities and therefore truth for one community will not 
be the same as truth for another. 3 The common response to this dilemma is to 
substantiate realism with reference to an objective set of standards for knowledge. 
1 Trigg 1973 p.1 
2 Trigg identifies neo-Wittgensteinian thinkers as conceptual relativists including 
Kuhn, Winch and Phillips. He would probably also include Malcolm. We have 
questioned the accuracy of his treatment of Kuhn. It may also be the case that his 
general treatment of the neo-Wittgensteinian position is inaccurate (though Keightley 
1976 offers an exposition and development of Wittgenstein that would cohere with 
Trigg's treatment of conceptual relativism). My purpose here is to outline conceptual 
relativism as a hypothetical position which would undermine apologetics rather than 
treat the work of any representative thinker in detail. 
3 When relativism is stated in this way it seems to fall foul of a simple objection. The 
conceptual relativist wishes to make an objective claim about the lack of objectivity. 
Hence, Trigg points out "He thus has to accept that sentences which state his thesis are 
apparently inconsistent with it." (Trigg 1973 p.3). 
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Trigg acknowledges that it is difficult to state such all-purpose criteria.4 Howe\'ec 
both relativism and objectivism face important difficulties. Conceptual relativism fails 
to provide a basis for apologetic engagement. This undermines the possibility of 
communication and, therefore, even stating the relativist case becomes profoundly 
difficult. However, for objectivists the problem is one of stating exactly what the 
objective standards of enquiry should be. D'Costa has charged two apologists with 
this failure. 5 He exposes the underlying strategy of Netland and Ward as the attempt 
to "Find neutral, commonly acceptable criteria which could not sensibly be rejected by 
any thinking adherent of any religious tradition. ,,6 Netland outlines ten propositions 
which he offers as criteria for testing the ultimate validity of any religious world view. 
The details of these criteria need not concern us but it is interesting that they amount 
to no more than the three standard philosophical descriptions of truth; truth as 
correspondence, truth as coherence and truth as pragmatic.? IfNetland is successful in 
developing a set of neutral principles then it leads to the establishment of the truth of 
Christianity on foundations that do not themselves depend upon the Christian faith. 
D'Costa remarks that it is odd that N etland, being a Christian, should be so willing to 
prioritise rational principles in the way that he does. Netland claims: "the reason I 
believe that one is justified in accepting the Christian faith as true is because it is the 
only worldview that satisfies the requirements of all the above criteria. ,,8 Two 
4 Trigg 1989 p.199 
5 D'Costa 1993a Cf. Netland 1991 and Ward 1991. Netland, from an evangelical 
Christian perspective, and Ward, from a pluralist perspective. The latter may not 
describe himself as an apologist but it will be assumed in this thesis that all attempts to 
confirm one's own view of Christianity and refute certain rival views is an example of 
apologetics. His earlier work (Ward 1982 and Ward 1984) were clear examples of an 
apologetic against the work of Cupitt. 
6 D'Costa 1993a p.80 
7 Netland 1991 pp.180-195. A similar proposal is found in Yandell 1984 pp.272-285 
to which Netland in indebted. 
8 Netland 1991 p.193 
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objections may be made to this claim. First, there is a distinctively Christian objection 
that this apologetic relativises Christianity itself in favour of a certain logical system. 
Second, there is the more general anti-foundationalist claim that such criteria simply 
do not exist. According to Malcolm the two objections run together. For him such 
criteria cannot exist in principle because Christianity is self-justifying in practice. It is 
the latter objection that we will pursue here. 
The primary problem Netland encounters in attempting to state the relevant criteria is 
his attempt to do so without presupposing the validity of one particular tradition. 
However, on examination of the principles he offers one finds that he cannot help but 
do exactly this. For example, consider the following two proposals for neutral criteria: 
P8: If one or more defining beliefs ofR [religion] are incompatible with widely 
accepted and well-established moral values and principles; or if R includes 
among its essential practices or rites activities which are incompatible with 
basic moral values and practices, then there is good reason for rejecting R as 
false. 
P9: If the defining beliefs ofR entail the denial of the objectivity of basic moral 
values and principles; or if they entail the denial of the objective distinction 
between right and wrong, good and evil, then there is good reason for 
rejecting R as false. 9 
Netland must rely upon the self-evidential status of such terms as "widely accepted", 
"well-established" and "basic" moral values in order to sustain this use of moral 
principles. However, this is extremely dubious in the light of religious pluralism. 
Such propositions leave the question of to whom the particular moral values are "well-
established" or "basic".lO D'Costa charges Netland with privileging "western secular 
9 N etland 1991 pp.l89-190 
10 There is also the theological question of the significance of the fall and corrupted 
human nature in this analysis. This question would be a part of the first objection to 
the whole enterprise of developing neutral principles in support of Christian faith but 
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tastes and sensibilities .... current notions of good taste and decency" .11 However, it is 
more probable that, given the context of his argument, Netland is privileging the 
Christian ethical world view rather than secular western modernity. Nonetheless, in 
order to incorporate the terms "widely held moral belief' and "objective moral order" 
Netland must assume the validity of a particular context (where the relevant moral 
beliefs are "widely held") and, presumably, this would exclude the contexts of 1930's 
Nazi Germany or twelfth century France or, in fact, any place where a Biblical form of 
Christianity has not determined public policy and informed the habits of those who 
live there. 
Ward attempts to describe an Archimedian point for the assessment of religious beliefs 
in terms of "a set of fundamental values which are given by the very nature of human 
being itself'. 12 Having observed common features of humanity Ward seeks to root his 
foundational criteria in common features of what it is to be human. While accepting 
that many "values do differ from culture to culture" he maintains that there is "a deep 
value structure" that draws upon the universality of human nature. 13 The argument, 
consciously analogous to Kant's deduction from value, leads Ward to conclude: 
"Happiness is a basic value".14 Happiness is left underdetermined in order to allow 
for the diverse particular contexts that will invest the term with content. Whatever its 
exact determination Ward describes happiness as a basic goal of human existence. 
Furthermore, in order to gain happiness one must be able to decide what actions or 
beliefs will lead to pleasure and to pain: "[so] rationality must also be taken as a basic 
that objection is not being pursued here. 
11 D'Costa 1993a p.87 
12 Ward 1991 p.179 
13 Ward 1991 pp.180-181 
14 Ward 1991 p.182 
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value".15 Ward does not specify the content of rationality and so avoids the obvious 
charges to be made against Netland. He prefers to describe rationality in general terms 
as a kind of common wisdom or sense. The exercise of this rationality requires the 
capacity to choose and so Ward adds freedom to his list of universal values. 16 
Whereas Netland's criteria suffered over-specification that highlighted an assumed 
framework of belief, Ward's criteria are under-specified and so exclude few possible 
frameworks. This is interesting because Netland uses his over-specified framework to 
justify a Christian exclusivist position while Ward uses his under-specified framework 
to justify a pluralist position. Both positions appear to assume the conclusion of their 
enquiries within their premises. 
Ward restates his position in response to D'Costa by stressing his commitment to 
common principles of rationality. 17 Ward points out that "simple forms of 
reasoning" 18 are necessary to human survival and, therefore, present in all cultures. 
He describes these simple forms as: "self-consistency, coherence with other 
knowledge, and adequacy to available data." 19 These are the same basic three 
principles that may be discerned in Netland's ten propositions. Concerning those 
three principles D'Costa affirms "here Netland genuinely isolates tradition-
transcending principles" .20 However, he also points out the seriously limited function 
of these principles pointing out that they "do not help in the task of evaluation".21 The 
15 Ward 1991 p.183 
16 Ward 1993 p.185 
17 Ward 1994 
18 Ward 1994 p.319 
19 Ward 1994 p.320 
20 D'Costa 1993a p.84 
21 D'Costa 1993a p.84 
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reason for this is that these principles are only ever found in a context of belief and 
behaviour which will significantly modify how those principles will function. Quine, 
in his influential essay, provided good reason to question the a priori status of logical 
laws: "Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough 
changes elsewhere in the system. ,,22 Quine argues against the distinction between 
contingent and analytic truths pointing out that analytic truths have no unique privilege 
in a rational framework. F or any number of reasons normally classed as contingent 
one may suspend or seriously modify an analytic truth including that of non-
contradiction.23 
Ward rejects the idea that "one can stand on neutral ground and choose with objective 
dispassion between all world-views" .24 Instead, he suggest that "ultimate axioms or 
basic principles" must be adopted on grounds other than pure rationality.25 This point 
qualifies the significance of the common principles he had been concerned to 
establish. The principles are now only of formal significance until invested with the 
resources of a particular world view. In distancing himself from the idea of neutral 
enquiry Ward has also undermined his attempt to establish the primacy of basic 
rational principles. 
The central question in this discussion concerns the relationship between reason and 
tradition. Despite the great differences between them in theological position, Ward26 
22 Quine 1972 p.65 
23 Pui -Lan identifies this feature in Asian thought in order to promote an approach to 
dialogue where non-contradiction is not the controlling rule of thought: "The yin-yang 
philosophy in oriental thinking understands that 'A' and 'negation A' are correlated, 
interdependent, and interpenetrating." (Pui-Lan 1994 p.69). 
24 Ward 1994 p.322 
25 Ward 1994 p.323 
26 It is possible that Ward 1994 represents a further shift III position but the 
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and Netland are both committed to some form of foundationalism. They seek to 
justify either a particular tradition (Netland) or the tradition that privileges no tradition 
(Ward) with principles of reason that transcend those traditions. This permits an 
apologetic procedure in keeping with the conditions outlined by Griffiths. However, a 
growing number of objections to foundationalist apologetics have begun to make this 
procedure untenable. Kuhn and Malcolm have raised the kind of objections which 
have led to a wider abandonment of foundationalism. Ward and Netland reject this 
abandonment on the grounds that it entails a loss of objectivity and an incoherent 
endorsement of relativism.27 Relativism is easily defeated as self-refuting for it 
cannot be an objective truth that no truth is objective or a relative truth that no truth is 
absolute. If relativism is incoherent then, claim Ward and Netland, tradition-
transcending rational principles are the only viable alternative. However, the cultural 
movement of non-foundationalism of which Kuhn and Malcolm are a part is a 
deliberate attempt to move beyond the polarity of either objectivity or relativity. 
Bernstein has charted this wider cultural movement with great clarity and his account 
will provide a basis to consider alternative models of apologetics.28 
Beyond Objectivism and Relativism 
Bernstein defines two opposing positions that have haunted discussions of 
foundationalism in western epistemology ever since the groundbreaking work of 
Descartes.29 These two positions are objectivism and relativism. The former is 
descri bed as: 
qualifications he makes here still do not entirely dispense with a basic foundationalist 
epistemology. 
27 N etland 1991 pp.l66-180 and Ward 1991 pp.l78-181. 
28 Bernstein 1983 
29 Descartes 1987. The legacy Descartes left to western intellectual thought is 
described as the "Cartesian Anxiety" (Bernstein 1983 p.16) which is in essence an 
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the basic conviction that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix 
or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of 
rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness or rightness.30 
The work of the philosopher according to this position is to establish this matrix so 
that moral or rational disputes may be settled without appeal to subjective factors. A 
great incentive to adopt this ambition was the success of the natural sciences from 
around the time of Descartes and on into the twentieth century. Given the success of 
the physical sciences to manipulate nature and settle disputes it was natural that 
philosophers should seek to develop an epistemology that did not rely on tradition, 
revelation or other cultural factors. Despite marked differences among its 
contributors, the dominant philosophical project from this time forward was the 
development of a theory of knowledge with the status of scientific objectivity.31 The 
only alternative to such a scientific epistemology seemed to be a collapse into 
relativism. Bernstein describes the rival view of the relativist: 
his or her essential claim is that there can be no higher appeal than to a given 
conceptual scheme, language game, set of social practices, or historical epoch. 
There is a nonreducible plurality of such schemes, paradigms, and practices; 
there is no substantive overarching framework in which radically different and 
alternative schemes are commensurable - no universal standards that somehow 
stand outside of and above these competing alternatives.32 
anxiety over how to establish secure foundations for true knowledge. 
30 Bernstein 1983 p.8 
31 Bernstein 1983 pp.45-47. This led to the distinction between fact and value which 
mirrors the objective-subjective distinction. Newbigin has critiqued this false 
distinction in western culture from a religious perspective. See particularly Newbigin 
1989 and 1995 pp.29-44. 
32 Bernstein 1983 pp.11-12 
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Bernstein distinguishes the intellectual movement of relativism from subjectivism. It 
is subjectivism that easily falls foul of the incoherence objection. If all truth were 
merely the expression of subjective feeling or opinion then clearly truth could not be 
appealed to as objective fact. However, relativism is a theory about all reflection and 
the objection that it is self-relativising is of no consequence.33 Therefore, two 
intellectual options seem to confront us; either objectivism or relativism. 
Bernstein identifies a growing consensus which acknowledges that this discussion of 
epistemology has been shaped by a false dichotomy. There is even a growing 
consensus regarding where the resources to solve this problem may be found. 
Bernstein finds an example of this dichotomy in the work of Rorty: 
Lurking in the background here is a false dichotomy: either permanent standards 
of rationality (objectivism) or arbitrary acceptance of one set of standards or 
practices over against its rival (relativism). 34 
In contrast to this polarisation Bernstein points to the growing number of thinkers who 
are critics of both these positions. Indeed, Bernstein follows Gadamer in pointing out 
that the two positions are related. Relativism is "itself parasitic upon objectivism. ,,35 
The reason for this is that both positions rely upon a common assumption that truth 
must either be founded on neutral principles or chosen as a result of personal 
prejudice. They both continue the project of solving the "Cartesian Anxiety" either by 
constructing objective foundations or by embracing relativism.36 
33 Bernstein refers to Gadamer's response to the internal incoherence objection on this 
point. Gadamer demonstrates that it is not the relativists case that is fatally wounded 
by this kind of argument but "the claim to truth of all formal argument that is 
affected." (Bernstein 1983 p.234 n.18) 
34 Bernstein 1983 p.68 
35 Bernstein 1983 p.37 
36 Bernstein 1983 p.23 
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The resources to overcome the false dichotomy are primarily to be found in the work 
of a number of continental scholars. Bernstein identifies a tradition of hermeneutics 
which has considered more carefully the role of the linguistic paradigm in which a 
community of thinkers conduct their rational enterprise.37 In the work of Kuhn, 
Bernstein draws attention to the recovery of hermeneutics in the history of science. 
The implications of this recovery has been to bring into question "the sharp dichotomy 
that has been made between observation and theory" along with "the insistence on the 
underdetermination of theory by fact" and "the exploration of the ways in which all 
description and observation are theory-impregnated.,,38 Kuhn is not commending the 
relativist position but he is undermining the illusory quest to replace the paradigmatic 
nature of rationality with neutral principles. That paradigmatic sense of rationality is 
not a capitulation to relativism but a matter of taking seriously the organic relationship 
between a community of enquirers, their beliefs, their methods and their world. 
The shift from a model of rationality that searches for determinate rules which 
can serve as necessary and sufficient conditions, to a model of practical 
rationality that emphasizes the role of exemplars and judgmental interpretation, 
is not only characteristic of theory-choice but is a leitmotif that pervades all 
of Kuhn's thinking about science.39 
It is the context of rational thought that provides the range of examples and models to 
guide the application of rational principles to specific situations or possible beliefs. 
37 This tradition includes Kuhn, Feyerabend, Gadamer, Habermas but also includes 
such critics of Kuhn as Popper. Each, in their own way, draws attention to the 
contextual place of rational thought even though their differences have sometimes 
obscured the basic consensus (Bernstein 1983 p.60). 
38 Bernstein 1983 p.31 
39 Bernstein 1983 p.57 
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Even the threefold criteria for truth (correspondence, coherence and the pragmatic) 
require exemplars to model how they should be applied in practice. 
In drawing together the themes of postempiricist thought Bernstein opens up the 
options for engagement with pluralism beyond the simple objectivism or relativism 
marking much Anglo-American thought. It is in this direction that the possibilities for 
a non-foundational Christian apologetic emerge.40 Before we consider various 
options for Christian apologetics after objectivism and relativism we will develop our 
analysis of foundationalist Christian apologetics. In order to do this we shall assess 
the work of Hick as a representative foundationalist apologist. He is an interesting 
choice because In certain respects Hick would distance himself from 
foundationalism.41 However, his foundationalism is apparent in the development of 
his epistemology. His apologetic strategy has evolved in keeping with marked 
changes in his theological position but in essence it has always depended upon a 
tradition-transcending account of the rationality of a religious outlook in contrast to 
naturalism. This analysis will enable us to locate the historic source of this form of 
foundationalism and then critique it in the light of postempiricist thought. 
40 Such apologetic strategies have been in circulation for some time i.e. Van Til 1976 
and Wolterstorff 1976 (Though see Phillips 1988 pp.94-113 for an alternative 
interpretation of these thinkers). An example of a specific attempt to go even further 
in appropriating the insights of the tradition identified by Bernstein to evangelical 
apologetics is found in Kenneson 1995. 
41 He would distance himself from foundationalism, arguing that his position shares 
much with Plantinga's non-foundationalism (Hick 1989a p.229 n.2). He would also 
distance himself from apologetics, arguing that our engagement with other religions 
should be one of dialogue rather than debate (Hick 1989a pp.3 78-3 79). This present 
thesis argues that these differences are semantic not substantial. 
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Chapter 2 An Account of Hick's Epistemology 
(aJ Against Propositionalism: Faith as Interpretation 
We shall now consider Hick's position regarding the relationship between faith and 
reason. It will be noted that Hick offers his work as an apologetic for religion against 
atheistic naturalism. In order to argue this it will be necessary to engage extensively 
with his epistemology. This is stated in most detail in his earliest book,l written prior 
to his adoption of a pluralist position regarding other religions.2 We shall see in the 
latter part of this chapter that Hick's epistemology remains substantially unchanged in 
his later work. In fact, his epistemology is the only stable element in his entire project 
and thus, if his work is faulted at this point, Hick's pluralism must be fatally flawed. 
Catholic Propositionalism 
Hick begins his extended treatment of faith by describing what he considers to be the 
mistaken Thomist-Catholic 'propositional' account of faith. With reference to 
Aquinas, Hick describes this position as claiming that belief is not directly related to 
God but "propositions".3 Hick identifies propositions as verbal statements about God 
such as those found in the creeds. If salvation is related to belief then it "is necessary 
for salvation to believe explicitly such central articles as the Incarnation and the 
Trinity"4 insofar as one is able to understand their cognitive content. The difference 
between faith and knowledge concerns the degree to which evidence supports the 
object of belief. Knowledge is self-evident while faith is not. However, it does not 
1 See Hick 1957. The problem of continuity in Hick's work will be treated extensively 
in Chapter 2 (d). See further D'Costa 1984. 
2 Early statements of this position are found in Hick 1972 and Hick 197.+b. 
3 Hick 1988a p.12 
4 Hick 1988a p.13 
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follow that faith is any less certain than knowledge. In fact, faith is itself a subjective 
act of certainty, it "involves an act of commitment which sets aside the uncertainty 
that would otherwise be present. ,,5 This certainty is grounded not in logical 
indubitability but in a subjective act of personal response. 
Hick points out that this account of faith does not demand an irrational leap in 
thinking. The act of faith is itself based on prior knowledge such as the existence of 
God (understood to be proven in the Scholastic tradition) or the reliability of the 
Bible and this knowledge provides reason for faith.6 Hick describes Locke's account 
as another expression of the Scholastic concern with the preambles to faith; "reason 
must establish that a particular proposition has in fact come from God before our faith 
can have anything to exercise itself upon. ,,7 Therefore, faith is based upon reason but 
not compelled by evidence. Hick illustrates this aspect of faith through Aquinas' 
discussion of demons who have faith in God's existence but who have no credit in 
their form of faith. Demons are compelled to believe by their intellect. 8 Faith is only 
a virtue when it is uncompelled. 
The Thomist-Catholic model of faith balances the private reasoning of individuals 
with the self-authenticating authority of the Church. Hick uses Newman's metaphor: 
"the lamp of private judgment may be required to enable us to find our way; but once 
5 Hick 1988a p.15 
6 Hick 1988a p.16 writes of this as the "Catholic" position but is not clear as to 
whether he considers it an appropriate reading of Aquinas. There are grounds to 
doubt that Hick's description of the Scholastic tradition is an accurate exposition of 
Aquinas. Wolterstorff "The Migration of the Theistic Arguments: From Natural 
Theology to Evidentialist Apologetics" in Audi and Wainwright 1986 draws a helpful 
contrast between Locke and Aquinas. See also Velecky 1994 for an alternative 
interpretation of the Thomistic "proofs". 
7 Hick 1988a p.18 
8 Hick 1988a p.19 
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we have reached home we no longer have need of it. ,,9 This simile highlights the 
resting place for the cognitive certainty of faith. It does not rest with a given reason 
or logical argument, but rather with the self-authenticating nature of the Church. 
Reasons are inevitably tentative pronouncements, open in principle to some form of 
falsification at a later date. However, if reasons are only the ladder or lamp by which 
the real secure platform is reached, the authority of the Church, then if the ladder or 
lamp are later found broken or faulty it will no longer matter. The certainty of faith 
will be grounded elsewhere. 
Hick summarises this account of faith in terms of three components. 10 Firstly, the 
account is "intellectualist" as it identifies faith with trust in the truth of propositions. 
Secondly, faith is "fideistic" being grounded in a self-authenticating source. Thirdly, 
faith is "voluntaristic" being an uncompelled act of the will. 
Revelation as Divine Communication 
This view of faith entails a particular concept of revelation. Faith and revelation 
correlate to one another as the human response to the divine disclosure. Hick 
describes the Thomist-Catholic view of revelation as the divine communication of 
verbally expressed truths to human beings. Hick describes the content of this 
communication as the knowledge necessary for salvation through Israel and in Christ: 
The Bible finds its place within this scheme of thought as the book in which 
the saving truths are written down and made available, under the Church's 
guardianship, to all mankind. 11 
9 Hick 1988a p.22 
10 Hick 1988a p.23 
II Hick 1988a p.25 
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According to Hick, this conception of revelation also requires belief in the verbal 
Inerrancy of the Bible. Whether one is discussing natural theology or revealed 
theology, Hick contends that this position "restricts the entire discussion to 
propositional truths." 12 This, then, is an intellectualist view of faith and reason as 
assent to verbal truths communicated by God. Interestingly, as Hick points out, even 
the post-Enlightenment critics of Christianity have tended to proceed upon the same 
intellectualist foundations. 13 They also believe that all knowledge must relate to 
propositions but, in contrast, they reject the idea that one is within one's epistemic 
rights to believe a proposition to be true without sufficient evidence. Hence, 
according to Hick's account, both Aquinas and Huxley are 'foundationalists'. 
Hick does not expressly state, at least in his early work, his exact objections to the 
Thomist-Catholic view he outlines. Rather than providing clear critical objections he 
notes that "the notion of divinely revealed propositions has virtually disappeared from 
Protestant theology." 14 Hick assumes, at this stage, that this position is untenable and 
continues in his attempt to produce an alternative conception of faith. Our purpose 
here is to note the position with which Hick takes issue as the background to his own 
alternative suggestion. Whatever the accuracy of Hick's exposition, the model he has 
described does capture the essential components of the foundationalist apologetic 
model. Given this model of the relationship between faith and reason it is reasonable 
to maintain that the objects of faith, though inherently groundless, may be accepted on 
the basis of reasonable evidence grounded in the normal rules of rationality and 
language use. 
12 Hick 1988a p.36 
13 Hick notes Huxley, Kaufmann and Robinson (l988a p.27) and one may add the 
various essays of Russell, Flew and Gale. 
14 Hick 1988a p.30. 
43 
Faith as Interpretation 
We have already noted that faith is a correlate to revelation. Hick maintains a 
conception of revelation not as divinely spoken truths (the heart of the Propositional 
model) but as divine presence. 15 Consequently, faith, as correlate, is "man's 
awareness of God." 16 Hick understands faith to be another form of perceptual 
expenence: 
We become conscious of the existence of other objects in the universe, whether 
things or persons, either by experiencing them for ourselves or by inferring their 
existence from evidences within our experience. 17 
The cognitive awareness of God is an example of experiencing something for 
ourselves directly rather than inferring its existence from evidence. Hick is concerned 
to show that faith is not an entirely unique form of knowledge but is related to all our 
forms of knowing. We are aware of the divine reality "not apart from the course of 
mundane life, but in it and through it." 18 This is because the divine presence is 
mediated through awareness of the world rather than it directly impinging on our 
senses. This relationship of knower to the world underlies the basic structure of all 
knowledge rather than being a unique element in religious knowledge. Hick argues 
that "while the object of religious knowledge is unique, its basic epistemological 
pattern is that of all our knowing."19 To understand Hick's model of faith we must 
first examine his general conception of knowledge in some detail. 
15 In Chapter 6 (a) we shall note the absence of any concept of revelation in Hick's 
later work. 
16 Hick 1988a p.95 
17 Hick 1988a p.95 
18 Hick 1988a p.96 
19 Hick 1988a p.97 
A General Account of Epistemology 
Human experience must be understood in terms of two factors. The first of these is 
""fi "20 b h" h H' k signi Icance y w IC IC means the form that the natural world takes when we 
encounter it. The second is that of "interpretation,,21 through which we relate 
ourselves in an appropriate manner to the significance before us. The world always 
presents itself as significant, in other words it takes a particular form. The only 
alternative to this sense of significance, is that we should experience the world as "a 
mere empty void or churning chaos".22 Significance is a basic feature of human 
experience without which knowledge would be impossible. Even at this early stage in 
his work, Hick acknowledged his sympathy with a Kantian form of epistemology:23 
In its most general form at least, we must accept the Kantian thesis that we 
can be aware only of that which enters into a certain framework of basic relations 
which is correlated with the structure of our own consciousness.24 
The significance of the world is not an optional extra that we might impose upon the 
universe as and when we felt it necessary so to do. Nor is the significance of the 
world inherent in the world regardless of the role, character and dispositions of the 
observers. Consciousness is structured in such a way that to experience the world is 
to experience form rather than chaos. The basic assumption of the knowing subject is 
the assumption that the universe is intelligible. The objects that we encounter in the 
world are only "objects" because the mind orders its information in a particular way 
and, through a network of relationships, isolates particular objects such as 'hats' and 
20 Hick 1988a p.96 
21 Hick 1988a p.97 
22 Hick 1988a p.98 
23 This connection will be developed in detail in Chapter 4. 
24 Hick 1988a p.98 
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'lamp-posts' from their surroundings. If the universe had no form then the notion of a 
subject-object relationship and an intelligible universe would make no sense at all. 
Oliver Sacks, in his collection of accounts of psychological disorders, describes a man 
who mistook his wife for his hat.25 In this example, the relationship between a man 
and his hat (and his wife) has become distorted. However, it does not follow that the 
world has lost all intelligibility, form and significance for him. Rather, the 
significance of the world has changed and the man is operating with a different 
conception of the intelligibility of the universe than that of his wife, doctor and most 
other human beings. However outlandish an ordering of the universe may become 
Hick maintains that it must be ordered. Ordering experience is the basic function of 
the mind and the basic assumption of all knowledge. 
Hick describes 'interpretation' as the subjective correlative of significance.26 By 
classifying interpretation as the subjective pole of knowledge, 'significance' must 
therefore be the objective pole. This means that objectivity is no more than the 
objective order of the world as we know it. Objectivity cannot be identified apart 
from its 'significance' for us. In a formal sense, both significance and interpretation 
are subjective components of our knowledge, though the former seems to have its 
source outside of our own imaginings. The implication of this point is that while 
Hick describes his epistemology in terms of the subject/object distinction, 
nonetheless, both subjectivity and objectivity exist only in relation to the knowing 
subject.27 
25 Sacks I 986 
26 Hick 1988a p.IOI 
27 Because objectivity is subsumed by subjectivity, the foundations are laid for the 
increasingly radical distinction made between the noumenal and phenomenal orders 
of reality that we shall trace through Hick's work. We note here that in its earliest 
philosophical expression Hick's epistemology already cut asunder the tie between 
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The Significance of Reality 
Hick distinguishes two forms of interpretation. Firstly, there is interpretation as 
"explanation,,28 where an attempt is made to address why something is or is not the 
case. Secondly, interpretation is "recognition"29 which implies a much more 
immediate epistemic act of recognising something when it is presented to our senses. 
The second sense relies upon the former as the context in which recognition occurs. 
Examples of explanation might include metaphysical and scientific theories of why 
the universe exists, its purpose, origins and telos. Recognition includes interpretation 
of things or animals such as houses, buses and dogs. Interpretation as recognition 
underlies all human knowledge and it is this sense of interpretation that Hick adopts 
as the key to understanding all human knowing including religious knowledge. 
The human subject interprets objects as having significance at different levels. Hick 
gives the example of a book that may be interpreted at a simple material level as a 
rectangular red object. At a more complex level, a language user may interpret it as 
"the expression of specific thoughts. ,,30 The more complex levels of interpretation 
presuppose the simple levels. This pattern of interpretation may be expressed 
diagrammatically as a simple epistemological staircase. 
knowledge and reality. 
28 Hick 1988a p.IOI 
29 Hick 1988a p.l 02 
30 Hick 1988a p.103. Hick may be confusing two objects of interpretation here: the 
significance of a book's format (red rectangle) and the significance of a book's content 
(expression of thoughts). It is not clear that the two acts of interpretation are related at 
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Figure 1 represents the way in which levels of interpretation build upon one another 
presupposing previous, less complex, interpretations of reality. Highly complex 
levels of interpretation recognise significance that is "superimposed upon,,31 and 
interpenetrate with more basic interpretations of significance. This pattern of 
development will be shown to form the basic structure of Hick's epistemology. 
Figure 1 Complexity of Interpretation 
All objects appear within situational significance. The example of the book clearly 
represents this: no one could make the highly complex interpretations of a book 
without a knowledge of the cultural and linguistic situation in which the book is 
found. Whenever an interpretation is made an entire web of related interpretations are 
also at work concerning the relationships between objects and between objects and 
people. However, Hick's point is that the interpretation/significance pattern of 
knowledge is true for all acts of knowing, whether we are concerned with a simple act 
of finding the vacuum cleaner or a complex act of interpreting Old English literature. 
Our focal awareness is only ever directed toward a particular situation selected from 
the web of situations in which we exist. While we are aware of a game of chess we 
31 Hick 1988ap.l03 
48 
are playing we may not be aware of the music playing in the background, the rain 
falling outside or even the wood out of which the chess pieces are made. The 
situation which has significance for us will change in terms of changing 
circumstances. Hick describes the epistemic impact of our friend talking to us or a 
fire breaking out in the building while we are playing chess. Either of these events 
would cause our focal awareness to change.32 
Hick describes situational awareness as threefold; "nature, man and God".33 The first 
level is the natural or physical environment in which we must survive and to which 
we must relate ourselves. The second level concerns human and social relationships 
in which we find moral significance. Finally, the divine level encompasses both 
previous levels and is "the ultimately fateful".34 The divine level is the object of our 
ultimate concern. Expressed diagrammatically, we may see how this relates to the 
basic-complex development previously considered. 
The Natural Realm 
Figure 2 Realms of Interpretation 
32 Hick 1988a p.l 06 
33 Hick 1988a p. 107 
34 Hick 1988a p.l 07 
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In figure 2 we see how each situation interpenetrates the previous one. Consequently, 
they are not distinct levels of interpretation. There is no other way, in this 
epistemology, but to climb the stair of knowledge from the natural realm, through the 
human realm and, through both of these realms, to the divine. 
Each realm of significance requIres two forms of human response in order for 
recognition to occur: interpretation and relation. Interpretation is normally "an 
unconscious and habitual process" by which we order the objects of perception.35 
The basic interpretation of the world which we inhabit as being 'there' is "unevidenced 
and unevidencable"36 because this basic act of interpretation itself provides the 
foundational level of interpretation. All knowledge involves interpretation, even the 
basic, unevidenced, act of interpreting the universe as a common world inhabited by 
independent minds. The second form of human response concerns the act of relating 
our lives to the interpretation that we adopt. Lives are ordered properly when they are 
related to the world as we interpret it in an appropriate way. 
The first order of interpretation involves appropriately relating ourselves to the natural 
significance of the world. The solipsist will be related in an appropriate way to the 
world by treating relationships with other people "not as transsubjective meetings 
with other personalities, but as dialogues and dramas with oneself. ,,37 At the level of 
natural significance, there is little scope for varied interpretations. People may 
interpret physical objects or situations as they wish but the appropriateness of those 
interpretations will be tested as those people live in relationship to the objects or 
situations in question. Returning to our example from Sacks, the man who interprets 
35 Hick 1988a p.l 08 
36 Hick 1988a p.l 09 
37 Hick 1988a p.ll 0 
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his wife as a hat fails to live successfully in relation both to his spouse and to his 
garments. The structure of the world does not permit great variety in interpretation. 
If one interprets the rain outside as sunshine and leaves the building without 
protection then one gets wet. 
Hick divides the levels of interpretation into three with natural significance at the 
basic level. We shall incorporate his divisions into the stair diagram and it will be 
clear that each step corresponds with the equivalent step found in figures 1 and 2. 
Natura! Signrfica 
Figure 3 Levels of Significance 
Human beings share with the animal world the need to interpret and relate to the 
natural significance of the world. In figure 3 we see that the second step is that of 
"moral significance" and this is the form that interpretation takes in the human realm 
of the second step in figure 2; "It is characteristic of mankind to live not only in terms 
of the natural significance of his world but also in the dimension of personality and 
responsibility. ,,38 Moral obligation is the character of human experience as we move 
on from the basic interpretation of the world in terms of natural significance to the 
38 Hick 1988a p.111 
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interpretation of human relationships and personal situations. This moral 
interpretation occurs when one feels an ethical obligation to act in a particular way in 
some situation. Hick describes this act of interpretation as "supervening" upon the 
prior act of interpreting the world as of natural significance.39 He then provides an 
example of how this development of interpretation might occur: 
A traveler on an unfrequented road .... comes upon a stranger who has met with 
an accident and who is lying injured and in need of help. At the level of natural 
significance this is just an empirical state of affairs .... But an act .... of interpre-
tation at the moral level reveals to the traveler a situation in which he is under 
obligation to render aid.40 
Such ethical situations are in the "human realm" of knowledge because they involve 
more than the subject-object relationship typical of natural significance. Hence, 
moral obligations arise when we recognise an ethical dimension in our responsibilities 
toward other people. Presumably, on Hick's thesis, if one feels ethical obligations 
toward animals then this is either because the well being of some or all people are at 
stake in the mistreatment of animals or because one has personified animals.41 
Ethical obligation toward the inanimate environment might also be explained by 
either of these motives. However, in a world of impersonal matter inhabited by a 
single human being, ethical significance would never arise and, with it, the need to 
climb the second step in this epistemic hierarchy of knowledge. 
39 Hick 1988a p.lll 
40 Hick 1988a p.lll 
41 And there may be good grounds for such a personification in which case the 
human-animal encounters would also be in the realm of moral, situational 
significance. However, Hick is not concerned with moral obligation outside the 
sphere of human relationships and so we need not deal with this issue here. 
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Hick describes the relationship between the natural and ethical spheres of significance 
as interpenetrating one another.42 The latter is more complex than the former but it is 
only made possible on the basis of the former; "ethical significance is mediated to us 
in and through the natural world. ,,43 While interpretation is necessary in order to 
relate oneself to either level of interpretation, Hick describes the ethical level as "a 
more truly voluntary one. ,,44 The reason for this is that reality permits greater variety 
in the possible human responses to the moral order. In the case of natural significance 
there are strict limitations on possible interpretations. In the case of situations 
demanding moral obligation we may choose to act in a variety of ways and it may be 
hard to assess which of two different actions is the more moral. This moral relativity 
gives rise to the need for the existence of prisons and long term moral debates where a 
plurality of views regarding what constitutes moral behaviour are obviously at issue. 
The Foundations of Religious Knowledge 
The third step or level of interpretation brings us to the question of the foundations for 
religious belief and the scope they allow for apologetic encounter. This is the level of 
religious significance; "As ethical significance interpenetrates natural significance, so 
religious significance interpenetrates both ethical and natural. ,,45 Just as ethical 
significance cannot exist without natural significance, so religious significance cannot 
exist without both previous levels. This is why the stair diagram is so appropriate in 
codifying Hick's position. Each step in the staircase rests on those previous to it and, 
while being a level in itself, cannot exist without the foundations provided by 
previous steps. So religious significance, while it may be considered as a level in 
42 Hick 1988a p.112 
43 Hick 1988a p.112 
44 Hick 1988a p.112 
45 Hick 1988a p.113 
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itself, may only be understood as mediated through the levels of natural and moral 
significance. Because each step interpenetrates those previous to it, Hick must 
declare the third step a "total interpretation".46 It is the highest step that we may 
reach and, on this step the act of interpretation recognises the world as having divine 
significance. At this stage in his thought Hick was working with an explicitly 
Christian position that we shall see heavily qualified a little later47 and so in this early 
expression of this thought he describes religious significance in theistic terms: 
His interpretative leap carries him into a world which exists through the 
will of a holy, righteous, and loving Being who is the creator and sustainer 
of all that is.48 
Hick's use of the term "leap" in this context is of no small significance. Each sphere 
or step of interpretation requires a step of some sort. The initial presupposition on 
which each level of interpretation rests is unevidenced. No evidence can be deduced 
to decide the issue is some final way between the solipsist and objective realist,49 
between those who act on moral obligations and the "moral solipsist", 50 or between 
the naturalist and the religious person. 51 Climbing the epistemological staircase 
requires initial acts of increasingly uncompelled interpretation to begin each new 
stage. The act of ethical interpretation was more voluntary than the natural. The act 
of religious interpretation is entirely uncompelled. Religious belief rests upon an 
awareness of divine reality mediated through the natural and ethical spheres of human 
46 Hick 1988a p.113 and the main theme of part 3 p.149ff 
47 See Chapter 2 (c) 
48 Hick 1988a p.115 
49 Hick 1988a p.ll 0 
50 Hick 1988a p.113 
51 Hick 1988a p.l15 
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knowledge but, according to Hick, this awareness results from an uncompelled human 
act rather than a compelling divine revelation. 
Religious faith is the act of interpretation at this final level. It is the uncompelled or 
free act of human response to an awareness, mediated through nature and conscience, 
of there being a good God.52 Hick ramifies his account of the uncompelled nature of 
faith by providing certain theological reasons for this being the case. In essence, it is 
the personal character of humanity and God and the relational character of faith that 
demands faith be uncompelled in nature: 
If man is to be personal, God must be deus absconditus. He must, so to 
speak, stand back, hiding himself behind his creation, and leaving us the 
freedom to recognise or fail to recognise his dealings with us.53 
Hick claims that the only alternative is a God who would manipulate human beings 
and coerce them into faith. The natural world does coerce responses by preventing 
certain dangerous interpretations from being made but God, unlike the natural order, 
"desires, not a compelled obedience, but our uncoerced growth towards the humanity 
revealed in Christ. ,,54 The ambiguity of religious significance in the world is the 
necessary condition for a truly personal relationship between humanity and God. We 
may locate the orders of compulsion and interpretation in a further staircase diagram. 
52 In later writings Hick substantially modifies the locus of religious awareness to 
accommodate his pluralist thesis. This move is considered in detail during Chapter 2 
(c). At this point we remain concerned with the early form of his epistemology. 
53 Hick 1988a p.135 
5.t Hick 1988a p.135 
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Natural World: 
Figure 4 Freedom and Interpretation 
Figure 4 describes the position of religious knowledge in Hick's epistemology. 
Religious knowledge is not primary, in the sense of preceding or even predetermining 
other areas of knowledge, but tertiary, depending as it does on the more basic levels 
of natural and moral knowing. Furthermore, religious knowledge is the ultimate 
expression of voluntaristic knowing. A free act of will is required in order to enter 
the religious dimension of knowledge. There may be atheists who agree with theists 
in most of the components in steps one and two but disagree as to the possibility of 
there existing a supreme creator being. The strength of this epistemic scheme for 
apologetic encounter seems great. However, as we continue to outline the underlying 
structure of Hick's epistemology it will become clear that this scheme demands a 
serious revision of Christian doctrine and, therefore, a profoundly truncated role for 
apologetics. In the next part of this section we shall consider the core of Hick's 
apologetic for Christian theism. 
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(b) Belief and Knowledge 
We have noted that, according to Hick, all knowledge involves interpretation of 
reality. Religious faith is a form of knowledge resulting from the human response to 
an awareness of a divine personal reality. All experience shapes the reality that we 
perceive and so Hick describes experience as best understood in terms of 
"experiencing-as". 1 This alternative description emphasises the subjective aspect of 
experience. Hick denies that there is any such thing as unmediated experience and, in 
contrast, affirms that all experience of the world is experience of something in a form 
that is appropriate to human cognition. 
The uncompelled nature of faith relates us to ambiguous religious reality rather than 
physical reality. This raises an important problem. One might have good reason to 
trust in the veridical nature of claims to experience concerning the material order 
because, being somewhat compelled, such experience is unambiguous and shared by 
most people. However, religious awareness is ambiguous and voluntary. 
Consequently, one may have good reason to question whether it is awareness of 
anything external to the knower. Hick, sensitive to this problem, finds the dilemma 
well stated by Hare in his suggestion that faith is a "blik ..... a way of looking at the 
world which terminates in the world itself. ,,2 The possibility of apologetics turns on 
this question of realism. If Hick is willing to accept the categorisation of religious 
knowledge as non-realist then his system has no place for religious apologetics. 
However, the stair diagram demonstrates the continuity between natural and religious 
I Hick 1988a p.142. Experiencing-as is a technical term added to the second edition 
of Faith and Knowledge. It is offered as a term of clarification for Hick's work rather 
than as a revision. It is discussed fully in Chapter 3 (a). 
2 Hick 1988a p.151. cf. Hare 1955. 
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knowledge. The uncompelled nature of religious knowledge distances it from other 
forms of knowledge only as a matter of degree not as a matter of kind. The realist 
intent of all knowledge claims is a continuous thread running through Hick's work. 
Theism against Atheism 
In his early work Hick is not concerned with the question of pluralism as such but only 
with the difference between theistic and atheistic (or supernaturalist and naturalist) 
belief. In the following discussion we shall pursue the clash of these particular 
polarities. Hick gives consideration to certain arguments in favour of the existence of 
God which, if favourable, would provide logical reasons to accompany religious 
awareness. If this connection could be made then faith would operate with at least 
some of the certitude belonging to natural significance beliefs and faith would not 
depend wholly upon uncompelled awareness of the divine. Hick deals with arguments 
both for and against the existence of God. Either argument would have the same 
logical function of providing reasons for affirming or rejecting the theistic explanation 
of the universe on grounds other than experiencing-as. 
One of the most common theistic arguments has been stated in terms of probability. 
In essence, such an argument is that the appearance of the universe suggests that it is 
more likely the product of an intelligent designer than not. 3 Hick's epistemological 
account of faith rules out any probability argument. Referring to a phrase coined by 
Pierce he writes; if "universes were as plentiful as blackberries, we might be able to 
3 A clear example given in Swinburne 1981. He describes rationality as belief 
"rendered probable by [the] evidence" (p.63). Though there are different degrees of 
this probability and the exact locus of what must be probable are varied nonetheless he 
maintains that rational belief must be belief in something that one understands to have 
a probability closer to 1 than to 0 and/or a greater probability than its alternatives 
(p.119). See also Abraham 1987. 
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estimate the probable character of this particular universe on the basis of the already 
known characters of other universes."4 Probability is inappropriate when applied to 
the character of the universe because our very use of the term "universe" implies the 
totality of all things. There is nothing by which such totality may be compared or 
measured. In our staircase diagram of Hick's epistemology we have seen that religious 
faith is the final interpretative step and, for that reason, is a total interpretation of the 
universe as we know it. As a total interpretation it may not be compared with 
anything else for there is no other information available with which the interpretation 
may be tested. This problem remains the same in the case of all world views. As 
systems of total explanation they may not be argued for in terms of probability: 
We cannot weigh one metaphysical system against another as relatively more 
or less probable .... if theism and naturalism are alike permissible interpretations 
of the phenomena of human experience, they must in the eyes of logic stand on 
an equal footing. 5 
Probability cannot decide in favour of Christian faith. However, nor can the 
antitheistic arguments such as the argument from evil decide against Christianity. The 
problem in deciding between theism and naturalism is not a lack of relevant 
information but a logical lack of any vantage point from which such an assessment 
could be made: 
There is no objective measuring rod by which to compare the depth to which 
wickedness can sink with the height to which goodness can rise, and so to 
balance the problem of evil, which challenges theism, against the problem of 
good, which challenges naturalism. 6 
4 Hick 1988a p.152 
5 Hick 1988a p.154 
6 Hick 1988a p.156 
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Following on from the fact that the interpretation of the world as having religious 
significance is a total interpretation, neither the theistic nor the atheistic world view 
can settle their differences by appeal to objective arguments or evidence. Debate 
between such world views cannot proceed purely in terms of rational argument but 
must involve the "attempt to bring the other to see the universe as he himself sees it. ,,7 
For example, appeals by theists to the evidential value of fulfilled prophecy or 
answered prayer cannot settle the dispute. The findings here rely upon voluntary 
interpretation of the evidence and the evidence is itself ambiguous. The religious 
perspective of the believer and the naturalist perspective of the unbeliever are already 
"arrived at by another path. ,,8 That "other path" is the experiential awareness of the 
religious believer that we have already considered. To be conscious of reality as 
infused with the divine presence provides the only justification for faith in God. 
Similarly, the atheist may also be justified in adopting the beliefs that they do because 
of a failure to perceive a religious dimension in their total picture of the universe.9 
The Status of Religious Language 
This distinction between believer and unbeliever implies that the differences between 
them cannot be settled by induction. Clearly, this creates a problem for apologetic 
appeal to evidence as grounds for belief but we have already had reason to dispense 
with any form of apologetics that adopts such a strategy. 10 However, Hick deals with 
a further problem concerning the meaning and status of religious language. If the 
difference between faith and unbelief does not concern any matter of fact such as a 
7 Hick 1988a p.156 
8 Hick 1988a p.156 
9 Clouser 1991 argues that all perspectives are inherently religious and so the 
religious / naturalist division is not sustainable. This is developed in reference to Hick 
in Brakenhielm 1 975. 
10 See Chapter 1 (d) 
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logical proof or an item of publicly accessible empirical fact then this gives rise to the 
possibility that there is no 'real' difference between the two positions. Faith is then to 
be understood as a "blik" word, a way of describing the world that is neither true nor 
false. Faith is then analogous to personal taste rather than public knowledge. 
Hick has consistently maintained a realist account of religious knowledge throughout 
his work. In order to do so he had to formulate a way by which he could express the 
difference between self-referential statements of personal taste and the realist nature of 
religious truth claims. Hick did this by adopting the verificationist challenge and 
providing a response to it. 
The classical statement of the verification principle was made by AJ .Ayer and the 
movement remembered as the Logical Positivists. 11 The most notorious principle 
suggested by Ayer was one offered as a criterion of meaning. The meaning of a claim 
could be understood by the conditions in which a claim would be understood to have 
been verified by sense experience. If one could not state the conditions under which 
sense verification could be said to have occurred then the claim must be understood to 
be, in a strictly technical sense, nonsense. This principle undermines the foundations 
of metaphysics. Rather than being offered as a principle to arbitrate between true and 
false statements it provides the means to distinguish between intelligible and 
nonsensical claims. The principle was subjected to heavy criticism and revision 
through which a weaker but more influential version of the principle was devised; 
falsification. 12 
11 Ayer 1946 and Ayer 1956. For a detailed discussion of the background to the 
movement and its influence on Hick see Loughlin 1986a pp.66-79. 
12 Popper 1980. Hick acknowledges the change (Hick 1988a pp.173-174) but 
suggests that both the earlier and later formulations of the principle share an 
asymmetrical relationship - some statements open only to verification (Hick 1988a 
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The Verification Principle 
Hick adopts a form of the verification principle; "in order to be either veridical or 
illusory the mode of experiencing that we call religious faith must be such that the 
theological statements which express it are either verifiable or falsifiable." 13 
Consequently, Hick brings the principle to bear upon the central theological 
statements of theistic belief. The experience that gives rise to faith is not itself 
testable because, according to Hick, it is non-propositional. However, certain 
theological expressions of faith are open to sense testing. 
Hick argues that in order to safeguard the meaningfulness of theological statements it 
must be possible for their core content to be experienced by a conscious human being. 
This is because the word 'verification' is itself "primarily the name for an event which 
takes place in human consciousness." 14 Hence, there must be some public event to 
which we may refer where at least one human being would have sensory confirmation 
of a key theistic belief. This necessity is not in order to establish its truth but only its 
meaningfulness: 
If a proposition contains or entails predictions which can be verified or 
falsified, its character as an assertion (though not of course its character as 
a true assertion) is thereby established. 15 
p.175). 
13 Hick 1988a p.169 
14 Hick 1988a p.171 
15 Hick 1988a p.172 
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Therefore, in order to confinn that religious utterances are genuine realist truth claims 
concerning objective reality Hick sets himself the task of isolating at least one claim 
that will be verified by a human subject through sensory experience. 
Hick's resolution of the problem is known as eschatological verification. 16 The truth 
claims that Hick subjects to the principle of sense experience testing are those based 
on "expectations concerning the future" .17 The particular form of the belief for 
Christians is that "when history is completed it will be seen to have led to a particular 
end-state and to have fulfilled a specific purpose, namely that of creating 'children of 
God' ".18 In order to show how this claim is compatible with the principle of 
verification Hick provides a simple parable. 19 The parable relates how two travellers 
walk the same road but have different views about where, if anywhere, the road leads. 
According to one, it leads to a celestial city whereas, according to the other, it leads 
nowhere. Each interprets all that they encounter along the road in the light of their 
own teleological belief. The road itself remains ambiguous providing no final 
evidence that would decide between them. However, there is an event that would 
verify the claims of the Celestial City believer. In the event of rounding a comer and 
arriving at the city, the believer would have his or her belief proven true. The point 
about the parable is not how one might verify a truth claim about the future or how 
16 While first propounded in Hick 195~") Hick has continued to maintain its validity 
throughout his work. The principle has been subjected to major criticism (particularly 
Mathis 1985) and Hick's retention of the principle despite major revisions to the rest 
of his work has been charged with incoherence (Loughlin 1990). Significant 
modifications have occurred, particularly in Hick 1976a, 1977d (Mackie 1987 
provides a response to this modification) and 1991 a the significance of which we shall 
investigate shortly. All we need note here is that Hick at least attempts to retain the 
fonn of this principle in all his work including as recently as Hick 1995 pp.72-76. 
17 Hick 1988a p.176 
18 Hick 1988a p.l 78 
19 Hick 1988a pp.177 -178 cf. Hick 1990a pp.l 04-105 
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one might seek to persuade an unbeliever. The parable shows how a real, experiential 
event is at issue and that, this being the case, the possibility of experiential testing 
proves that the rival assertions are both to be credited with the status of being genuine, 
meaningful assertions. Significant problems arise with this principle but Hick does 
argue that it secures one important victory. The meaningfulness of theistic or 
supernaturalist truth claims is established on the foundations of empiricism. 
Hick's Apologetic 
Hick seems to have offered a strong basis for a credible Christian apologetic. His 
epistemology is built upon a form of realism20 in which one may distinguish between 
the neutral sensory data and the interpretative act that the human agent must make in 
order to integrate that data into his or her world view. This realism provides a basis 
for interreligious discussion, debate and disagreement over matters of 'fact'. 
Furthermore, religious belief is only a more complex development of natural and 
moral knowledge in which the methods of settling disputes is relatively clear cut. The 
difference between the method involved in solving a scientific dispute and solving a 
religious dispute is only a matter of degree not of kind. Indeed, the celestial city 
parable presents a basic empiricist criteria for evidence. This thesis will claim that the 
strength of Hick's apologetic is also its weakness. The kind of foundationalist strategy 
Hick outlined in this early work would inevitably demand a revision of Christianity 
and we tum to this in the next section. 
20 Hick's distinction between naive and critical realism (Hick 1989a pp.173-174) is 
irrelevant. It is unclear that there is such a thing as naive realism offered by any 
serious contributor to the philosophy or theology discussions. Certainly, Hick can 
identify none. 
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(c) The Copernican Revolution 
Hick's theological position underwent a dramatic change during the late sixties 1 which 
resulted in his newly formulated approach to the relationship between Christianity and 
other religions. D'Costa suggests that there were three primary causes to his shift of 
position. Firstly, Hick's position on universal salvation undermined the viability of 
any position which maintained that only Christianity is true while all other religions 
are false.2 Secondly, his move to Birmingham brought him into contact with many 
different religions for which he gained great respect.3 Thirdly, his work on a theology 
of death4 led Hick to take seriously the alternative eschatological pictures held by 
other world religions. 5 These factors contribute to what Hick describes as a 
Copernican revolution in theology. This is a revolution that has occurred in his own 
work and which he calls to take place in the work of all mainstream Christian thought. 
Hick has stated his developing position in many different writings and, as much 
remains in print, a confusion arises regarding the coherence of Hick's published 
corpus.6 We shall now consider an early statement by Hick of the Copernican 
revolution and contrast this with a later statement. We shall then be in a position to 
consider the coherence of the internal project of the Copernican revolution and the 
wider implications for coherence in the relationship between the Copernican 
revolution and Hick's apologetic for faith. 7 
1 Useful biographical information is found in D'Costa 1987 pp.5-18, Eddy 1992 and 
Sinkinson 1995a pp.5-8. 
2 D'Costa 1987 p.12 cf. Hick 1980a ppA-5 
3 D'Costa 1987 p.13 cf. Hick 1980a p.5 
4 Hick 1976a 
5 D'Costa 1987 p.13 
6 Giving rise to the charge of incoherence in Loughlin 1990. 
7 Chapter 2 (d) 
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The Essence of Christianity 
An early statement of Hick's position is found in what is primarily a collection of 
essays with the title God and the Universe of Faiths. 8 The essays with which we shall 
be concerned were first given as part of a series of public lectures in 1972 and a form 
of one chapter was first published in that year. 9 
By the 'essence' of the Christian faith, Hick means "what is most important in 
Christianity". 10 However, before mounting an empirical investigation into this 
essence, he also states that the reason for isolating it is in order to facilitate an 
interreligious comparison: 
It is this that we want to be able to compare with the essence of other faiths, 
rather than any historical peculiarities of the Christian tradition which lie away 
from its religious centre. 1 1 
This highlights an important assumption concerning universality and particularity. 
The essence, according to Hick, cannot be particular to Christianity because if that 
were the case then comparison would be impossible. Therefore, essence must be 
something universal in order for comparison to be made. Consequently, the essence 
cannot be tied to the historical particularities of incarnation, atonement or resurrection 
because these would not facilitate comparison. This assumption lays down very 
significant parameters for what possible conclusions Hick may come to. In effect, 
8 "The Essence of Christianity", "The Copernican Revolution in Theology" and "The 
New Map of the Universe of Faiths" in Hick 1988b pp.1 08-147 will be understood, as 
they were intended to be in the Birmingham lectures where they were first given, as 
forming a single argument (Hick 1988b xvi). 
9 Hick 1972 
10 Hick 1988b p.108 
11 Hick 1988b p.1 08 
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Hick is arguIng that the possibility of comparison must determine what would 
constitute the essence of faith. Whatever is sui generis or contingent in a historical 
context must "lie away from" the essence of faith. This is a highly questionable 
methodological assumption; a desired objective (comparison) determines what might 
count as evidence for essence. Ruled out, a priori, is the possibility that religions 
could be strictly incommensurable or have, as their essence, matters of historical 
particularity . 
Tracing the New Testament description of salvation as a "way" Hick concludes that 
"the essence of Christianity is not in believing rightly but in acting rightly in relation 
to our fellows." 12 Some beliefs form an integral part of the Christian way of life but 
the permanent basis of Christianity is found in: 
The life, death and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, his influence upon those 
who responded to him in faith, their memories of him and of his words, and 
their experience of a new quality of life in a new relationship with God and with 
one another .... 13 
The essence of Christianity is a practical way of life related to the particularities of the 
Christ-event. However, in keeping with the methodological assumption noted earlier, 
Hick is keen to dissociate the Christ-event from historical particularities and, in effect, 
from particularism altogether. Consequently, he informs us that the "Christ-event was 
not an event in public history, but an event experienced in faith."14 The particularities 
of the Christ-event are not historical particularities but particular experiences of the 
12 Hick 1988b p.11 0 
13 Hick 1988b p.lll 
14 Hick 1988b p.112 
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New Testament writers and of many later readers. These kind of particularities are 
not bound by history but are continually open to contemporary experience: 
To be a Christian today is to share the faith of the New Testament writers, 
seeing something of what they saw and feeling something of what they felt. 
But although we can share their faith we cannot, except for occasional 
glimpses, penetrate behind it to the Jesus of secular history. 15 
Hick's use of 'faith' here means 'experience', the correlation of which we have already 
noted. 16 An important distinction is now drawn between the Christ-event and the 
historical Jesus. The Christ-event concerns contemporary experience of reality but the 
historical figure of Jesus is an ambiguous figure of the past. I7 Hick argues that a 
process occurred in which Jesus was deified: "the community lived and grew, more 
and more men and women experiencing the excitement and peace of the new way, 
until before two generations had passed they came to think of Jesus as virtually 
God."18 Hick's positive statements of who Jesus actually was are remarkably vivid 
considering his claim regarding the ambiguity of the evidence and, furthermore, these 
positive descriptions remain in use by Hick throughout his later work. 19 Concerning 
the ministry of Christ Hick writes: 
Travelling about Palestine with Jesus as he preached and healed, the disciples 
15 Hick 1988b p.112 
16 Chapter 2 (b) 
17 The data are "fragmentary and ambiguous" writes Hick elsewhere in "Jesus and the 
World Religions" in Hick 1977a p.167. 
18 Hick 1988b p.113 
19 There are, of course, a number of significant changes in his metaphysical account of 
the incarnation. The account in the volume under present consideration (pp.148-164), 
replacing a substance Christology with a relational one, remains a relatively "high" 
Christology but is dispensed with in Hick 1989a in favour of a metaphorical account 
of incarnation that dissociates metaphorical language from ontology altogether. See 
also his account in Hick 1989b. 
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had a sense of being on the inside of a dynamic divine action in the world, an 
invasion of human life by God's redeeming power focused in Jesus. He was 
God's agent among them .... 20 
Here Hick maintains an important identification between the activity of God and the 
activity of Christ in the "invasion" of human life by divine action.21 However, this 
identification is related not to the ontological status of the historical Jesus but to the 
religious experience of the disciples. As we have noted, this is the third step in 
experience22 and represents an experience shaped by the cultural/physical/ethical 
interpretative framework already in place. Hence, the first Jewish disciples interpreted 
their experience of Christ in a Judeo-Greek metaphysical framework. A different 
interpretation would have occurred elsewhere; "In eastern terms he was a jivanmukti, 
or he was a Buddha, one who had attained to true knowledge of and relation to 
reality. ,,23 The categories by which Christ was understood were relative to the culture 
of those followers who lived during, and soon after, his time. Had the historical Jesus 
ministered in the east, or the early Church been born in the east, Hick is sure that 
Jesus would have been understood in eastern terms. This account of the relationship 
between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith highlights an important aspect of 
Hick's account of the relationship between theology and experience: "theology is the 
attempt to state the meaning of revelatory events experienced in faith. ,,24 Thus 
theology has a second order relationship to experience which is the primary means by 
which Jesus is interpreted. In this way, Hick is able to distinguish between the essence 
of Christianity and the theology of the Church: 
20 Hick 1988b p.l13 
21 This is the kind of identification between God and Jesus spelled out in the 
homoagape Christology presented by Hick in this volume Hick 1988b pp.148-l64. 
22 Chapter 2 (b) 
23 Hick 1988b p.115 
24 Hick 1 988b p.ll 7 
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Christianity .... is an open-ended history which has taken varying forms in 
varying circumstances, and which has as its essence the way of salvation that 
was initiated by the Christ -event. 25 
Hick identifies salvation as "spiritual life and health,,26 and understands the specific 
Christian meaning of salvation to be the development of life and health through the 
Christ-event. The Christ-event, as we have noted, is not a matter of historical 
particularities or factual reality but of a particular quality of experience on the part of 
those who claimed to be followers of Jesus. For this reason, this description is 
seriously lacking in any substantial meaning.27 
The End of Exclusivism 
More specific descriptions of salvation have occupied the history of Christian thought. 
Hick notes the "controlling assumption" of many Protestant and Catholic VIews 
throughout history as "outside the Church, or outside Christianity, there IS no 
salvation. ,,28 The impetus for what Hick terms the Copernican revolution lies in the 
apparent repugnance of the implications of such exclusivism: 
Can we then accept the conclusion that the God of love who seeks to save 
all mankind has nevertheless ordained that men must be saved in such a way 
that only a small minority can in fact receive this salvation?29 
Hick notes a number of attempts to soften these "repugnant" conclusions. In particular 
some thinkers made exemptions for those wholly ignorant of Christ or the Church and 
others sought to include those who held some kind of implicit faith by desire or 
25 Hick 1988b p.119 
26 Hick 1988b p.119 
27 For example, it is a description lacking any account of the atonement (but see Hick 
1993a pp.112-126). 
28 Hick 1988b p.121 
29 Hick 1988b p.122 
70 
longing for something otherwise unknown.30 Hick draws upon the scientific debate of 
the sixteenth century to illustrate how he perceives the salvation debate being 
resolved.31 
Prior to the revolutionary work of Copernicus, Ptolemy has established a picture of the 
universe that had come to be understood as harmonious with the Bible account. 
According to the Ptolemaic picture, the earth existed at the centre of the universe with 
the stars, planets and sun revolving around it in concentric circles. The planets, 
however, created a problem in this picture because increasing knowledge of their 
movements indicated that they followed no such pattern. Consequently, astronomers 
introduced what were known as "epicycles" to accommodate these irregularities. The 
planets moved in smaller supplementary cycles during the course of their larger orbit 
of the earth. With the use of these epicycles, astronomers sought to maintain the 
Ptolemaic picture of the earth at the centre of the universe. However, increasingly 
accurate observation led to increasing numbers of epicycles being required to sustain 
this ancient world view until, eventually, the picture looked "artificial, implausible and 
30 A nuanced and valuable account of the various positions adopted in the history of 
Christian thought is found in Sanders 1992. The variety of positions are schematised 
in D'Costa 1986a and Race 1993. 
31 The following account is a summary of Hick's reading of the revolution. He 
misunderstands both the factors involved in the revolution and the exact nature of the 
Papal response which was primarily a rejection of Galileo's application of Copernicus 
and not the published work of Copernicus which Church authorities permitted free 
discussion of. An accurate historical account is provided in Allen 1989 pp.27-49. The 
real issue between the Church authorities and Galileo was not the reliability of the 
Bible or the centrality of the earth to God's purposes but the truth of the Aristotelian 
world view which had come to dominate. The increasing orderliness and harmony of 
the great chain of being were received truth in the Aristotelian view and ruled out the 
possibility of decay in the heavenly realms such as that represented by sunspots on the 
surface of the sun (Also see Kuhn 1957). We simply note here the inadequacy of 
Hick's account but grant its usefulness as an analogy for the polemical point that he 
wishes to make. 
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unconvincing. ,,32 This paved the way for a great revolution in cosmological 
understanding as Copernicus arrived at the more plausible picture of the universe with 
the sun at the centre thus abandoning the need for epicycles to account for the 
movement of the planets.33 
Hick draws upon this account as an analogy for the developments he identifies in 
Christian theology. The older theological picture of salvation as exclusive to the 
Church or Christianity is Ptolemaic. Christ or the Church are at the centre of the 
universe of religions with all others revolving around this centre. The inclusivist 
strategy of relating other religions to Christ through implicit desire for salvation or 
some other non-confessional approach34 represents the attempt to develop 'epicycles' 
to account for the problem of plausibility in the theologically Ptolemaic world view. 
Hick presents his own position as a revolutionary change in perspective; a theological 
equivalent to the work of Copernicus. 35 
The Copernican revolution was essentially a change of perspective: "a transformation 
in the way in which men understood the universe and their location within it."36 The 
32 Hick 1988b p.125 
33 This, of course, was subsequently found to be wrong and the centre of the universe 
shifted elsewhere. Further complications in the movement of planets were caused by 
the influence of some planets on each other. 
34 Hick briefly surveys the work of Rahner, Kling and Pannenberg in Hick 1988b 
pp.127-130 but see also the accounts in D'Costa 1986a and 1993b. 
35 Lipner 1977 took issue with the polarisation of issues that Hick's use of Copernicus 
caused. He points out that Hick's basic assumption is that theologians are either 
absolutist and, therefore, Ptolemaic or pluralist and, therefore, Copernican. The only 
middle position is the interim attempt to offer epicycles. Lipner points out the error of 
transferring the word epicycle from science to theology. In the latter case what Hick 
refers to as epicycles are the attempts of theologians to develop a Christian theology of 
religions (Lipner 1977 p.257). See further Almond 1983. 
36 Hick 1988b p.130 
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religious change Hick calls for IS a change of perspective In our religious 
understanding: 
It involves a shift from the dogma that Christianity is at the centre to the real-
isation that it is God who is at the centre, and that all the religions of mankind, 
including our own, serve and revolve around him.37 
The Ptolemaic viewpoint is not limited to orthodox Christianity alone but finds home 
also among devout Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims and others: "the adherent of each 
system of belief can assume that his own system is alone fully true and that all others 
are more or less true according as the approximate to or diverge from it. ,,38 Not only 
does Hick call Christians to change perspective but, also, the Ptolemaic believers of all 
religions are called into this revolution. 
This treatment of Ptolemaic theology suggests an important problem. If the theologies 
of most devout people are, in some sense, Ptolemaic (though each claiming different 
centres) then how can one be sure that Hick's position will not be, itself, a Ptolemaic 
position? The analogy with the Copernican revolution fails at this point because the 
historical debate concerned two alternatives: either the earth at the centre with 
complex accounts of planetary motion or the sun at the centre with a less complex 
account required for planetary motion. The choice lay between two competing 
"exclusivisms". This is not the case with Hick's proposed Copernican revolution. 
37 Hick 1988b p.131. We noted how the change in cosmological perspective did not 
end with the Copernican revolution as the centre of the universe shifted away from the 
earth to elsewhere in space. This change is also present in Hick's work as later 
speculation leads him to shift the religious centre away from God to the "Real" 
(D'Costa 1991 pp.3-16). This change is considered in detail later but, for the sake of 
clarity in exposition at this stage, I will continue to use "God" as Hick's designation for 
the new centre of religious faith. 
38 Hick 1988b p.132 
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Here the choice is between myriad centres of faith and the problem is why Hick 
should consider the choice of "God" as the centre of faiths to not be Ptolemaic 
whereas to acknowledge Jesus, Allah, Nirvana or Brahman as the centre is Ptolemaic. 
Hick's resolution of this problem, at this stage, is to describe the Copernican 
revolution in theology as the result of one having to 
stand back in thought from the arena of competing systems, surveying 
the scene as a whole, to see something that is hidden from the 
Ptolemaic believer.39 
What Hick supposes to be hidden from the Ptolemaic believer is the fact that most 
believers tend to be adherents of the religion which informs their parents and their 
culture. This seems to add nothing to Hick's general point in favour of a revolution, 
namely the implausibility of adding epicycles to the Ptolemaic model. However, what 
is interesting here is the process by which Hick distinguishes the retention of a 
Ptolemaic world view and the adoption of a Copernican one. Essentially, it is a matter 
of "standing back". If one stands back from personal commitments and loyalties then 
one is able to survey all relevant factors as a whole in order to see a basic distinction 
between two alternatives - the Ptolemaic positions of mainstream religions and the 
Copernican shift of perspective through which they are all subjected to a new 
perspective. There is not an either/or choice between one model and another but a 
choice between loyalty to a religious perspective or distancing oneself altogether from 
any such loyalties. Hick fails to recognise the inappropriateness of his analogy 
because he fails to recognise that his own position is not a distinct alternative to 
exclusivisms but yet another exclusivism alongside the plurality of Ptolemaic religious 
believers he is so critical of. 40 
39 Hick 1988b p.132 
40 See D'Costa 1996c for an effective argument that Hick's position IS another 
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With this general claim outlined Hick sets out a new 'map' of the history of religions. 
Rather than being an interpretation of religions from the perspective of one religion (a 
Ptolemaic approach) Hick provides an interpretation of religion from the "standing 
back" methodology commended by the Copernican revolution. In the next chapter we 
will interact in detail with a more recent statement of his epistemology. However, first 
we must consider whether Hick's later statement of the pluralist hypothesis marks a 
dramatic discontinuity in his work. 
exclusivism. Plantinga 1994 presents a defence of exclusivism in which he describes 
the inevitability of some exclusive beliefs. 
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(d) Continuity and Discontinuity 
Hick has produced so much material in the course of his career it is understandable 
that there should be modifications and changes in his work. In this section we shall 
consider the major modification to his position, the Copernican Revolution, and 
assess its consistency with his epistemology. 
Prefaces 
Through our account of religious knowledge we have been concerned primarily with 
the position outlined in Faith and Knowledge (2nd Edition)! on the assumption that its 
fundamental argument remains a part of Hick's later thought. In the preface to the 
second edition Hick notes that despite having undergone substantial revision the book 
remains "an exposition of the view of faith which seemed to me, and still seems to me, 
most adequate"2 and he also notes that the idea of eschatological verification remains 
in the argument though "now given a fuller treatment". 3 
In the reissue of the second edition a new preface is included in which Hick declares 
that with regard to his later work "Faith and Knowledge remains foundational".4 Hick 
endorses the epistemological position laid out and restates his indebtedness to Kant 
and Schleiermacher.5 Hick notes that his subsequent writings in philosophy of 
religion "proceeded in a natural trajectory from the [earlier] epistemology".6 The use 
1 Hick 1966. References in this thesis are from the 1988 reissue of the second edition 
(Hick 1988a). The first edition was published in 1957. 
2 Hick 1988a Preface to the Second Edition (1966) p.xi 
3 Hick 1988a Preface to the Second Edition (1966) p.xi 
4 Hick 1988a Preface to the reissue of the Second Edition (1988) p. vii 
5 Acknowledgment is also given to significance of Oman 1931 in Hick 1988a p.7 
6 Hick 1988a Preface to the reissue of the Second Edition (1988) p.ix 
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of the term 'trajectory' serves to indicate the continuity in Hick's philosophical work. 
However, with regard to his theology, Hick notes that the book assumes "a more 
traditional position than now seems to me sustainable". 7 The treatment of Hick's work 
as a whole in this thesis relies upon the substantial continuity of his work and the 
possibility that "the theology, whether old or new, does not affect the basic 
epistemological argument."g Consequently, Hick draws a marked distinction between 
his theology and his philosophical position. According to his self-description, 
substantial revisions in his theology have not altered his basic philosophical position.9 
However, a pressing problem remains regarding the extent to which Hick's work may 
be treated as a coherent whole. 10 
We shall now consider Hick's statement of religious belief and rationality as it appears 
in An Interpretation of Religion 11 as a comparison to the earlier statement previously 
considered. From this we will be able to isolate any significant developments or new 
emphases that may help in engaging with the debate concerning the continuity and 
discontinuity of Hick's work. 
Refinements to the Epistemology 
7 Hick 1988a Preface to the reissue of the Second Edition (1988) p.ix 
g Hick 1988a Preface to the reissue of the Second Edition (1988) p.ix 
9 Substantial changes in Hick's theological thought have been given extensive 
treatment elsewhere. Biographical accounts suffice to give this information (see 
D'Costa 1987 pp.1-16, Gillis 1989 pp.28-30 and Sinkinson 1995a). For the purpose of 
my argument here it is not necessary to trace the historical changes in Hick's 
theological position. 
10 This is true not only of the relationship between his epistemology and the pluralist 
position but also of that between his theodicy and eschatology with his pluralist 
position. I shall only be concerned with the continuity of his epistemology and 
pluralism. 
11 Hick 1989a esp. pp.129-230 
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Hick asserts that the universe is ambiguous with regard to its meaning because it is 
open to both religious and non-religious interpretations. 12 However, this gives rise to 
an interesting epistemological tension between the theoretical and practical 
dimensions in our interpretation of reality. Reality must be "understood, experienced 
and inhabited in a particular way" though it "retains its ambiguity for the intellect". 13 
This implies that the ambiguity of the universe is not an interpretation we may choose 
to make but an assumption that underlies any interpretation we adopt. Ambiguity 
functions as a presupposition of the particular interpretation we live by. 
Consequently, there is a form of agnosticism regarding the nature of reality held in 
tension with the particular interpretation adopted by the human subject: 
For whilst the objective ambiguity of our environment consists in the 
fact that it is capable of being interpreted in a variety of ways, its con-
sciously experienced and actively lived-in character consists in its ac-
tually being interpreted as meaningful in a particular way which, whilst 
it operates, excludes other possible ways. 14 
Epistemology is, then, the adoption of a particular meaning in order to understand the 
universe and "to find it intelligible .... in the practical sense that one is able to behave 
appropriately (or in a way that one takes to be appropriate) in relation to it" .15 The 
adoption of a particular meaning requires the practical exclusion of alternative 
meanings but, nonetheless, includes the intellectual admission that the universe IS 
itself fundamentally ambiguous and open to a variety of possible interpretations. 
12 Hick 1989a p.129 
13 Hick 1989a p.129 
14 Hick 1989a p.129 
15 Hick 1989a p.131 
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Hick also re-affirms the threefold division of levels of interpretation with regard to the 
universe. These are the levels of the natural or physical, the personal or ethical, and 
the awareness of the divine. 16 He describes each level of meaning in terms of the 
practical behavioural responses to which they give rise. The appropriate behavioural 
responses generated by natural meaning are essentially actions of self-preservation; "to 
avoid mortal danger". 17 There is of course no reason why an organism might not 
adopt a policy of self-annihilation but the fact that organisms have a will to survive 
means that there is a basic dispositional aim which provides a standard by which 
appropriate and inappropriate behaviour may be assessed. 
The choice of moral and aesthetic 18 meaning in relation to reality will also depend 
upon a presupposed disposition to behave in a certain way. The basic disposition 
upon which ethical behaviour is based is the recognition that another person is an 
independent and equally valid source of consciousness in relation to ourselves. 
Failure to relate to people in this way is a moral failure; "I can only be aware of the 
bare neutral existence of a fellow human being if I have degraded that being in my 
own eyes from a thou to an it." 19 The moral failure is the result of experiencing 
another as a thing rather than as a person. When social relationships are interpreted in 
terms of I-it rather than I-thou20 then one has failed to climb the stairway of 
experience from natural meaning to ethical meaning. 
16 Hick 1989a pp.l33-134 
17 Hick 1989a p.139 
18 As a matter of fact Hick barely considers aesthetic meaning, treating it as analogous 
to ethical meaning but involving a concern with quality rather than duty or obligation. 
Hick 1989a pp.l51-152 
19 Hick 1989a p.145 
20 Hick acknowledges his indebtedness to Buber 1937 in Hick 1989a p.145 
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The third level of interpretation is that of religious meaning. Religious meaning arises 
with the experience "generated at the interface between the Real and the human 
psyche. ,,21 This experience takes two forms. The first is an experience of the 
"presence of the transcendent,,22 mediated through events or objects in the material 
world while the second is a direct experience of the divine. 
Religious meaning requires an uncompelled act of interpretation on the part of the 
human subject in order to make sense of an otherwise ambiguous reality. The 
Christian act of interpretation is a particular example of this: 
Thus the Christian response to Jesus was and is an uncompelled interpretation, 
experiencing an ambiguous figure in a distinctive way as mediating the trans-
forming presence of God.23 
The interpretation of reality or an aspect of reality (such as the shadowy historical 
figure of Jesus) as of religious significance "occurs at the deeper level of the cognitive 
choice whereby we come to experience in either a religious or a non-religious way. ,,24 
Faith is not the result of experience so much as the ground of experience. Faith 
provides the framework in which experience occurs. In this way, faith is a new 
category operating analogously to the Kantian categories of space and time.25 It is 
"that uncompelled subjective contribution to conscious experience which is 
responsible for its distinctively religious character. ,,26 Hick reiterates the continuity 
21 Hick 1989a pp.153-154. The "Real" being Hick's chosen designation for the 
ultimate divine reality at the centre of the orbiting religions. 
22 Hick 1989a p.154 
23 Hick 1989a p.157 
24 Hick 1989a p.159 
25 A point explored further when we examine the relationship of Kant's work to Hick 
in Chapter 4. 
26 Hick 1989a p.160 
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between each level of meaning found in reality and the corresponding increase in the 
degree of epistemic freedom relative to each level. 
From Ambiguity to Plurality 
The major point of departure for Hick's epistemology as he develops it in the wake of 
Faith and Knowledge27 and as it is crystallised in An Interpretation of Religion is the 
assertion of a pluralist theology of religions.28 Before we consider this in detail we 
will outline the way in which Hick is able to develop a pluralist account in continuity 
with his epistemology. 
Hick identifies the value of maintaining cognitive freedom in religious faith as its 
ability to "protect our finite freedom and autonomy. ,,29 Our finitude must necessarily 
limit the capacity for information that we are able to process and this is no more 
clearly felt than in relation to religious belief where knowledge can only be partial and 
selective. Religious traditions are to be understood as communal statements of this 
partial knowledge: 
Religious traditions, considered as 'filters' or 'resistances', function as 
totalities which include not only concepts and images of God or of the 
Absolute, with the modes of experience which they inform, but also 
systems of doctrine, ritual and myth, art forms, moral codes, lifestyles 
and patterns of social organisation. 30 
27 See especially Hick 1972, 1983a, 1983b, 1985 and Hick 1988b as statements of the 
pluralist position prior to Hick 1989a. 
28 A term defined and extrapolated in contrast to theologies of religion where Christ is 
in some way normative in D'Costa 1986a, 1986b and Race 1993. 
29 Hick 1989a p.162 cf. Chapter 2 (a) Figure 4 
30 Hick 1989a p.163 
81 
The images used here indicate that the purpose of a religion is not to divulge otherwise 
unobtainable information (as in Catholic Propositionalism) but, rather, to filter the 
vast array of chaotic and ambiguous information such that a partial but meaningful 
aspect of reality is disclosed. Like a resistor in an electronic circuit, a religion 
prevents a damaging and unhelpful overload of current (information) by restraining 
most incoming energy. A religion provides the conceptual apparatus to order and 
make sense of the reality with which humans must deal. 
Hick relates each level of interpretation to the practical consequences of adopting any 
given interpretation. Only a limited range of practical options may be adopted in 
response to natural significance. This explains the relative success of technology and 
medicine to transcend cultural differences. An interpretation of the physical order may 
be tested and found false with reference to the inappropriate behaviour that it may 
inspire. Immoral ethical interpretations may, similarly, give rise to destructive social 
implications. Hick extends the notion of appropriateness and practical dispositions to 
the criterion for religious truth: 
In a word, the central criterion will be soteriological, the bringing about of a 
transformation of human existence from self-centredness to Reality-centredness 
- a transformation which shows itself, within the conditions of this world, in 
compassion (karuna) or love (agape).31 
Because Hick has rejected the propositionalist account of faith it is entirely consistent 
for his position to become praxis-oriented rather than information-oriented. The truth 
of a religious tradition is not to be understood in terms of truth claims (information) 
but in terms of soteriological transformation of individuals and communities. 
31 Hick 1989a p.164 
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Critics of Continuity 
Various arguments have been made in attempts to establish or deny the coherence or 
continuity of Hick's work when it is treated as a corpus. Some of these attempts 
involve misunderstandings while other attempts are of crucial significance. 
Loughlin has proved an unrelenting critic of Hick's work and has drawn attention to 
the major incoherencies of Hick's project.32 We shall review this criticism in order to 
assess the difficulties of treating the corpus of Hick's work as a whole. 
Prefacing Pluralism 
Macmillan reissued many of Hick's major works in 1988, each with a new preface. 
This major publishing venture occurred one year prior to the publication of An 
Interpretation of Religion. Consequently, an impression is given that the corpus of 
Hick's work forms a coherent whole.33 The use of prefaces compounds this 
impression by allowing Hick the space in which to become "the narrator of Hick's 
texts".34 By becoming narrator, Loughlin describes Hick as re-writing his own work 
into a single system. By becoming narrator, radical changes in his position in respect 
of Christo logy and theodicy may be smoothed into a coherent whole rather than being 
confessed as total revolutions in his thought. Loughlin explores this problem of 
apparent continuity and underlying discontinuity in the light of three "moments" of 
thought: Epistemology, Christology and Theodicy.35 
32 Loughlin 1986a, 1990 and 1991 
33 This is the assumption underlying the present thesis and the reason why the 1988 
text of Faith and Knowledge is used. 
34 Loughlin 1990 p.30 
35 Loughlin 1990 p.31 
83 
Regarding epistemology, Loughlin considers Hick's sustained use of eschatological 
verification and shows three distinct phases in its employment. 
(1) 1957: The first statement of the principle, in Faith and Knowledge, was a response 
to logical positivism and maintained that post-mortem experience of the Kingdom of 
God would constitute verification of Christian theism. Such verification provided the 
basis for the claim that theistic language is meaningful. 
(2) 1966: In the second edition of Faith and Knowledge Hick relates the person of 
Christ to the Kingdom of God "in order to render explicit its Christian character". 36 
Rather than permit the Kingdom to be understood in empty terms Hick relocates it in 
specific Christian terms. 
(3) 1977: Rather than continue the relation between verification and Christ, Hick 
severed the connection and described the eschaton as the unambiguous encounter with 
the divine presence.37 As such, it may not verify anything specific in this life after all. 
Christianity is too specific a formulation of such a hope of encounter for it to be seen 
as open to verification in any privileged sense. D'Costa has drawn attention to this 
continuing movement in Hick's work away from a tradition specific notion of 
fulfilment in the eschaton toward a more general sense of verification. In this 
movement he describes Hick's revised principle in his 1989 work as "minimalist" 
because it disqualifies "specific details of eschatological expectations.,,38 
36 Loughlin 1990 p.32 
37 Loughlin 1990 p.32 
38 D'Costa 1991 p.7 
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Eschatological verification is based on the same basic epistemic-linguistic rules as 
logical positivism. Loughlin claims that Hick is mistaken to accept such basic ground 
rules: "God is not any-thing .... and the empiricist framework will permit the 
verification of only things. ,,39 Furthermore, he argues that Hick always knew this to 
be mistaken because he assumed that faith found immediate justification in religious 
experience - no further verification has ever been necessary. This raises the question 
of why Hick should then still see a need to retain the principle. 
Concerning Christology, Loughlin draws attention to two very different accounts 
embedded in Hick's work. Hick has presented a functional account of the incarnation 
in terms of agape: the love of God and the love of Christ were qualitatively one. 
However, he also explains the incarnation in terms of its quality as mythology rather 
than metaphysics. According to the agape Christo logy, when a believer uses such 
Christocentric language they are, in fact, using a mythology to express their religious 
experience. Loughlin points out that Hick is able to retain both of these accounts 
within one moment "by drawing a distinction between presenting and explaining the 
doctrine. ,,40 Hick presents the doctrine in terms of agape but explains the doctrine in 
terms of mythology. However, the mythological account cancels out the force of the 
'presented' doctrine. If all accounts of the incarnation are mythological (expressive of 
feeling rather than metaphysics) then there is little reason for finding a new way of 
presenting the doctrine. 
The change in Hick's position is made strikingly clear in his theodicy. Loughlin charts 
the change from a Christian theodicy, through a theistic theodicy ("no longer a matter 
39 Loughlin 1990 p.33 
40 Loughlin 1990 p.35 
85 
of a specific faith but of a general belief'41) to a theodicy in keeping with the pluralist 
shift from God to the 'divine'. However, this change of position is assisted by the 
introduction of the mythological account of religious language that allows Hick to re-
interpret his previous work on theodicy: 
Hick is able to stand back sufficiently far from his own Irenaean theodicy 
to see that it is also a myth, just like Augustine's theodicy. He is able to 
apply to his theodicy the mythographical analysis he had formerly applied 
only to his agape Christology.42 
As we noted with Hick's Christology, his theodicy is also emptied of decisive content. 
Whether Irenaean or Augustinian, theodices are myths expressing religious experience 
rather than being metaphysical explanations. 
Loughlin draws attention to Hick's inability to apply the notion of myth consistently 
and interpret the pluralist hypothesis as the "myth" of religious pluralism.43 
Loughlin's point is that by interpreting religious truth claims as mythology Hick's own 
system ought, logically, to be cast as another myth. The problems attendant on Hick's 
use of myth will concern us later44 but the issue here is the claim that to maintain the 
continuity of his literary corpus Hick has had to interpret the claims of his earlier work 
through the device of myth by which he empties them of all significant content. 
Loughlin is critical of both the content and the method of Hick's project finding 
underlying discontinuity in both. Concerning content, Hick attempts to systematise 
the contents of all major post-axial religions in terms of "a single coherence and 
41 Loughlin 1990 p.36 
42 Loughlin 1990 p.37 
43 Loughlin 1990 p.38 
44 Chapter 5 (b) 
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continuity: the reduction of plurality to pluralism. ,,45 Concerning method, Hick 
pursues an ill-conceived ad hoc task of sewing together a "patchwork of texts"46 that 
do not belong to each other but for that which Loughlin identifies as the "authorial 
force"47 which unites them. 
The substance of Loughlin's criticism is that Hick fails to recognise how radical a 
revision has been made. The texts of the past no longer belong to him as if he were 
the creator of a grand philosophical system. Rather, each major48 text in Hick's 
project discards all that went before. If Loughlin's thesis is correct then this present 
attempt to treat Hick's work in terms of the unitive theme of the justification of 
knowledge would be flawed. There are two important critical responses to Loughlin 
that we will consider here. The first of these is Hick's own response. 
Hick's Response 
Hick clearly reacts in an unfavourable way to the style of Loughlin's article 
understanding him to be interpreting the prefaces as "an extraordinary - even fantastic 
- literary conspiracy theory".49 In response, Hick claims that each preface draws 
attention to both the developments and the continuities of his own position. 
45 Loughlin 1990 pA8 
46 Loughlin 1990 pA8 
47 Loughlin 1990 pA 7 
48 It is not clear in this particular article whether Loughlin intends us to understand 
every text in this way or only those texts that mark a new departure for Hick - this 
would primarily mean each issue of Faith and Knowledge and Evil and the God of 
Love along with the inter-play between God and the Universe of Faiths and An 
Interpretation of Religion. 
49 Hick 1990b p.57 
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Concerning epistemology, Hick denies that his use of eschatological verification is at 
its heart. Rather, it is an important principle as "the crux between a realist and non-
realist construal of religious language. ,,50 While the agenda has been set by the logical 
positivists, the meaningfulness of religious language remains in debate and to address 
this debate Hick retains a modified form of the principle. Consequently, the principle 
addresses realism and language rather than, contra Loughlin's interpretation, the 
justification of belief. Loughlin's comment that religion provides its own verification 
meets with Hick's disapproval for this would suggest that religion concerns only 
matters internal to its own system. Verification must not remain internal but should be 
measured "by its appropriateness to the nature of reality". 51 The dialogue is somewhat 
confused at this point between the problem of justification and that of verification. 
Hick clearly does retain the notion of verification as something that will take place in 
the future because it is a public event. It is not available at the moment because it is 
not open to individual or even communal access. The verification can only occur at a 
future time when there will be global access to the verifying event. However, Hick 
has a distinct notion of justification that is available now and is not dependent on 
being publicly accessible. Hick's concept of justification is a private matter. One can 
be justified in one's belief now regardless of external evidence. Loughlin uses the 
term "confirmation,,52 in his article to identify this aspect of Hick's work and the 
distinction of terms seems to underlie the confusion at this point. His accusation that 
Hick is inconsistent in his use of eschatological verification and experiential 
justification rests on the confusion of these two distinct elements in Hick's 
epistemology. 
50 Hick 1990b p.59 
51 Hick 1990bp.61 
52 Loughlin 1990 p.33 
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Concerning Christology, Hick maintains that Loughlin is mistaken to regard his agape 
account of the incarnation as a reversal of his earlier critique of Baillie. A reversal did 
occur, but later, "somewhere in the late 1970's"53 when the agape account had largely 
been abandoned. This reversal could not constitute a contradiction because by this 
stage Hick was no longer attempting to hold together his earlier agape account with 
the later form of the pluralist hypothesis. In his response, Hick barely deals with 
Loughlin's objections regarding his use of myth, conceding that it is a "highly elastic 
concept" but simply maintaining that it remains "a coherent and useful notion."54 
Hick is willing to admit a substantial change with regard to his theodicy. The change 
concerns the application of his mythological treatment of theology to theodicy in 
particular with the result that "it speaks in human terms of that which transcends the 
scope of our human conceptualities. "55 However, Hick considers this a legitimate 
development of his work rather than an inconsistency. This suggests that Loughlin's 
criticism here finds its mark. The reissue of Evil and the God of Love may give the 
impression that the same theodicy is being stated whereas, from Hick's analysis of 
religious language, we know that the restatement also constitutes a reinterpretation 
such that the theodicy has no immediate metaphysical implications. 
The Development of Pluralism 
Barnes has made useful observations on the exchange between Loughlin and Hick that 
will cast further light on the question of continuity and discontinuity in Hick's work. 
Barnes notes three senses in which the word 'development' may be used: 
53 Hick 1990b p.61 
54 Hick 1990b pp.61-62. The myth debate is given more attention by Loughlin and 
Hick in Hewitt 1991. Cf. Chapter 5 (d). 
55 Hick 1990b p.62 
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drawing out and making explicit what was originally implicit; rejecting what 
has gone before; or, finally, expanding one's position by the incorporation of 
new insights, arguments and ideas. 56 
Hick's theological position develops in all of these ways but whether they engender 
inconsistencies in his position is a distinct question. Barnes disputes Loughlin's 
contention that there is a clear contrast between an early and a later Hick position. 
Rather than discontinuity, Barnes argues for continuity: 
Hick's theology should be interpreted as the increasingly systematic drawing 
out of his initial starting point rather than being divided into two different and 
opposing parts. 57 
Bames suggests that the reason for Loughlin's mistake is that he identifies too readily 
Hick's epistemology with the principle of eschatological verification. 58 Echoing 
Hick's own response to Loughlin on this point,59 Bames draws attention to the 
coherent use made of "experiencing-as" throughout Hick's work.60 
After describing Hick's use of experiencing-as in his early work, Bames traces its 
development. The term was introduced in the Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture 
series given in 1967-68 but described the same account of faith present in the first 
edition of Faith and Knowledge. Each statement of his epistemology (the editions of 
Faith and Knowledge along with the Royal Institute lectures) comprised of a rejection 
56 Barnes 1992 p.395 
57 Bames 1992 p.396 
58 This objection applies also to Mathis 1985 in which the incoherence of Hick's 
developing notion of eschatological verification is used to fault his thesis. 
59 " .... the central theme of my epistemology is the concept of experiencing-as .... " 
Hick 1990b p.59 
60 Bames 1992 p.396 
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of faith as belief in the truth of verbal propositions and an affirmation of faith as the 
interpretative element in human experience. In later works Hick deals with the 
problem of competing interpretations by drawing attention to the ambiguity of 
evidence and the necessity of personal confirmatory experience.61 Furthermore, in An 
Interpretation of Religion Barnes notes that "the same basic epistemology is 
retained" .62 
Bames suggests that the reason for Loughlin's appraisal of Hick in terms of 
discontinuity is that he understands Christology as the key to interpreting Hick's 
theology. Clearly, Hick made a major change of position regarding the person of 
Christ and he freely admits this change. One may question the extent to which this 
change affects the fundamental continuity of Hick's corpus of work. In contrast to 
Loughlin, Hick and Bames claim that the radical change in Christo logy does not 
change the basic coherence of Hick's corpus.63 
Bames provides a helpful analysis of why Hick's work remains systematic. The 
essential reason is that Christology has only ever played a subsidiary role in Hick's 
work. Loughlin's objections would apply to most Christian theologians. Given a 
substantial revision of the doctrine of Christ one would expect a substantial revision 
throughout that particular theology. In Hick's case his epistemology in no way relies 
upon his Christology: 
6 I Bames draws attention to Hick 1977b and Hick 1970 
62 Bames 1992 p.399 
63 Bames 1992 and Loughlin 1990 discuss Hick's work in terms of a two stage 
development. D'Costa suggests that Hick is better understood in terms of three crucial 
stages. He moved from "Christocentrism to theocentrism to a Realocentrism." 
(D'Costa 1991 p.5) Though this is a helpful analysis it also fails to draw out the clear 
continuity of Hick's epistemology which, as we shall discuss in Chapter 3, has always 
carried the seeds of agnosticism. 
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Christo logy had virtually no part to play in Hick's analysis of the nature of 
Christian faith, as he presents it in Faith and Knowledge: it was not an integral 
part of his epistemology of Christian belief. 64 
Changes in Christological formulation need have no effect on Hick's epistemology 
precisely because his epistemology bears no intrinsic relation either to Christian 
theology in general or to Christology in particular. The incoherence of Hick's major 
corpus of work cannot be argued for on the basis of changes in Christo logy or 
theodicy. 
Epistemology is the key element in Hick's work that has remained constant and lends 
coherence to his 'system'. Barnes gives reason to understand the later developed 
pluralism as a legitimate development of his early epistemology of religious 
knowledge. In particular, "his account of the epistemological character of faith can be 
divorced from the specific content of faith. ,,65 Pluralism is not only a legitimate 
development of this epistemology but a logical or necessary outcome: 
Once the shift is made to construing religion exclusively in terms of internal 
experience which is not susceptible to external or public assessment .... the 
reported encounters with 'the Real' in other religions should likewise be 
regarded by [Hick] as genuine.66 
Barnes makes the crucial point that to adopt Hick's epistemology is to implicitly 
commit oneself to the pluralist position. The former leads inexorably to the latter. We 
shall see how this must be in the next chapter. 
64 Barnes 1992 p.400 
65 Barnes 1992 p.401 
66 Barnes 1992 p.401 
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Philosophical Continuity and Theological Discontinuity 
Loughlin emphasises discontinuity in Hick's position because his interpretation rests 
upon a theological treatment of Hick. Of the three areas he considers two are 
distinctively the arena of Christian theology; Christology and theodicy. However, 
even his treatment of epistemology is essentially a discussion of eschatology - the 
theological dimension of Hick's otherwise non-theological account. Loughlin notes 
the radical discontinuity of Hick's theological position with regard to eschatology, the 
person of Jesus and the problem of evil. If one understands his theology to be 
marginal to his main project of attempting to produce a theologically neutral 
apologetic for faith then this discontinuity loses significance. In terms of 
epistemology, Hick's philosophical position remains largely consistent. The 
distinction between theology and philosophy is very important at this point in the 
analysis. Because Hick's work is a deliberate attempt to avoid rooting his assumptions 
in any particular confessional framework the result must be a work of philosophy 
rather than theology. The very term 'theology' implies a tradition specific to theism 
which Hick is keen to depart from dependence upon. The earliest expressions of his 
epistemology were quite capable of bearing the weight of the pluralist hypothesis.67 
67 Shaw 1985 also documents the fundamental continuity of Hick's epistemology 
which he describes as an evolutionary monist scheme in which human experience 
interacts with the natural order that in turn enables experience to evolve beyond purely 
natural/physical categories. This conceptual scheme is able to adapt to a plurality of 
possible doctrinal expressions (pp.74-76). 
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Chapter 3 Ambiguity and the Rationality of Religion 
(a) Christian Faith and Religious Faith 
We have now established the substantial continuity in Hick's epistemological position 
despite dramatic revolutions in his theology. Hick's account of faith is, in essence, a 
theory of knowledge. We shall now consider Hick's shift from an account of faith 
specific to one tradition (Christian faith) to one compatible with a plurality of 
traditions (religious faith) and how he achieves this with minimal effect on the 
theoretical foundations he has formulated. At this level of discussion, the 'shift' is 
superficial: Hick has never maintained anything other than a non-tradition specific 
sense of religious faith. This discussion has two sections; first we treat the 
particularity of 'Christian Faith' and then its submerging into the general category of 
'Religious Faith'. 
1. Christian Faith 
With reference to the stair diagram we have noted that Hick describes faith as a level 
of interpretation similar to, though superseding, interpretations of the universe in 
terms of material structure and moral significance. As such, faith (along with natural 
and moral levels of interpretation) may be described as a human act of response to 
environment. We may question the sense in which this is an act of Christian faith. 
1.1 Faith and the Personal God 
Hick claims that faith relates us to a unique 'object'. 1 As a total interpretation of our 
surroundings it relates us to an objectively existing God: 
1 Hick 1988a p.97 
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enfolding and interpenetrating this interlocking mass of finite situations there 
is also, according to the insistent witness of theistic religion, the all-
encompassing situation of being in the presence of God and within the sphere 
of an on-going divine purpose.2 
This description of faith depends upon a theistic framework of interpretation in which 
it makes sense to speak of God being present and having purposes. Hick emphasises 
the realist sense in which he identifies God as the object of faith. The God of faith is 
not simply 'the divine' but a being capable of purpose and presence. This personal 
nature of God is emphasised by Hick in his account of the freedom of faith. He uses 
the analogy of human relationships to describe the difference between an I-It 
relationship and an I-Thou relationship. The latter better presents theistic faith. The 
analogy with personal human relationships draws upon the example of a situation 
where we have been discussing someone, in their absence, as an object of concern, 
when they enter the room: 
We can no longer treat them as a specimen to be dissected, for he mani-
festly stands on an equal footing with ourselves as a separate mind and 
will, an unique personality .... 3 
Hick pursues this analogy by pressing the voluntary nature of personal relationships 
which coheres with his voluntarist description of faith.4 The important point here is 
that Hick's understanding of faith is based upon a concept of a personal God as the 
object of faith. This gives us reason to treat Hick's account of faith as a specifically 
Christian description. 
2 Hick 1988a p.l 07 
3 Hick 1988a p.129 
4 See Chapter 2 (a) 
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1.2 Faith and Jesus Christ 
In his earlier work on faith, Hick considered a personal relationship with God to be the 
pinnacle of religious experience. The history of religions had been marked by 
"gradual liberation"5 of individuals from group mentality to a sense of the personal 
divine mind calling him or her into free relationship. The doctrine of the incarnation 
is the "classic exemplification of this principle".6 Hence, he describes Jesus Christ as 
the culmination of this gradual process of God revealing himself. 7 
In Christianity the catalyst of faith is the person of Jesus Christ. It is in 
the historical figure of Jesus the Christ that, according to the Christian 
claim, God has in an unique and final way disclosed himself to men.8 
Hick distinguishes two senses in which faith is related to Christ: faith in and faith from 
Christ. Faith in Christ is the act of interpreting the historical Jesus as the Christ. Faith 
from Christ concerns the interpretation of the universe from the new-found 
Christological perspective.9 This is a Christian description because it relates faith 
directly to the person and message of the historical Jesus. 
1.3 Faith and Works 
Hick also sees his analysis of faith as providing resources for understanding the 
relationship between faith and works and this brings us to the crucial ethical basis for 
faith. While Christ's teachings concerning morality involve certain rules, nonetheless, 
the purpose of the morality is more than to simply lay down rules: 
5 Hick 1988a p.139 
6 Hick 1988a p.140 
7 Hick 1988a p.139 
8 Hick 1988a p.216 Hick provides a defence of the orthodox doctrine of the 
incarnation pp.219-228 
9 Hick 1988a p.218 
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But Jesus' critique of the Law arises from his perception that the kingdom 
is extended not merely by securing conformity of men's overt deeds to a 
stated code, but by changing people themselves. 1 0 
Hick argues that there is an integral connection between faith and works. Christian 
faith involves a new interpretation of reality which precipitates a radical 
transformation of one's very nature. I 1 Hick does not envisage Christian faith as an 
assent to belief without practical implications. 
The Distinctive Features ojChristian Faith 
There are three aspects of Hick's earlier presentation of faith that suggest he is 
describing a distinctive Christian faith. Firstly, faith relates people to a personal God 
in an I-Thou relationship of love, presence and purpose. Secondly, faith is both 
exemplified and made possible by Jesus Christ. Thirdly, faith is integrated with a 
lifestyle transformed by Christ's teachings. However, Hick's description does not 
depend upon a Christian theology. We shall now examine the non-tradition specific 
sense of faith that underlies even his early work. This will then provide a bridge for us 
to cross into the epistemology of his later work. 12 
2. Religious Faith 
Hick offers his work on faith and epistemology as appropriate for theists, agnostics 
and atheists though, of course, each of these groupings will regard the significance of 
faith quite differently: "we start from what is for the theist the conviction, for the 
10 Hick 1988a p.241 
11 Hick 1988a p.240 cf. Jesus' teaching in the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew Ch. 5-
8). 
12 Primarily expressed in Hick 1989a. We shall see that the Faith and Knowledge 
thesis needs but minor modification to be adopted as congruous with this later work. 
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agnostic the hypothesis, and for the atheist the delusion that God exists." 13 Hick does 
not claim that his work offers any attempt to settle the question of the factuality or 
otherwise of the existence of God. His philosophical account of the nature of faith 
does not depend on his readers taking any particular position regarding the existence 
of God. However, Hick does concede that the question he tackles is contained within 
certain parameters by the fact that he is considering awareness of one God rather than 
many gods. His chosen field is monotheistic rather than polytheistic. Furthermore, he 
describes the field to be the ethical monotheism of the Judeo-Christian tradition: 
For this book is not a comprehensive treatment of the place of faith in 
the religions of the world, but only an essay on the epistemology of faith 
as it occurs in that form of religion which constitutes a live option for 
most of the participants in our Western stream of culture. 14 
This suggests that Hick is dealing only with faith as conceived in the major religion or 
religions of the west. However, as a matter of fact, the significance of the "live 
option" he describes is primarily of illustrative significance. While the theories of 
faith with which Hick engages are within the Christian tradition, the framework in 
which the discussion is conducted is that of philosophical descriptions of human 
cognition. He describes his aim as an inquiry "into the manner and structure of the 
religious person's supposed awareness of the divine,,15 which comprises a careful 
avoidance of tradition specific terms. The epistemological structure of faith that Hick 
develops does not depend in any substantial sense on the truth of Christian revelation. 
In contrast, it is an account of faith that applies to any description of how people come 
to believe in a supernatural significance of the universe. The three step epistemology 
13 Hick 1988a p.2 
14 Hick 1988a p.2 
15 Hick 1988a p.1 
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of nature, ethics and the divine owe nothing uniquely to Christian belief. 16 Hick is 
committed to a philosophically neutral categorisation of the religious mind in his 
work. In his early work Hick assumes that Christianity is the best or highest 
exemplification of faith but he is certainly not committed to ruling out alternative 
valid expressions of faith. In terms of the defence of faith Hick is primarily engaged 
in a defence of the concept of religious knowledge but not necessarily to any particular 
expression of it. We shall now see that the publication of An Interpretation of 
Religion 17 required no great amendment to his epistemology but, rather, a 
simplification of it to its logical essence. 
2.1 Faith and Ambiguity 
Hick continues to maintain that the universe is religiously ambiguous. I8 By this he 
means that we are not morally or logically compelled to adopt one particular 
interpretation of the universe. This ambiguity is not peculiar to religious belief but is 
rooted in the structure of knowledge itself. Even in the case of natural meaning, "we 
can never compare the world as it appears in consciousness with the postulated world 
as it exists independently of its impact upon our human sensory and nervous 
systems" 19 and, as a consequence, we cannot claim to know directly that the meaning 
we impose upon the world (by the act of interpretation) is correct. Nonetheless, the 
16 An indication of that fact that Christianity illustrates rather than determines Hick's 
thesis is to be found in his use of the scripture references. The Bible is quoted directly 
83 times in Hick 1988a. Of these, 80 are to be found in the final part in which Hick 
brings his theory to bear on Christian belief (pp.213-263) while just 3 are found in the 
bulk of the work in which Hick develops an epistemology for faith. This is not a 
criticism in itself but does provide evidence for the argument that Hick's description of 
faith is a philosophical account illustrated by the distinctiveness of Christianity but not 
arising from them. 
17 Hick 1989a 
18 Hick 1989a p.l29. 
19 Hick 1989a p.l35 
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meaning we come to adopt will determine our lifestyle in relation to our environment 
(the physical analogy of the faith and works relationship) and lifestyles may be tested 
by the pragmatic qualities of whether they enable one "to live successfully" or are 
"self-destructive" .20 Furthermore, there are only a very narrow band of parameters 
regarding what might constitute viable natural meanings: 
Thus at this level our cognitive freedom is minimal; the physical world 
compels us to interpret its signals correctly and to live in it in terms of 
its real meaning for beings such as ourselves.21 
In this manner Hick establishes what will become a crucial connection between 
interpretation and experience. The interpretation of the world will be the result not of 
guesswork, which could have disastrous results, but of engagement with and 
experience of the world. 
2.2 Faith and Experience 
The connection is made by Hick with the term 'experiencing-as'. This is a 
development from Wittgenstein's concept of 'seeing-as' though Hick applies the 
concept more broadly so that it covers not just odd moments of experience but all of 
our expenence: 
But I want to argue that all conscious experiencing, including seeing, is 
experiencing-as: not only, for example seeing the protuberance -
erroneously - as a squirrel, but also seeing it correctly as a knobble on 
the branch.22 
20 Hick 1989a p.135 
21 Hick 1989a p.137 
22 Hick 1989a p.140. 
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The greater complexities of ethics and aesthetics give rise to a more pronounced sense 
of ambiguity and religious beliefs even more so. However, underlying all experience 
is the fundamental ambiguity overcome only by the act of interpretation on the part of 
the human subj ect. 
According to Hick's analysis there is a fundamental connection between faith and 
experience. In his earlier work Jesus functions for Christians as the source of faith but 
now his significance is relativised. Hick uses Jastrow's famous Duck-Rabbit puzzle to 
describe the creative act of interpretation?3 He then applies this to the place of Jesus 
in Christian faith: 
Thus the Christian response to Jesus was and is an uncompelled interpretation, 
experiencing an ambiguous figure in a distinctive way as mediating the trans-
forming presence of God.24 
Christ is the object of religious faith for Christians and other objects of faith are 
subject to the interpretations of religious people in other traditions. The world process 
is itself the object of Buddhist interpretation - open to reinterpretation as either the 
"stream of life, death and rebirth" or "in a radically different way it is Nirvana! ,,25 So 
we see the same process of an ambiguous object finding order, significance and 
meaning through the interpretative faculties of faith. Religious experience provides 
the cause for the interpretation of the universe in terms of religious meaning. 
2.3 Faith and the World Religions 
23 Cf. Hick 1989a p.140 
24 Hick 1989a p.157 
25 Hick 1989a p.157 
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In Hick's earlier work we noted that Christianity provided primary illustrative material 
for his account of faith. In his later work he distances himself from any specific world 
religion and provides an account of the function of faith in all religions. He suggests 
that it would be destructive for a finite human being "to have imposed upon it a more 
extensive or intensive awareness than it is able to assimilate.,,26 Therefore, reality 
must be shaped in some form to prevent an overload of information that would 
overwhelm the human subject. It is religious traditions that act as the cognitive 'filters' 
or 'resistances' of the vast array of information available.27 Most of the major post-
axial world religions function in this way. Christianity does not provide either a 
unique or a supreme source of knowledge for faith. 
Faith as the Religious Outlook 
Hick maintains the three levels of interpretation and describes religious interpretation 
as a 'total' interpretation subsuming interpretations of both the natural order and of 
ethics. However, he describes faith in general religious terms rather than in terms of 
specific Christian belief. In doing so he makes clear the underlying continuity of his 
epistemological position despite significant changes in his theological outlook. His 
apologetic provides a justification of religious faith as a general category. The primary 
reason why Hick believes such an apologetic to be necessary is because faith asserts 
something in the face of the religious ambiguity of the universe. 
26 Hick 1989a p.162 
27 Hick 1989a p.163 
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(b) Ambiguity and Scepticism 
The religious ambiguity of the universe is an important ground in Hick's case for 
cognitive freedom. The primary difference between natural meaning and religious 
meaning is that in the former the "margin of cognitive freedom" is a "narrow one" 1 
whereas in the latter cognitive freedom is "at a maximum".2 Hick provided theological 
substantiation for this idea in his earlier work with reference to the personal nature of 
God and the importance of truly personal relationships being uncompelled. 3 Because 
God desires that humans exercise free will in their choosing to love him, Hick 
describes God as "hiding himself behind his creation".4 According to his argument, 
for God to provide total proof of his existence would be for God to manipulate and 
coerce the human will. Various objections have been raised to this argument and we 
shall consider them further below.5 However, the sense in which God is personal is 
also subjected to rigorous revision in later work and consequently this theological 
appeal no longer carries the same weight. 
Radical Ambiguity as a Basis for Pluralism 
In order to sustain the case for a pluralist interpretation of religion Hick must provide a 
fresh treatment of the necessary religious ambiguity of the universe. Consideration 
will now be given to Hick's new case for ambiguity and then a comparison will be 
drawn with a brief account of the sceptic methodology. 
1 Hick 1988a p.123 
2 Hick 1988a p.128 
3 Hick provides three theological reasons to dispense with the "proofs" for the 
existence of God of which one is the coercion of belief they would imply. Badham 
1990 pp.50-54 (cf. Hick 1967). 
4 Hick 1988a p.135 
5 See Chapter 3 (c). 
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The fundamental ambiguous aspect of the universe is its potential for being interpreted 
"in both religious and naturalistic ways".6 Until the western Enlightenment Hick 
notes that intellectual thought had been dominated by religious world views but, in its 
wake, he describes the rising plausibility of various forms of naturalism. Hick does 
not argue that the universe is structurally ambiguous in itself but that all interpretation 
of the universe, being the creative act of free human subjects, is uncompelled. This, 
according to Hick, is something we have come to notice as heirs of the Enlightenment: 
"And in this post-Enlightenment age of doubt we have realised that the universe is 
religiously ambiguous. It evokes and sustains non-religious as well as religious 
responses."7 However, Hick does not wish simply to defend the weak point that the 
universe is as a matter of empirical fact interpreted in various ways and is, therefore, 
ambiguous. Such a sense of ambiguity only states the obvious about diversity in 
human culture but sheds no light on the nature of the epistemic relationship between 
human beings and the universe. Hick's account of ambiguity leads on to a claim that 
these different interpretations are "alike rationally defensible". 8 Philosophical 
arguments for or against any fundamental position must then necessarily be 
inconcl usi ve. 
Hick proceeds to give consideration to various arguments offered within the western 
theological tradition both for and against the existence of God.9 These need not detain 
us in detail. The ontological argument is "refuted by Kant's counter-argument" that 
"existence is not a predicate" and therefore no object may be defined into existence. IO 
6 Hick 1989a p.73 
7 Hick 1989a p.74 
8 Hick 1989a p.74 
9 See also Hick 1970 
10 Hick 1989a p.75 
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Cosmological arguments may not be open to formal refutation but Hick points out that 
they are unable to address the question why one should not accept that the universe is 
simply "the ultimate unexplained reality" .11 To this, the apologist depending on the 
cosmological argument is reduced to silence. Design arguments fail to convince for a 
number of reasons but fundamentally because they must assume some external 
measure by which the universe as a whole may be measured and the probability of its 
coming into existence by accident assessed: "there is no objective sense in which this 
is either more or less probable than any other possible universe." 12 An extension of 
the design argument appeals to the existence of human consciousness as evidence of a 
divine creator. Hick accepts that the religious person may feel this to be so but 
nonetheless "it is possible to find a naturalistic interpretation" that also accounts for all 
the known facts. 13 
Morality finds a secure foundation in religion but it does not provide conclusive 
evidence for the truth of a religious world view. While Christians may find that 
conscience suggests the divine origin of ethics the naturalist may be disposed to see 
that "morality is simply a remarkable human feature, continuous with though going far 
beyond analogous features of some of the other forms of animal life." 14 Religious 
experience may be compelling for those who have it but still explained in terms of 
illusion by the naturalist. It is perfectly sensible for the naturalist to claim that "the 
feeling of an unseen presence could all be hallucinatory in character.,,15 
11 Hick 1989a p.80 
12 Hick 1989a p.90 
13 Hick 1989a p.94 
14 Hick 1989a p.98 
15 Hick 1989a p.l 02 
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Hick also argues to the similar, though inverse, conclusions with reference to two 
major naturalistic challenges to theism. He outlines the arguments underlying the 
approaches of Freud and Durkheim to religion. Each depends upon the objection that 
religious phenomena can be satisfactorily explained without reference to a 
supernatural divinity. However, each is a case of reductionism that must depend 
"upon a prior naturalistic conviction". 16 Neither case is proven or provable but simply 
show how religious symbolism, desires and emotions may be satisfactorily explained 
in a non-religious way. Evil presents another challenge to theistic belief but, at the 
very least, Hick argues that some form of theodicy is able to show that while theism is 
certainly not proven by acts of wickedness in the world, it "can be shown not to be 
necessarily incompatible with them." 17 
The varIOUS arguments for and against naturalism and supernaturalism are not 
conclusive. Hick provides ample reason in each case to accept that religious or non-
religious conclusions are already assumed as part of the premises in each argument. 
There is no neutral, arbitrating argument that can settle the fundamental dispute 
between a naturalist and supernaturalist interpretation of the universe. This leads Hick 
to reassert his argument: 
It seems, then, that the universe maintains its inscrutable ambiguity. In some 
aspects it invites whilst in others it repels a religious response. It permits both 
a religious and a naturalistic faith, but haunted in each case by a contrary 
possibility that can never be exorcised. 18 
16 Hick 1989a p.114 
17 Hick 1989a p.121 
18 Hick 1989a p.124 
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The supposed ambiguity of the universe provides the basis for the re-Iaunch of Hick's 
now simplified epistemology of religious knowledge. Faith is the act of interpretation 
by which human beings order the ambiguous data of the universe into a sense and 
meaning that reveal a supernatural divine reality behind it. In one sense, this act is a 
necessary act of interpretation because even the secularist must make sense of the 
ultimate ambiguity of the universe and, consequently, make certain, albeit negative, 
religious judgements. 
The relationship between faith and the ambiguity of the universe gives rise to an 
important tension. Hick is relying upon a distinction between the logical or formal 
religious ambiguity of the universe and its concrete character in experience as 
unambiguous. Most people all of the time and some people for most of the time will 
interpret the universe in a particular way and, therefore, will not experience it as 
ambiguous. Only in the formal, logical sense might they admit the religious ambiguity 
of the universe. This is for two reasons. Firstly, this is because, as we have noted, 
Hick is certain that the universe does have a "definite character" 19 (an objective 
meaning) despite the various, sometimes incompatible, interpretations that humans 
make. Secondly, this is because one may only adopt one particular world view as a 
live option at any given time: 
For whilst the objective ambiguity of our environment consists in the fact that it 
is capable of being interpreted in a variety of ways, its consciously experienced 
and actively lived-in character consists in its actually being interpreted as mean-
ingful in a particular way which, whilst it operates, excludes other possible 
ways.20 
19 Hick 1989a p.73 
20 Hick 1989a p.129 
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The tension that arises with this ambiguity thesis is that in order to adopt the pluralist 
hypothesis one must be simultaneously aware of the religious ambiguity of the 
universe and convinced that the universe is religiously unambiguous. For 
philosophical reasons one must accept ambiguity while for psychological reasons one 
cannot accept ambiguity. If this tension is unresolved then it indicates an interesting 
interpretation of Hick's theological position. This interpretation would be that Hick 
adopts a Christian position for all practical purposes and devotional life (the 
psychological conviction of religion) but suspends that commitment in favour of the 
pluralist account when considering the phenomenon of religion in strictly logical terms 
(the philosophical interpretation of religion). This is a basic distinction between 
theory and practice. However, Hick does not permit this tension to remain unresolved. 
The pluralist hypothesis is offered as an all-inclusive interpretation of particular 
religious patterns of belief and behaviour. It cannot be excluded from extending its 
revolutionary impulse to the devotional life of believers. Every religious believer 
must appropriate the implications of the ambiguity thesis for their own faith.21 Hick's 
resolution is to claim that when one recognises the logical ambiguity of the universe 
then one must suspend the psychological certainty of commitment to a particular 
religious tradition. This suspension of commitment leads to what has been described 
as "transcendental agnosticism". 22 
21 "It is for the adherents of each of the great traditions to look critically at their own 
dogmas in the light of their new experience within a religiously plural world." (Hick 
1985 p.50) For Christians, it is commitment to the uniqueness or superiority of Christ 
that must be suspended in the light of pluralism (cf. Forrester 1976 p72, Netland 1991 
pp.240-249, Ogden 1988 pp.503-507). 
22 D'Costa 1991 and Mase 1994. Byrne identified earlier expressions of Hick's 
pluralist position as both sceptic and agnostic (Byrne 1982 p.292). 
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The Sceptic Tradition 
Penelhum describes the methodology of Scepticism as the demonstration of the 
unsatisfactory nature of any positive argument for a dogmatic position.23 Dogmatic 
certitude is not possible because of "the incapacity of human reason" .24 A central aim 
of Scepticism was to bring people to the realisation of these limitations in human 
reason. However, Scepticism did not intend to simply leave its victims in a state of 
doubt but to provide a practical way of life by which anyone could live happily with 
those doubts. Scepticism was offered as a practical philosophy. The position of 
suspended judgment was to lead to "Quietude".25 According to Penelhum, the Sceptic 
is to yield in conformity to one's cultural norms "in an undogmatic, or uncommitted, or 
belief-less way".26 There are habits of life that will lead one to live as if certain 
presuppositions or assumptions were certainly true but when articulating those views 
at a theoretical level or in philosophical discussion one must acknowledge that that 
certainty has no foundation. 
Hick does not acknowledge any connection between his ambiguity thesis and the 
methodology of the Sceptics. However, it is interesting to draw the connections 
because they are almost identical. A description of the Sceptic methodology by 
Penelhum will bring this connection into focus: 
the Sceptic will assemble all those arguments that Dogmatists have used to 
show that it not only appears that p, but really is, and then will assemble all the 
arguments that contrary-minded Dogmatists have used to show that even if it 
23 Penelhum 1983. "Dogmatist" being a technical term in Pyrrhonian Scepticism to 
identify philosophical schools claiming knowledge with certainty; i.e. Epicureanism 
and Stoicism. See Penelhum 1983 pA. 
24 Penelhum 1983 pA 
25 Penelhum 1983 p.6 
26 Penelhum 1983 p.6 
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~ppears. that p, it is not; this assemblage will bring upon him an incapacity to 
Judge eIther that p, or that not-po This will not make it cease to appear to him 
that p .... but it will enable him to live with his fellows who insist that p by 
conforming in his actions to their beliefs without affirming them.27 
Hick and the Sceptics develop a system of methodological doubt In which no 
proposition may be held as entirely certain. This is because a fundamental distinction 
is made between reality as it really is and reality as it is understood by the limited 
human intellect. The resulting pattern of behaviour commended by both Hick and the 
Sceptics is that of suspending commitment on the truthfulness of any given world 
view but acting in day to day life as if one particular world view (for practical 
purposes probably the world view that dominates one's culture) were veridical. The 
practice of setting arguments for p and for not-p off against one another is a simple 
method for securing transcendence of commitment to p as an absolute truth. This is 
exactly the method adopted by Hick. 
The discovery of the logical ambiguity of the universe does not leave the particular 
world view one continues to live with unchanged. On the contrary, the point of the 
Sceptic challenge is that this discovery would lead to cognitive peace: "what the 
Sceptic is helping us to do is to live in a world in which knowledge of [external 
realities] is not available. ,,28 However, the manner in which the Sceptic adopts 
customary traditions is different from the non-Sceptics adherence to those same 
practices. The traditions the Sceptic returns to in the wake of practising 
methodological doubt are "disinfected" of "those specious underpinnings of belief and 
valuation that have given it meaning. ,,29 
27 Penelhum 1983 p.9 
28 Penelhum 1983 p.8 
29 Penelhum 1983 p.I 0 
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The Sceptic came to realise that unravelling the ambiguity of the universe was neither 
possible nor necessary for a content life. His or her way of life: 
was one in which quietude could come from recognising that the world which 
he and others like him inhabited was one in which we could live satisfactorily 
by assenting to appearances but not disputing about the realities which lay 
behind them.30 
Hick also makes this claim regarding our religious commitments and the ultimate 
religious ambiguity of the universe. Religious commitments may still be professed 
after the Copernican revolution but their significance is seriously relativised. For a 
pluralist, creedal confessions are second-order statements based as they are on an 
underlying profession of the fundamental ambiguity of the universe. Hick is entitled 
to continue to profess the truth of Christianity but only because in line with his 
epistemology he has extensively revised the nature of this commitment and relativised 
the certainty of those truths. 
Faith Without Assurance 
The assumption that the universe is religiously ambiguous causes a change in the 
manner that religious beliefs are held. Even though, according to Hick's model, 
ambiguity remains only a formal or logical assumption, nonetheless, at the level of 
practice and confession it must cause one to approach debate and dispute without the 
conviction that one has true answers but with a humble ignorance continually 
searching for the truth that lies beyond.31 In order to sustain his ambiguity thesis Hick 
30 Penelhum 1983 p.ll 
31 The suspension of religious convictions that this ambiguity entails is also demanded 
by Markham's "open" account of religious dialogue in Markham 1994: "We now 
accept that absolute certainty about the nature of the world is clearly unobtainable. " 
p.176. It is the assumption also of Ward's convergent pluralism in Ward 1991 pp.175-
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must engage in apologetics but his apologetics are essentially an anti-apologetics. He 
is concerned with denying that our theological positions are built on certain axiomatic 
truths that must then be debated, defended and extended to those with alternative 
belief systems. Epistemological considerations lead Hick to argue that there are no 
axiomatic truths available to us because the universe is itself religiously ambiguous. 
F or this reason one must accept the truth of the Sceptic tradition at least with regard to 
religious commitment. Belief is a second order act of opinion informing day to day 
devotion and lifestyle which is held alongside a first order admission that the universe 
is religiously silent, open to a range of equally plausible interpretations. 
Ambiguity and Coercion 
Penelhum has questioned Hick's proposal that for belief to be meaningfully free it 
must occur without coercion. He rejects the argument that an ambiguous universe is a 
necessary condition for human freedom. Hick is mistaken because he confuses 
"having the truth made clear to one with being shattered into submission. ,,32 Having 
the truth made clear to one (through reason, revelation or miracle) causes "removal of 
grounds for reasonable doubt,,33 but not the restriction of freedom. Penelhum points 
out that any human subject "could refuse to accept them".34 The fact that such 
behaviour is irrational is neither here nor there as free beings are free to be irrational if 
they choose to be so.35 One may choose to act irrationally and, in so doing, be 
exercising cognitive freedom. 36 
177. 
32 Penelhum 1993 p.172 cf. Penelhum 1983 pp.111-112. 
33 Penelhum 1993 p.172 
34 Penelhum 1993 p.172 
35 Hick hints at this possibility in Badham 1990 pp.55-60 where he points out that a 
successful proof would not necessarily lead anyone to worship. 
36 This point will be explored further with reference to the relativity of rationality in 
Chapter 5. While I believe Penelhum's point to be sound I would want to suggest that 
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Coercion and the Faith of Christ 
Hick's description of the faith of Christ IS a good example of 'coerced' faith. 
Throughout the dramatic revisions in his Christo logy a clear pattern emerges in his 
descriptions of the faith of Christ. In his early work we read: 
For in whatever manner Jesus first impressed his disciples - whether as a 
wonder-worker, as a teacher, or as a magnetic and numinous personality 
- the outstanding fact about him, which soon gripped them, was his sheer 
moral goodness and purity, his total lack of concern for himself and the 
absolute dedication of his life to his heavenly Father's purposes.37 
In this early description of Christ, Hick is keen to stress (through the use of "sheer", 
"total" and "absolute") the quality of faith and conviction that motivated Jesus. This 
was a man consumed with the sense of God's will and purpose. There is no hint that 
Jesus had come to make a reasonable choice in the face of an ambiguous situation. 
This characterisation of Jesus is made with increasing clarity and force in Hick's later 
work. He describes Jesus as "intensely and overwhelmingly conscious of the reality of 
God" and "his life a continuous response to the divine love as both utterly gracious 
and utterly demanding. ,,38 Hick does not describe Jesus exercising cognitive freedom 
in his response to God. On the contrary, he was 'overwhelmingly conscious' of the 
truth of theism and found God's love 'utterly demanding'. 
the use of the terms "rational" and "irrational" beg too many questions. It would be 
more accurate to say that a human agent may choose to reject one system of rationality 
and adopt an alternative rational system in order to avoid having to adopt a belief they 
do not wish to. In doing so it is a simple truism that their resulting belief will be 
classed as irrational or non-rational by those retaining the former rationality. 
37 Hick 1988b p.223 
38 Hick 1977b p.172 
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For Hick's Agape-Christology39 to work he must make an identification between the 
will of Christ and the will of God. He is aware that this identification suggests a cause 
and effect relationship between God and Christ and, he remarks, this may echo the 
paradox of the compatibility of divine sovereignty and human freedom: 
"But this must not lead us to a picture of God (in heaven) causing Jesus (on 
earth) to act in this way or that, like a puppet-master pulling strings or a 
general directing his troops by field radio. ,,40 
In contrast, Hick argues that the relationship between God and Christ in purpose is 
"analogous to that in which the radiating energy of the sun 'causes' the falling of its 
rays upon the earth's surface. ,,41 In other words, Hick wishes to describe the 
relationship in more organic, continuous metaphors than puppets or soldiers would 
suggest. However, this does nothing to lessen the implications for the free will of 
Jesus. It does permit Hick to open the logical possibility of many "saviours" (or, more 
technically, people whose wills matched the will of God) but not to weaken the 
overwhelming nature of God's revelation to these people. Consequently, Hick 
continues to describe the experience of Jesus in unequivocal terms: 
But Jesus was so fully God's agent, so completely conscious of living in God's 
presence and serving God's love, that the divine reality was mediated through 
him to others.42 
39 The Christo logy Hick espoused in 1977. This suggestion arises in the period at the 
end of his conservative phase immediately prior to Copernican revolution. It is 
interesting to note that even here, the Christology is preparing the ground for the shift 
to the radical position. 
40 Hick 1988b pp.162-163 
41 Hick 1988b p.163 
42 Hick 1988b p.1 77 
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That Jesus is so 'fully' and 'completely' aware of the truth of theism continues to raise 
the problem of how far he shared in the logical predicament of ambiguity with all that 
this entails for certainty in religious belief. Interestingly, one of the strongest 
statements of the absolute sense in which Hick claims that Jesus was aware of the 
truth of theism is found in his most recent writings: 
From the point of view of the psychology of religion we can say that only an 
extremely intense God-consciousness could have sustained Jesus' firm prophetic 
assurance and charismatic power. The heavenly Father was utterly real to him 
- as real as the men and women with whom he interacted every day or the 
Galilean hills among which they lived.43 
To Jesus the reality of God was no different from the reality of the physical world 
around him. So real was Jesus' consciousness of God that even his disciples were able 
to appropriate his consciousness for themselves. This description raises acute 
problems when related to Hick's account of faith and ambiguity. We have noted that 
the three step epistemology is present throughout Hick's work. A primary distinction 
between the first step, the natural, and the third step, the religious, is that at the first 
step only narrow parameters for interpretation are possible while at the third step, as a 
result of the ambiguity thesis, enormous variation is possible. In Faith and Knowledge 
Hick draws a moral conclusion from this distinction; "If God were to reveal himself to 
us in the coercive way in which the physical world is disclosed to us, he would thereby 
annihilate us as free and responsible persons."44 However, in the case of Jesus Christ, 
his experience of God was on a level with his experience of the Galilean hills. Christ's 
experience of God was within the first step (the natural) of interpretation. The reason 
why his experience was so vivid lay in God's overwhelming revelation of himself and 
43 Hick 1993a p.18 cf. Hick 1989a p.216 
44 Hick 1988b p.134 
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this revelation of love being so utterly demanding. Hick describes the faith of Jesus 
(along with that of Paul, Old Testament saints and those of Christian history) as 
"involuntary" .45 
Conclusion 
Hick commends Jesus to us as a model of religious faith as well as the source of 
Christian faith and, yet, Jesus is an example of someone whose faith was compelled. 
According to Hick's anthropology Jesus is fully human and to be fully human one 
must be a free agent capable of an uncoerced response to the religious ambiguity of the 
universe. Jesus, even were he the only figure in history to have done so, would be the 
exception that proves the rule: there is no incoherence in a free moral agent adopting 
a religious belief even though under compulsion to believe. It is true that 'compulsion' 
in this sense does not imply being violently forced to believe that something is the 
case but this is of no consequence. Penelhum is correct in declaring that Hick 
confuses being shattered into submission with having the truth shown to one. Hick's 
use of the word 'compulsion' is exactly a confusion of these senses. If one agrees that 
no such incompatibility between compulsion and freedom exist then as a consequence, 
adoption of theism rather than atheism may be understood in terms of obedience and 
disobedience (moral categories) rather than in terms of rationality and irrationality 
(intellectual categories). This being the case we have grounds to question the viability 
of Hick's ambiguity thesis. We must now assess how, given an ambiguous universe, 
Hick seeks to ground the rationality of faith. 
45 Badham 1990 p.59 
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(c) An Apologetic for Religion 
According to Hick's early work the rationality of theistic belief is justified on the 
grounds of vivid religious experience. This does not necessarily mean that anyone at 
all is justified in holding theistic belief to be true: 
the proper question is whether the religious man's awareness of being in the 
unseen presence of God constitutes a sufficient reason for the religious man 
himself to be sure of the reality of God. l 
Hick argues that religious experience provides the grounds for those who have it to be 
rationally justified in believing whatever their experience compels them to believe. In 
this sense, the connection between belief and experience is the same at the third step, 
religious belief, as it is at the first step, natural belief. We trust that our experience is 
substantially veridical. It is important to note that this is a person-relative application 
of rationality. The atheist and the theist may both be rationally justified in believing 
what they believe on the basis of their different personal experiences. In terms of 
Hick's realist framework, only one, at most, can be correct in their belief but both can 
be rational. 
In his contribution to Arguments For the Existence of God Hick developed his 
understanding of rational religious belief further. After providing three theological 
reasons why many Christians have rejected theistic proofs as inappropriate,2 Hick 
moves on to establish the rational structure of belief without proof. He observes that 
religious belief does not normally arise from speculative logical arguments or proofs: 
"The claims of religion are claims made by individuals and communities on the basis 
1 Hick 1988a p.21 0 
2 Badham 1990 pp.50-55 
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of their experience". 3 The starting point for religious belief does not lie in 
metaphysical speculation but in experience. Therefore, the test for rational belief 
cannot start with the logical process by which those beliefs are arrived at but must start 
with the pre-theoretical experience that causes those beliefs to arise. The question of 
rationality is then settled with reference to "the rationality of a particular person's 
believing, given the data that he is using"4 rather than by comparison with some 
universal standards of truth. 
Hick's Parity Argument 
Hick uses a version of the parity argument5 in order to maintain that religious belief is 
rational even given the fact that there are many people who have had no significant 
religious experience. His sceptic account of knowledge undermines the assumption 
that sense experience can be trusted with complete certainty. On the contrary, 
Scepticism claimed that "its veridical character cannot be logically demonstrated".6 
The assumption that sense experience can be trusted as a true disclosure of an 
objective world can find no theoretical guarantee. Hick maintains that this follows 
the: 
success of Hume's attempt to show that our normal non-solipsist belief in 
an objective world of enduring objects around us in space is neither a 
product of, nor justifiable by, philosophical reasoning but is what has been 
called .... a natural belief.7 
3 Badham 1990 p.55 
4 Badham 1990 p.56 
5 An argument relying upon analogy. 
6 Badham 1990 p.57 
7 Badham 1990 p.57 In ascribing this concept to Hume, Hick is following the ground 
breaking work of Norman Kemp Smith 1941. Hume offers certain sceptic arguments 
only to transcend them with his own notion of natural belief. Kling 1991 pp.453-477 
also develops a form of the parity argument in his treatment of "fundamental trust". 
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A 'natural belief is part of a class of beliefs that have no theoretical justification but 
are essential and natural to human existence. One simply cannot live without 
assuming an objective universe despite the absence of theoretical proof. Therefore, 
one must relax, in the manner of Quietude, into adopting a naturalist position where 
unproven beliefs are held as true beliefs. 
It is thus a basic truth in, or a presupposition of, our language that it is 
rational or sane to believe in the reality of the external world that we 
inhabit in common with other people, and irrational or insane not to 
do so.8 
There are two features of sense experience that induce trust in its veridical nature. The 
first is the "involuntary character"9 of such experience. The experience is so 
compelling that one feels unable, psychologically, to believe otherwise. The second 
feature is the obvious practical advantage one finds in living on the assumption that 
the experience is veridical. It enables one to "act successfully in terms of our belief in 
an external world".10 Taken together, these two features provide adequate reasons for 
one living upon the assumption that belief in an objective reality is a true belief. Such 
true belief counts as justified belief. Hick then applies the same structure of argument 
to belief in the religious significance of the universe. 
Religious experience is, at least for theists, the "sense of the presence of God" .11 This 
experience is, for many, of such a compelling quality that it would seem reasonable for 
those individuals to assume the veridical nature of their experience. It would seem 
8 Badham 1990 p.58 
9 Badham 1990 p.58 
10 Badham 1990 p.58 
II Badham 1990 p.58 
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insane to those who have such experience to do otherwise: "he is no more inclined to 
doubt its veridical character than to doubt the evidence of his senses". 12 Hick 
describes an analogous relationship between the reasonableness of natural belief in 
empirical matters and the reasonableness of belief in religious matters. If one is 
justified then so, by parity, is the other. 
Hick's Account of Credulity 
In An Interpretation of Religion Hick expands his account of rationality and belief 
with reference to the principle of credulity. 13 This principle suggests that, given no 
obvious countervailing considerations, one should trust that how one perceives things 
to be is how things really are. Countervailing considerations might include the 
amount of alcohol one has consumed or the brevity of an experience. 14 If such 
countervailing considerations are not present then, according to the principle of 
credulity, to not trust our basic perceptions of the world as an external reality is to 
"border upon insanity". 15 
Hick describes as "the great souls or mahatmas" 16 those whose experience of God was 
"as real" as their experience of other people and, in the case of Jesus, of "the hills and 
rivers and lake of Galilee" .17 The principle of credulity, which we share with these 
great souls, informs us that we can only live: "on the basis of our experience and on 
the assumption that it is generally cognitive .... of reality transcending our own 
12 Badham 1990 p.S9 
13 A term developed in Swinburne 1979. 
14 Hick 1989a p.21S 
15 Hick 1989ap.21S 
16 Hick 1989a p.21S 
17 Hick 1989a p.216 
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consciousness. " 18 Therefore, the great soul must trust in the veridical nature of their 
experience of God as a living presence. 
However, Hick assumes that none of his readership have the intensity of experience 
that marks the great souls. The rationality of belief in the case of exceptional 
experience provides only a weak foundation for rationality in the case of normal 
experience. Hick asks "whether it is rational for us to adopt beliefs on the ground that 
someone else, in another culture, reasonably held them." 19 The first principle Hick 
introduces to address this question is that those adopted beliefs must be compatible 
with the wider range of beliefs we already acknowledge to be true. For example, Hick 
argues that we cannot adopt the beliefs of Jesus concerning cosmology or medicine 
because these fail "to cohere with .... our contemporary scientific beliefs. ,,20 To trust 
in the experience of someone else as veridical requires that one adopt certain related 
beliefs as at least logically possible but does not require that one adopt all of their 
beliefs. Hick claims that this is the proper place for natural theology which does not 
"prove the existence of God, or even show it to be probable".21 Instead it provides 
grounds for the possibility of the belief being true. Confirmation of this possibility is 
provided by religious experience. 
Regarding those who do not have such compelling religious experIences, Hick 
concludes that they "cannot have the same justification for belief as those who do".22 
Hick discusses the justification of belief in the case of two alternative types of 
18 Hick 1989a p.216 
19 Hick 1989a p.21 9 
20 Hick 1989a p.219 
21 Hick 1989a p.219 
22 Hick 1989a p.221 
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religious people not benefiting from the experience open to the great souls. Firstly. 
concerning those devoid of personal experience: 
They might possibly .... be so impressed by the moral and spiritual fruits of 
faith in the lives of the saints as to be drawn to share, at least tentatively, the 
latter's beliefs - in which case it would .... be proper to count their being 
impressed in this way as itself a secondary kind of religious experience.23 
The second type of person, more normal according to Hick, are those who do have a 
less intensive version, a "remote echo" ,24 of the same kind of experience described by 
the great souls. These are the 'peak' experiences of the divine presence during 
moments of heightened awareness. Because such experiences are more sporadic and 
less compelling than those of the great souls; "One's belief is not so deeply or solidly 
grounded as theirs. ,,25 Nonetheless, it does provide reason for such people to adopt 
the beliefs they do. 
Hick establishes the rationality of religious belief on the cognitive expenence of 
religious meaning in the universe. Such experience is a ground for the third step in 
epistemic development. Hick describes three forms or levels of religious experience. 
The most basic level is the experience of being impressed by the claimed experience 
of someone else. This experience provides the least grounds for faith and, as a 
consequence, is "always vulnerable to the kind of sceptical challenge" found in the 
modem world.26 The second level is that of momentary peak experiences giving 
cause to trust in the validity of the experience claimed by others. In this case, personal 
experience bolsters the confidence one has in the more profound experience seen in 
23 Hick 1989a p.221 
24 Hick 1989a p.222 
25 Hick 1989a p.223 
26 Hick 1989a p.222 
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another. The third level, the highest, is that of the great soul, saint or mahatma whose 
religious experience is continuous with their experience of the natural world. While 
each level varies in the extent to which it provides grounds for the reasonableness of 
belief, it remains the case that each does provide minimal grounds for belief. Hick 
rests his case for the rationality of belief in the personal religious experience of the 
believer. Whatever the intensity, faith is justified by experience. 
Hick places great weight on personal religious expenence In his defence of the 
reasonableness of religious belief. He has done so throughout his epistemology and so 
it is a continuous thread running through both his early philosophy and his later 
development of the pluralist hypothesis. It is capable of this consistent position in his 
work because of two relevant features. Firstly, Hick's description of religious 
experience is individualistic. It is not traditions as a whole that are the subjects of 
justification but the personal or even private religious feelings of individuals. 
Therefore, if a prima facie similarity of experience can be established among 
individuals throughout the world religions then Hick is able to marginalise the 
significance of the traditions to which they belong. Secondly, Hick's account of 
religious experience has minimal content. It is largely an account of a quality of 
experience rather than an account of the content of experience. His use of such 
expressions as the 'divine presence' or 'limitless goodness' to identify the content of 
religious experience are deliberately vague. This permits Hick to extend his 




Hick's epistemology is built upon these two major features of belief. The 
individualism of religious belief separates specific cases of faith from the broad 
traditions of enquiry in which they are found.27 The minimalist content of religious 
experience demands a distinction between the direct beliefs the religious person is 
entitled to hold on the basis of their experience and the indirect beliefs they formulate 
in theology. Theology is, for Hick, a second-order discourse. A major critique of 
these features will be made when we turn to a range of responses to enlightenment 
thought.28 However, we will now analyse the very core of Hick's contemporary 
epistemology. We will see that it is Hick's commitment to a Kantian account of 
religious knowledge that compels him to adopt the sceptical assumptions of his 
ambiguity thesis. 
27 This is an extension of the key argument in Smith's distinction between religion as 
the cumulative tradition and religion as a personal act of faith (Smith 1963). Hick 
acknowledges a significant debt to Smith in his pluralist hypothesis (Hick 1989a 
p.160). 
28 Particularly in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4 The Kantian Inheritance 
(a) Two Worlds of Truth 
Kant's philosophy has always exercised a degree of influence on Hick's thought though 
this influence has become more prominent in his most recent work. In this section we 
will trace his use of Kant and analyse the implications of drawing upon Kant's 
epistemology. In section (a) we shall examine Hick's conscious appropriation of Kant. 
In sections (b) and (c) we uncover more general themes in Kant's work that are echoed 
in Hick. In section (d) we will be in a position to establish the great continuity that 
lies between the work of these two thinkers. This continuity is much greater than Hick 
would himself acknowledge. It is this continuity that provides the basis for the claim 
that Hick is committed to an essential scepticism with regard to religious knowledge. 
This in tum undermines the possibility of a faith constituted approach to enquiry and 
apologetics. 
Faith based on Morality 
In his earlier work, Hick criticised Kant's description of God and immortality for being 
no more than postulates of reason. These religious postulates are assumptions made in 
the course of practical considerations. Hick distances himself from the theoretical 
nature of Kant's categorisations: 
For the purpose of our inquiry, the main comment to be made upon this 
Kantian theory is that it leaves no room for any acquaintance with or 
experience of the divine, such as religious persons claim. l 
I Hick 1988a p.62 
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As already noted, Hick's theistic world VIew finds justification in the religious 
experience of individual believers. God, therefore, is not for Hick a postulate of 
reason or morality but a felt presence. Nonetheless, Hick writes elsewhere that Kant's 
position on this does have "limited validity" because: 
To recognise moral claims as taking precedence over all other interests is, 
implicitly, to believe in a reality of some kind, other than the natural world, 
that is superior to oneself and entitled to one's obedience.2 
Consequently, there is an important connection between the work of Hick and Kant 
regarding the possibility of indirect justification. Moral belief is the second step of 
interpretation in Hick's schematic epistemology. Moral interpretation, as with 
religious interpretation, is grounded upon experience of a certain sort and it is this 
experience that provides the indirect justification for moral beliefs. Hick adds 
religious experience as a further component missing in Kant's epistemology but he 
argues that such an addition remains consistent with Kant's thought. However, even at 
this early stage of his work he identifies a development in Kant's position with which 
he is much more sympathetic: 
in the later very fragmentary Opus Postumum Kant moved toward a 
rather different view according to which the experience of the moral law, 
instead of being treated as the basis for a theistic postulation, is thought 
of as in some manner mediating the divine presence and will.3 
Such a shift in Kant's thought would be much more attractive to Hick. Furthermore, 
such a shift does not require a radical change in epistemology. The important term in 
use here is the description of experience as "mediating" something beyond experience. 
Mediation allows for a more direct connection between human subject and divine 
2 Hick 1990a p.29 
3 Hick 1988a p.63 
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reality through experience than the noumenonlphenomenon distinction would suggest. 
However, in the course of our discussion we will see that Hick's notion of mediation , 
shaped by Kant's epistemology, is an empty term. 
The General Category of the Ethical 
Despite Hick's disavowal of Kant's notion of the religious postulate, he does affirm 
Kant's general treatment of ethics particularly with reference to the categorical 
imperative. He describes it as one of the philosophical "high points" where Christ's 
golden rule has found expression.4 According to Hick, Kant's description of the 
universal validity of ethics based on the categorical imperative is open to being 
understood in entirely Buddhist terms. Kant's man of duty is equivalent to an arhat 
making his ethics "a useful stepping-stone to the more positive and mysterious things 
that are said about nirvana in the pali canon."5 In this way Hick categorises Kant's 
work on ethics as a theoretical exposition of a core moral belief found in both 
Christianity and Buddhism. Such a treatment of ethics provides the basis for 
substantiating the pluralist hypothesis because it removes the need to define moral 
claims in terms specific to any tradition. 
The Kantian Structure of Pluralism 
The most sustained use Hick makes of Kant is with regard to the epistemic framework 
of the pluralist hypothesis. While Hick's three step epistemology is compatible with 
the notion of different interpretations of the same religious object it does not explain 
why such different interpretations should occur. This is particularly significant as 
there are not such very different interpretations in the case of natural or moral 
knowledge. Hick's argument in favour of cognitive freedom of religious interpretation 
4 Hick 1976a p.426 
5 Hick 1976a p.435 
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primarily concerns the freedom to adopt or not adopt a religious, as opposed to a 
naturalistic, interpretation of the universe. In itself, it does not account for why there 
should be such varied religious interpretations of the universe. Hick draws directly 
from Kant's epistemology in order to account for pluralism. We will now review this 
more sustained use of Kant and then briefly compare Kant's own claims with those of 
Hick in order to draw out the distinctiveness of Hick's position. 
The basic thesis of religious pluralism as defined by Hick relies upon the crucial 
distinction between "the Real an sich and the Real as variously experienced-and-
thought by different human communities".6 Human communities do not perceive the 
Real as it is. Their perception is always conditioned by the cultural context in which it 
occurs. Therefore, the Real as perceived is not the same as the Real that is not 
perceived. In order to provide a theoretical framework for this claim Hick draws upon 
"one of Kant's most basic epistemological insights" which he expresses in general 
terms as: 
the mind actively interprets sensory information in terms of concepts, 
so that the environment as we consciously perceive and inhabit it is 
our familiar three-dimensional world of objects interacting in space.7 
The familiar environment we inhabit is not the real world in itself. Hick identifies the 
active component of human knowledge. According to him the mind does not 
passively receive the sensory information from which it constructs a view of the 
world.8 N or is the environment simply the construction of the mind. Hick affirms 
6 Hick 1989a p.236 
7 Hick 1989a p.240 
8 The assumption of the classical empiricist thinkers. See especially Locke 1976 
[1690] who, famously. described the mind as "white paper void of all characters" 
(p.33) until furnished with ideas from experience. 
128 
both sensory information (objectivity) and the active role of the mind in interpretation 
(subjectivity). The characteristics of dimensional experience - time, space, substance, 
causality and so on - are all categories of the mind through which the otherwise 
chaotic sensory information is ordered. Hick is well aware that this is but one, simple, 
aspect of Kant's thought and that the broader range of his work is subject to intense 
debate.9 Therefore, he distinguishes his own use of Kant from Kantian studies, noting 
that his own application is not one of which Kant would have approved. He also 
suggests that the basic thrust of Kant's principle is to be found in Thomas Aquinas and 
the Muslim theologian Al Junaid.lO However, Hick is not simply using Kant's work 
as an illustration of his own arguments and conclusions in the way that he uses the 
Bible. 1 1 There is a distinctively Kantian insight he is drawing upon. This is Kant's 
explicit distinction "between an entity as it is in itself and as it appears in 
perception" .12 This distinction is characterised as noumenon and phenomenon where 
the latter indicates reality as ordered by our interpretative capacities and the former 
indicates that world as it is in itself. Hick states the consequent division: "the 
noumenal world exists independently of our perception of it and the phenomenal 
world is that same world as it appears to our human consciousness." 13 
Knowledge distinguished from Reality 
The basic insight Hick wishes to press into service must be modified in order to suit 
his purposes. He is not concerned to develop this distinction with regard to natural 
belief. As we have noted, the first two steps in his epistemology, nature and morality, 
permit little freedom of interpretation and, as a result, command much continuity of 
9 Hick 1989a p.240 
10 Hick 1989a p.241 
11 cf. Chapter 3 (a) n.16 
12 Hick 1989a p.241 
13 Hick 1989a p.241 
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thought between people belonging to different cultures and periods in history. 
However, the third step pennits great epistemic freedom and it is this step, the 
religious interpretation and its resulting pluralism, that is to be understood in tenns of 
the Kantian distinction. Therefore, the analogous use Hick is making of Kant's 
thought is the claim that the Real as it is in-itself must be distinguished from the Real 
as it is perceived by us. In this discussion, Hick remarks that he is departing from 
Kant's own thought: 
But for Kant God is postulated, not experienced. In partial agreement but 
also partial disagreement with him, I want to say that the Real an sich is 
postulated by us as a pre-supposition, not of the moral life, but of religious 
experience and the religious life, whilst the gods, as also the mystically 
known Brahman, Sunyata and so on, are phenomenal manifestations of the 
Real occurring within the realm of religious experience. 14 
Hick affinns the existence of the Real in the same way that Kant affinns the existence 
of the noumenon: it is the ground of phenomenon. However, its existence cannot be 
known directly, for all knowledge is interpreted and, therefore, knowledge of 
phenomenon. This implies that the existence of the Real must, after all, be a postulate. 
Hick only differs from Kant on this point in asserting that the ground of the postulate 
is experience rather than morality or pure reason. Nonetheless, the earlier suggestion 
by Hick that his position differed from Kant because of the possibility of mediated 
experience of the Real no longer holds. IS The divine presence is not mediated by 
experience because the only possible objects of experience are the phenomenon: 
"When we speak of a moral God .... we are speaking of the Real as humanly 
experienced: that is, as phenomenon." 16 The persona of the Real not the Real itself is 
14 Hick 1989a p.243 
15 cf. Hick 1988a p.63 
16 Hick 1989a p.246 
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the object of experience. Therefore, the Real (the in-itself) is not experienced but 
postulated as the necessary ground of religious experience. Despite Hick's earlier 
protestations to the contrary it is clear that the noumenal Real is a postulate for his 
work in the same way as it had been for Kant. The only remaining difference being 
that Kant understands this to be a postulate of morality and pure reason whereas Hick 
maintains that it is a postulate of religious experience. However, even this difference 
is superficial. In our analysis of Hick's epistemology we have understood Hick's 
treatment of religious experience to be essentially moralistic: religious experience 
includes, while transcending, the experience of moral necessity and compulsion in 
one's life. Thus, in a very real sense Hick adds nothing to Kant's two-fold theory of 
reality and the role of postulate as the only bridge between the two. 
The differences Hick describes between his own epistemic position and that of Kant 
are not matters of substance. An absolute divide is maintained between the Real an 
sich and the Real as experienced. The dichotomy is offered as a means of both 
explaining the existence of a plurality of religious interpretations and of demanding 
tolerance on the part of those who hold to one of those many interpretations. This 
conclusion is seriously problematic as we shall see in a moment but first we may 
consider Kant's own treatment of the phenomenonlnoumenon relationship. 
The Significance of H ume 
Kant had been greatly occupied with the thought of Hume. Prior to his encounter with 
Hume's thought he had been party to the mainstream of German Idealist philosophy 
but, in Kant's famous words, Hume "interrupted my dogmatic slumber". 17 Hume's 
treatment of causality had brought to the surface a fundamental problem in 
17 Kant 1989 (1783) p.7 
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epistemology. An example of what we might call causality is the relationship between 
a flame and its heat upon us. Burne describes the epistemic interpretation of this 
relationship: 
Thus we remember to have seen that species of object we callflame, 
and to have felt that species of sensation we call heat. We likewise 
call to mind their constant conjunction in all past instances. Without 
any further ceremony, we call the one cause, and the other effect, and 
infer the existence of the one from the other. 18 
The problem with the absence of 'ceremony' is that it also represents an absence of 
reason. There is no thing, 'causation', that we have identified in this process. All that 
has been identified is the constant conjunction of events and the natural habit of 
relating them to one another through the concepts of cause and effect. Hume applied 
this treatment to many areas of thought and thus exhibited the poverty of the 
empiricist position: many of our most treasured beliefs are not based upon sensory 
evidence or experience but rather on simple habits of the mind. Exactly what Hume 
wanted to make of these startling conclusions is the subject of much debate. 19 Kant 
did not accept what he understood to be Hume's sceptical conclusions but undertook 
the constructive task of demonstrating how an epistemology may proceed on the basis 
of the a priori nature of many beliefs such as causation and subsistence. Kant 
18 Burne 1987 (1739) p.134 
19 The traditional view of Burne describes him as a sceptic. Russell accuses him of 
this suggesting that his work represented the "bankruptcy of eighteenth-century 
reasonableness" (Russell 1984 p.645). Hume himself certainly prompts such 
suspicions with his admission that "As the sceptical doubt arises naturally from a 
profound and intense reflection on those subjects, it always increases the further we 
carry our reflection .... carelessness and inattention alone can afford us any remedy." 
(Hume 1987 p.269). However, Norman Kemp Smith broke the long tradition of 
interpreting Hume as a sceptic and, instead emphasised the place of natural instinctual 
belief as the grounds of knowledge (Kemp Smith 1941). For our purposes we shall 
not refer to this discussion but simply adopt Kant's treatment of Hume as a sceptic. 
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understood Hume to have set a problem rather than found a solution and to the task of 
finding that solution Kant set himself. He contrasts his work with that of Hume who: 
ran his ship ashore, for safety's sake, landing on scepticism, there to let 
it lie and rot; whereas my object is rather to give it a pilot, who, by means 
of safe astronomical principles .... may steer the ship safely .... 20 
In his response to Hume's scepticism, Kant maintained that the mind was formed by a 
priori intuitions: "At the basis of empirical intuition lies a pure intuition (of space and 
time) which is a priori. "21 Kant argued that space and time were intuitions of the 
human mind already present in the encounter with reality. All reality is ordered by the 
mind in terms of spatial position and temporal sequence. Knowledge is impossible 
without the a priori contribution of these intuitions. Furthermore, Kant drew up a 
table of the concepts of the human mind that also order all knowledge.22 The 
resulting "physical system" is one that "precedes all empirical cognition of nature"23 
and provides the framework in which all experience will occur. Kant's solution to 
what he supposed was Hume's dilemma is to affirm the subjective contribution of the 
human mind in the construction of human knowledge while also establishing 
empirical realism on the presupposition that such construction only occurs in response 
to the sensations of an external world. Besides the empirical, Kant established that: 
particular concepts must yet be superadded - concepts which have their 
origin quite a priori in the pure understanding, and under which every 
perception must first of all be subsumed and then their means changed 
into experience.24 
20 Kant 1989 p.9 
21 Kant 1989 p.36 
22 Kant 1989 p.61 
23 Kant 1989 p.64 
24 Kant 1989 pp.54-55 
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Thus far, we may identify Hick's use of Kant's categories and intuitions, as analogous 
to the role of religion and doctrine where human thought forms shape religious 
experience into its culturally peculiar forms. The connection Hick draws with Kant's 
work is sometimes analogous but other times direct. To treat the Christian world view 
as a correlate to Kant's a priori would clearly be an example of using Kant's work 
analogously. In contrast to Kant, the Christian world view, as an a priori, may be 
adopted for a variety of reasons and held with a variety of degrees of strength and 
conviction. Kant's a priori do not have these features because they are prior to all 
experience whatsoever. Hick uses the a priori as analogous to the role of religious 
experience within the religious world view. 
The Postulates of Religious Faith 
However, there is a direct connection that Hick makes between religious belief and 
Kant's epistemology. This is the role of the basic belief that the universe is filled with 
a divine presence and will. Such a basic belief is not specifically Christian but, rather, 
an example of the basic religious interpretation of the universe. This is a genuine 
example of an a priori category of the understanding existing for those who have it, as 
it were, prior to all reflection. There are then two uses Hick makes of Kant's a priori, 
one of which is analogous and one is direct. These two uses relate to the distinction in 
Hick's work between religious faith and Christian faith.25 Christian faith is only 
analogous to Kant's a priori whereas religious faith is a direct example of Kant's a 
priOri. 
25 Chapter 3 (a). 
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Kant denies that the categories of the understanding apply to reality in itself. Because 
they have an active role in the construction of reality they cannot reach beyond the 
reality they help shape: 
A transcendental use is made of a concept in a principle, when it is 
referred to things in-themselves; an empirical use, when it is referred 
merely to appearances, that is to objects of a possible experience.26 
Though affirming the latter use of categories, Kant denies the possibility of their 
transcendental use. Transcendental use of the categories is impossible because the 
categories only ever exist in a composite form; made up of both "the logical form of 
the concept" and "an object to which it may apply" .27 The empirical element of sense 
experience is essential to the operation of the a priori without which they "are mere 
play of imagination" .28 Thus, the categories are only applicable to the phenomenal 
world of appearances. The noumena are not sensible and, therefore, not an 
appropriate object for the intuitions of space and time or the categories of the 
understanding. Consequently, the noumenon is no more than a postulate and lies 
beyond discursive understanding: 
Where this unity of time is not to be met with, as is the case with noumena, 
the whole use, indeed the whole meaning of the categories is entirely lost, 
for even the possibility of things to correspond to the categories is in this 
case incomprehensible.29 
Thus we see a sharp divide between the phenomenal world ordered and comprehended 
by the active participation of the mind and the noumenal world which is beyond 
26 Kant 1993 (1781) p.206 
27 Kant 1993 p.207 
28 Kant 1993 p.207 
29 Kant 1993 p.212 
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comprehension. Our knowledge of the noumena is only a negative knowledge. Kant 
considers the claim that there might be some form of sixth sense, a kind of sense of 
the noumena, which would yield at least knowledge of the noumena by acquaintance. 
He describes this the ''positive sense" of noumena in which noumena become "an 
object of a non-sensible intuition. ,,30 Yet Kant's argument is that this suggestion is 
impossible. All objects arise with sense experience and, therefore, only the negative 
meaning of noumena, that which is not known, is appropriate. The noumenal world 
cannot rise above the status of a postulate. 
However, the important function of the noumena in Kant's thought is found in his 
denial that the sensible world could be all that there is. It is true that we cannot extend 
our intuition beyond phenomena, nor can we "maintain that sensibility is the only 
possible mode of intuition". 31 All our categories of understanding are limited to the 
phenomenal realm such that: 
we do not possess an intuition, not even the concept of a possible 
intuition, by means of which objects beyond the region of sensibility 
could be given us, and in reference to which the understanding might 
be employed assertorically.32 
Therefore, the noumenon is a limiting concept providing the basis for Kant's refutation 
of the Idealist claim that reality is nothing but ideas within the realm of thought and 
the claim of traditional Christian metaphysics that it is possible to employ the 
understanding 'assertorically' to analyse non- or super- sensory reality. The resulting 
epistemic treatment of the noumena could be described as agnostic: 
30 Kant 1993 p.211 
31 Kant 1993 p.213 
32 Kant 1993 p.213 
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But [the noumenon] at the same time prescribes limits by itself, for it 
confesses itself unable to know these by means of categories, and 
hence is compelled to think them merely as an unknown something.33 
The description of Kant's position as agnostic concerning the noumenon may be 
qualified in two ways by this quotation. Firstly, in terms of Kant's philosophy the 
noumenon is not God but all reality considered in itself rather than as appearance. 
Secondly, though the noumenon may not be the subject of positive descriptions (it 
exists, is big, is yellow and so on) nonetheless, as a necessary postulate, certain 
negative descriptions may not be applied to it (it does not exist, for example). Having 
denied the transcendental use of the categories (which would have permitted positive 
descriptions of the noumena) Kant affirms the transcendental significance of the 
categories34 because they do assume that there is a reality in itself even though 
inaccessible to us. 
Conclusions 
Kant's epistemology may be characterised as being founded upon two worlds of truth. 
One is accessible and dependent upon the active participation of the human mind 
whereas the other is a regulative, limiting concept. It is a necessary postulate of 
empirical realism but not a subject for assertive propositions. Hick's pluralist thesis 
has much to gain from this two worlds notion of truth. If successful, this analysis 
permits him to affirm a shared noumenon as the postulate of the plural phenomena 
worshipped, adored or revered by the adherents of various religious traditions. The 
analysis has great explanatory power. However, there are two related areas of 
difficulty for this application. The first area of difficulty concerns the legitimacy of 
33 Kant 1993 p.214 
34 Kant 1993 p.21 0 
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H· k' d· 35 IC S rea lng of Kant. The second area of difficulty arises with the implications of 
adopting a two worlds theory of truth. In the following part of this section we shall 
analyse this latter set of problems by exploring the Kantian epistemology a little 
further. 
35 A significant critique of the kind of use made of Kant by Hick is to be found in 
Godlove 1989. Godlove argues that a plurality of conceptual schemas is ruled out by 
Kant's work. It was Durkheim's misreading of Kant that introduced the framework 
model of epistemology into religious studies and this in turn has been passed on to 
such thinkers as Hick. Godlove maintains the significance of the universality of the 
categories, a point not developed by Hick. This difficulty is an important one but we 
will not pursue it directly in this thesis. The problems in Hick's epistemology may not 
be reflected in Kant's own system but may be a set of problems that necessarily arise 
from Hick's idiosyncratic use of Kant. 
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(b) Kantian Epistemology Assessed 
Kant's dualist epistemology has been subjected to much discussion and diverse 
interpretations have been offered. In outlining some plausible responses to Kant we 
will be able to identify crucial implications for Hick's use of the Kantian insight for his 
own pluralist ends. 
The Problem of Realism 
Sayers raises questions concerning the viability of Kant's thought for any attempt at 
establishing cognitive realism. The components of thought that establish objectivity, 
universality and necessity must, Sayers points out, "go beyond" Kant's notion of sense 
experience. Because these components of objectivity are not given in experience, 
"this 'going beyond' is the work of thought". 1 Kant's claim that we make an active 
contribution to our knowledge leads Sayers to conclude that the result "must 
necessarily alter what is given and so 'produce' or 'create' something new. ,,2 The 
fundamental problem is that the notion of objectivity itself, or independently existing 
things, cannot be known through experience and, therefore, must be a construction of 
the mind. This "leads inevitably to the rejection of realism".3 Sayers traces back to 
Engels the notion that Kant's epistemology is a form of "agnosticism".4 Kant is 
agnostic regarding reality because he simultaneously maintains that there are things-
in-themselves and that we cannot know or claim anything about them. Such 
agnosticism is found deeply unsatisfactory by Sayers: 
I Sayers 1985 p.21 
2 Sayers 1985 p.21 
3 Sayers 1985 p.23 
4 Sayers 1985 p.90 
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For, in it, the thing-in-itself is an idle and empty notion - something entirely 
abstract, indeterminate and unknowable: a seemingly pointless vestige of, 
and sop to, realism and materialism; a veritable nothing about which nothing 
can be said.5 
Kant holds that there is something there and that we can know nothing about it. Such 
agnosticism, Sayers points out, has little practical difference from aletheism (or, in 
terms of the religious knowledge; atheism). The thing-in-itself when abstracted so 
completely from the possibilities of perceptual knowledge loses meaning and content. 
As Sayers points out, its function is merely a sop to realism which Kant made in order 
to distance himself from idealism. Furthermore, nothing is at stake in abandoning the 
'empty notion' altogether along with its attendant realism and turn instead to some 
form of idealism or radical non-realist scepticism.6 
Sayers points out, following Hegel's discussion, that in order to sustain realism it must 
be possible to identify a connection between thought and reality: 
Thought is the means by which we can penetrate beyond immediate 
appearances and the given data of the senses, and grasp the essential 
and underlying reality of things. Once this is understood, it is possible 
to acknowledge the Kantian and rationalist insight that thought con-
tributes to knowledge, and yet resist the idealist implications .... 7 
Such an account of knowledge is exactly what Kant seeks to deny. Thought cannot 
penetrate beyond appearances because the objects of thought must, necessarily, be 
things as they appear to the thinking capacity. To penetrate beyond appearances 
would literally involve thinking the unthinkable or perceiving reality as it is 
5 Sayers 1985 p.90 
6 Sayers uses the example of Rorty as someone who makes this latter move (cf. Sayers 
1985 p.91). We might add Cupitt as an example from theology. 
7 Sayers 1985 p.25 
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unperceived. However, Sayers offers an alternative synthesis which at least seems 
plausible. This synthesis involves both the concession that thought contributes to 
knowledge and the assertion that objective knowledge is possible. In order to adopt 
this synthesis Sayers must assume that categories of the mind exist not in spite of the 
structure of reality but exactly because that is the way reality is: 
Universality and necessity are not merely subjective creations of our minds. 
They have an objective being: they are the inherent characteristics of things-
in-themselves, which exist objectively and independently of our thought. 8 
Sayers' assertion provides the possibility of a connection between thought and reality 
upon which realism could be founded. If retaining realism is important, and it is 
important for both Kant and Hick, then such a move is attractive. Unfortunately, 
assertion seems to be all that Sayers argument amounts to for there is little prospect for 
proving that subjective categories of the mind are also inherent in the world.9 In the 
context of Kant's thought, no archimedian point exists from which to make this claim. 
The problem for Sayers' proposal is that he attempts to resolve the problem of realism 
from within Kant's model, though in Hegelian dress, rather than abandoning the 
epistemology altogether. 
The Critical and the Pre-Critical in Kant 
Schrader argues that Kant is essentially inconsistent on the problem of noumenal 
reality because of two rival tensions within his work. One is his critical position in 
keeping with the wider project of which he was a part 10 and as established through the 
8 Sayers 1985 p.27 
9 To be fair, Sayers' main point is to argue for the supremacy of Hegel's account of 
knowledge over Kant's and so the main concerns of his work are exposition of the 
differences between the two who otherwise shared so much (cf. Sayers 1985 p.21-25). 
10 The Enlightenment. See "What is Enlightenment?" in Kant 1963 for his declaration 
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main line of argument in the three critiques. The other strand of thought was Kant's 
pre-critical rationalism, commitment to God and pietism which, according to 
Schrader, constantly bedevilled his critical work. 1 1 
Schrader describes the main charge against Kant as being the incoherence of an 
unknowable thing-in-itselfthat can yet be known to exist. This is essentially the same 
problem as Sayers identifies regarding realism. In order to make his claim it seems 
that Kant must make an extension of the concepts of pure reason beyond their proper 
boundaries: 
One may posit the thing-in-itself as the cause of appearances which are known, 
but then one is guilty of extending the category of causality beyond the realm of 
appearances, a procedure which [Kant] had explicitly repudiated. 12 
It is simply not legitimate to claim that the noumenon is the cause of the phenomena 
for the category of causality belongs to the structure of the mind not to the thing-in-
itself.I3 Schrader suggests that Kant's critical position does not permit the relationship 
of causality between noumenon and phenomena which "must be dismissed as 
reflecting Kant's private views" and "should not be regarded as central to his 
position." 14 The extension of any categories to the thing-in-itself also represents a 
"serious inconsistency" 15 but one not central to his critical thesis but, rather, 
of commitment to this project. Cf. Chapter 5 (a). 
11 Westphal argues that Kant's theism is a conscious element in his critical thought 
such that the thing-in-itself is only properly understood as the thing-for-God. 
(Westphal 1968 p.119) 
12 Schrader 1968 p.172 
13 A point also made by Copleston 1960 p.64. 
14 Schrader 1968 pp.174-175 
15 Schrader 1968 p.176 
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highlighting his "continuing struggle between rationalism and empiricism".16 
Schrader has his own alternative reading of Kant in which there is an attempt to solve 
this problem. However, given the more mainstream interpretation of Kant, with which 
Hick is working, the fundamental dilemma is now brought into view. This is the 
dilemma that any adoption of the Kantian epistemology must provide a description of 
the connection between noumenon and phenomena. 17 Kant's discussion is clouded by 
two incompatible objectives: 
The important point is that while Kant flatly declared that reality in itself is 
theoretically unknowable, he could not escape trying to formulate mean-
ingful theoretical concepts of it. 18 
The same problem would seem to confront anyone who adopts a radical dualist 
conception of knowledge. Hick clearly does adopt this notion of truth and in order to 
do so he plays upon a feature of everyday experience that is proposed as evidence for 
his epistemic thesis. The feature is the obvious fact that the way we see things is 
influenced by cultural and intellectual factors along with normal physical limitations. 
Furthermore, from time to time we are confronted by the difference between the way 
we see things and how things really are. A straight stick in the water appears crooked, 
but, on inspection it proves to be a straight stick subject to an optical illusion caused 
by water and light. However, this feature of human experience certainly need not lead 
to the epistemic thesis proposed by Hick. The reason why we can identify cultural 
influences and optical illusions is because we believe that reality can be identified 
through experience and that the thoughts of our mind may be tested through encounter 
with reality. Reality is not a 'something else' beyond intellectual reach but is itself 
16 Schrader 1968 p.177 
17 Byrne applies this to Hick in Byrne 1991 p.125 
18 Schrader 1968 p.188 
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disclosed in experience. For this reason philosophy, theology or any other fonn of 
investigation is able to proceed on the assumption that closer approximations to truth 
as well as greater degrees of error are possible results of any study. The radical dualist 
thesis implicit in Kant's two worlds of truth does not pennit such a possibility with 
regard to its reality: the noumenon. 
The Problem for Ontology 
Many critics have noted the serious consequences for Hick's position that results from 
his adoption of Kant's epistemology. Rowe considers the distinction between the Real 
as noumenon and the objects of belief as phenomena and asks what the remaining 
ontological status of the phenomenal descriptions of the deity is. His answer is one 
that Hick would deny but is consistent with Kantian dualism: 
Although Hick does not commit himself, I suspect that he thinks of them 
as analogous to 'veridical hallucinations' - no such entities really exist, but 
these 'appearances' are occasions of a salvation/liberation process in which 
human beings are transfonned from self-centred to reality-centred beings. 19 
In keeping with Kant's thought it is not possible to describe phenomena as reality for 
they are always constructed by the mind in response to an unknown reality. Thus, 
Rowe is correct to describe the phenomena as non-existent. Hick should deny the 
actual existence of God, Christ, Allah, Vishnu, Brahman and so on. All he may 
postulate is the Real about which nothing may be said. However, as both Sayers and 
Schrader point out, the problem remains in Kant's work that a causal connection 
cannot be maintained between the Real and the appearances perceived by the 
categories of the understanding. Existence as a category cannot be applied to the 
Real-in-itself. It seems that the Real cannot be established in tenns of a realist 
19 Rowe 1993 p.22 
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epistemology because such descriptions as independent existence cannot apply to it. 
Nor can the appearances within the religion shed light on the Real because no causal 
connection may be maintained. Hick's adoption of the Kantian epistemology involves 
an implicit denial of realism. 20 
Revisioning Realism 
Hebblethwaite points out that while Hick has consistently remained committed to 
what he calls cognitive realism in religious claims, his "understanding of the truth-
content of such implicit claims has undergone a sea-change".21 Prior to the Kantian 
revolution in his work Hick had understood reality to be the object of religious 
experience and belief though described in partial and limited language and concepts. 
Through his use of Kant a gap is created between the objects of experience and belief 
and the Real: 
Despite the interpretative processing involved, Christian faith gave cognitive 
access to the noumenally real as actually being personal and gracious. But 
now, in the pluralist context, nearly all these alleged truths are transferred to 
the phenomenal level. 22 
This transferral of truth from noumenal to phenomenal is significant because it implies 
the shift of the realist heart of religion from the Real to appearances. The phenomenal 
level of reality is not actual reality and so the personal manifestations of the Real are 
not the Real. Therefore, cognitive realism and its attendant correspondence theory of 
truth no longer hold with regard to the objects of religious belief. According to Hick's 
20 Eddy 1994 further substantiates this claim. 
21 Hebblethwaite 1993 p.125 
22 Hebblethwaite 1993 pp.127 -128 
145 
Kantian position, truth in religion is not a matter of the relationship between doctrinal 
claims and Ultimate Reality: 
One might still say that they remain true of that reality as it appears in one of 
its personalist manifestations. But Hick is more inclined to speak of them now 
as myths, expressive of religiously appropriate attitudes, namely attitudes con-
ducive to ethical and spiritual transformation .... 23 
The reason why a new term such as myth must be introduced is that such claims are no 
longer true in a realist sense (correspondence) but true in a pragmatic sense of helping 
to shape our behaviour. We shall return to consider the plausibility of Hick's 
philosophy of language later24 but here we note that the force compelling Hick to 
introduce myth as an interpretative device is the adoption of a Kantian epistemology. 
Dualism and Judgement 
Carruthers, following Lonergan, pursues the problem of dualism in Kant's work as it is 
found in the epistemology of Hick. Carruthers suggests that Kant's distinction arises 
from a confusion of two ways in which we use the term 'knowing': 
(1) the complex dynamic process of human knowing which experiences, 
understands and judges, and (2) the extroverted, biological or animal 'knowing' 
which simply experiences something as 'already out there now real'. 25 
While both types of knowing are constituitive of human knowledge only the former is 
distinctive of human knowledge. Human knowing involves the whole exercise of 
rationality and judgment rather than just perceptual knowledge. According to 
Carruthers, Kant collapses this distinction and really only produces a nuanced version 
23 Hebblethwaite 1993 p.128 
24 Chapter 5 (b) 
25 Carruthers 1990 p.298 
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of the second type of knowing. The second type clearly only deals in appearances and 
lacks the important feature of the first type that goes beyond appearances to make 
judgements on what really is or is not the case. It is the element of judgment that 
introduces the possibility of drawing a distinction between how things appear to one 
and what things are really like: 
Judgment has its own set of conditions to be fulfilled before it can decide 
positively or negatively. It aims not at description, that is, not at things as 
they appear to the knower. It aims at things in themselves.26 
Judgement exercises a crucial distinction between appearances and reality. It functions 
as a means of identifying which beliefs approximate reality more and appearance less. 
Kant limits possible knowledge to appearances and describes judgement as no more 
than the exercise of the categories in the ordering of appearances. Carruthers points 
out that he "has switched from knowing as taking a good look, to knowing as 
experiencing, understanding and judging. ,,27 Clearly the second type of knowledge 
Carruthers specifies, pre-critical knowledge, deals only in perception of appearances 
but no good reason is offered, certainly not by Hick, to restrict knowledge in toto to 
perceptual-type knowledge. Carruthers argues that the exercise of rationality is itself 
an example of a different type of knowing - one that identifies what a thing or things 
are really like behind their mere appearances. 
Kant might retort that Carruthers is making impossible claims for knowledge by 
introducing the possibility of judging things-in-themselves. The problem that Kant 
has identified is that no such access to truth is possible for the human mind. However, 
as Sayers and Schrader point out, Kant cannot consistently maintain this dichotomy 
26 Carruthers 1990 p.299 
27 Carruthers 1990 p.299 
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between truth as reality and truth as appearance. They point out that Kant cannot 
consistently restrict the application of categories to appearances. Carruthers also 
identifies this inconsistency though he does so in a different way. He points out that 
Kant's entire epistemology is intended to describe what knowledge really is: 
.... Kant intends his description of human cognition not to be just an account 
of how cognition appears. Rather, he intends it as an account of human-
cognition-in-itself. As such, he is claiming to have reached at least one 
thing-in-itself, namely, human cognition.28 
If human cognition were restricted to appearances alone then Kant's epistemology 
would do no more than describe how cognition appears. However, Kant does not 
restrict his work in this way but intends his epistemology to be understood as a 
description of what human cognition really is. Carruthers has drawn out another 
example of the difficulty in restricting categories and concepts to phenomena alone. 
Any theory that attempts to maintain a realist component - whether with regard to God 
or human cognition - must permit the exercise of rationality in describing at least some 
aspects of the 'noumenon'. The resulting description would not, of course, be the 
noumenon in terms of a Kantian definition, but would mark a description of the thing-
in-itself and not appearances only. 
Kant's distinction between noumenon and phenomena cannot be consistently 
maintained. Hick's use of the Kantian epistemology in this respect is problematic for 
exactly these reasons. If the Real is truly and strictly beyond the categories and the 
concepts provided by religion and culture then certainly nothing could be said of it 
and, as a result, it can only be a 'nothing' of which not even existence can be 
predicated. Furthermore, not only are the objects of religious devotion to be 
28 Carruthers 1990 p.299 
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distinguished from the Real in-itself but there is no way of connecting those objects to 
the Real. Hick describes them as "manifestations of the Real"29 but, owing to the 
radical epistemic thesis underlying his claims, such 'manifestation' has no causal 
connection for causality is a category of the understanding and not applicable to the 
thing-in-itself. 
Hick maintains that while our concepts do not apply to the Real we may "make certain 
purely formal statements about the postulated Real" .30 Hick suggests two such 
statements: that the Real is "that than which no greater can be conceived" and that the 
Real is "the noumenal ground of the encountered gods" .31 These formal statements 
look encouraging, particularly as the former seems to relate Hick's position to the 
theological tradition of Anselm.32 However, in the light of the Kantian epistemology 
both of these statements are empty of content. In the latter statement it is difficult to 
substantiate what Hick means by "ground", particularly as the Kantian position must 
rule out a causal connection. It seems most likely that Hick does mean something like 
a causal connection and, if so, then this statement suffers all of the objections Schrader 
levels at Kant. The former statement can only be a limiting notion: nothing greater 
than the Real can be conceived because the Real itself cannot be conceived. The word 
'greater' has no theological significance for Hick but is simply lip service to Anselm's 
theological position. Anselm clearly did intend something substantive by his use of 
'greater'. For example, in his response to Gaunilo he writes: 
For we attribute to the divine substance anything of which it can be 
conceived that it is better to be than not to be that thing. For example: 
29 Hick 1989a p.243 
30 Hick 1989a p.246 
31 Hick 1989a p.246 
32 Hick draws attention to this similarity in Hick 1989a p.246. 
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it is better to be eternal than not eternal; good, than not good; nay, 
goodness itself, than not goodness itself.33 
By 'greater' Anselm sought to relate God to His self-revelation as good, eternal, 
existent and so on. Such specification is not open to Hick for whom such terms would 
represent an illicit bridge between the Real and its phenomenal manifestations. Hick 
uses Anselm's proposition as only a limiting concept. His point is that the noumenon 
is beyond all conception. Such an empty notion shares absolutely nothing with 
Anselm's ontological argument despite Hick's positive references. 34 
33 Anselm "St. Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo" in Plantinga 1968. 
34 Hence, Loughlin claims "At the centre of Hick's universe of faiths there i.s an 'empty 
space'," which he likens to Barthes' Tokyo, a city which turns around a forbIdden and 
empty centre (Loughlin 1987 p.SOS). 
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(c) Kant's Interpretation of Religion 
Hick explicitly acknowledges his debt to Kant's basic epistemological insight but 
distances himself from other features of his philosophy. In particular, Hick identifies 
religious experience as the ground of belief whereas Kant understood the existence of 
God to be a postulate of moral experience. However, in this part we shall outline 
general features of Kant's philosophy of religion in order to argue that Hick's work 
shares many more features with Kant than he acknowledges. In fact, it will be argued 
that the mature statement Hick provides of his own position is very similar to that of 
Kant. 
Moral Religion 
Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone 1 is often understood to be 
primarily concerned with ethics. While he argued that morality "needs no 
representation of an end which must precede the determining of the will", no need of a 
religious superstructure, nonetheless "it is quite possible that it is necessarily related to 
such an end".2 This is because Kant recognised that the determining of the will may 
require a fe/os which only religion can provide. In fact, Kant claimed that the 
determining of the will toward a moral end does require just such a teleology; that 
represented by the summum bonum or highest good.3 
1 Kant 1960 (1793) 
2 Kant 1960 pA 
3 See Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (Kant 1959a). As Copleston 
describes the connection between the achievement of the highest good and the purpose 
of human existence; "the attainment of the first element of the summum bonum, the 
pursuit of which is commanded by the moral law, is possible only on the supposition 
that the soul is immortal." (Copleston 1960 p.130) 
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~orality thus leads ineluctably to religion, through which it extends 
Itself to the idea of a powerful moral Lawgiver, outside of mankind, 
for Whose will that is the final end (of creation) which at the same time 
can and ought to be man's final end.4 
It is from the foundations in ethics that Kant was led to consider the nature and 
function of religion in the human life and so, as has often been noted, Kant's emphasis 
on religion is always found in moral terms.5 
The Freedom of the Will 
Because Kant is concerned to establish the validity and meaning of religion in terms of 
moral categories he begins his discussion with a consideration of the origins of evil 
and human nature in relation to God. Kant is clear that the origin of evil lies in the 
exercise of free will: 
Man himself must make or have made himself into whatever, in a moral 
sense, whether good or evil, he is or is to become. Either condition must 
be an effect of his free choice; for otherwise he could not be held responsible 
for it and could be morally neither good nor evil. 6 
Created good, human beings were also created free and with this freedom of the will 
came the responsibility to choose good or evil. Kant seems to be deliberately 
opposing the Augustinian or Calvinist emphasis on the bondage of the will to sin and 
consequent inability to choose the good without the intervention of grace.7 Kant 
4 Kant 1960 pp.5-6 
5 Despland 1973 argues that the emphasis on morality has led commentators to 
misinterpret Kant's theology as purely moralistic and he offers an alternative 
interpretation that does not lead to such a caricature. Of course, Kant's work is not 
purely moralistic but it is clear that, as our discussion will show, morality provides the 
norm and standard for all theological inquiry (See also Palmquist 1992). 
6 Kant 1960 p.40 
7 Calvin 1949 esp. vol. 1 Book 2 Chapter 5 (pp.272-291) i.e. "[Paul] teaches that 
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stresses the importance of free will because, according to his system, it is only through 
the possibility of free choice to sin that human beings can be morally culpable for 
sinful behaviour. Furthermore, because the choice of the good is also utterly free and 
undetermined, the human being is also responsible for choosing the good. This 
possibility is sustained by Kant through his denial that people are utterly devoid of the 
good: "a seed of goodness still remains in its entire purity"s. Human beings must be 
capable, argues Kant, of doing what is right without the need for some kind of 
supernatural miracle of grace; "For when the moral law commands that we ought now 
to be better men, it follows inevitably that we must be able to be better men". 9 Evil 
could not be evil were it impossible to comply with the moral demand not to do evil. 
It is only because people have the option not to do evil that they act wrongly when 
they do evil. The important implications of Kant's consideration is that there is no 
need for special acts of God in redemption or grace in order for people to choose to do 
good rather than evil. People are created with the seed of goodness which enables 
them to do good and be held responsible for their own actions when they do wrong. 
We shall now see how this anthropology opens the possibility for Kant's description of 
religion as universal. 
The Reinterpretation of Christianity 
The essence of religion, for Kant, is the moral law or imperative. In the light of this he 
interprets the historical particularities of Christianity. The incarnation is the 
salvation is prepared for those only on whom the Lord is pleased to bestow mercy -
that ruin and death await all whom he has not chosen" (p.289) for which Calvin is 
interpreting Romans 9: 18. Kant cites the same verse in Romans but, in contrast to 
Calvin describes it as a teaching which "taken according to the letter, is the saIto 
mortal~ of human reason" (Kant 1960 p.lll). Reardon 1988 pp.93-100 provides an 
alternative perspective. 
S Kant 1960 p.41 
9 Kant 1960 p.46 
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personification of the good principle and so Jesus Christ is the example or archetype 
of what all people are to be. However, the historical Jesus has only a contingent 
relationship to the archetype: 
We need therefore, no empirical example to make the idea of a person 
morally well-pleasing to God our archetype; this idea as an archetype 
is already present in our reason. 10 
The historical Jesus is only a representation of the archetype which itself exists in each 
one of us and is accessible through the exercise of pure reason. Kant chides those 
whose imitation of Jesus depends upon his metaphysical identity. If one does not 
recognise the authority of the archetype but demands the credentials of one who 
embodies the archetype then one shows "moral unbelief' or "lack of faith in virtue" 
and "This is a lack which no belief that rests upon miracles (and is merely historical) 
can repair." 1 1 Kant's description of the person and work of Christ dispenses with 
reference to the supernatural. Regarding Christ's essential teaching, the gospel, Kant 
writes: 
he declared that servile belief (taking the form of confessions and practices 
on days of divine worship) is essentially vain and that moral faith, which 
alone renders men holy 'as their Father in heaven is holy' and which proves 
its genuineness by a good course of life, is the only saving faith. 12 
Kant claims that Jesus taught the same message of using free choice to choose the 
good and not evil as himself. The centrality of Christ's work was in the message he 
brought rather than its historical particularity. Concerning the resurrection and 
ascension Kant has little patience. He describes these as belonging to "more secret 
10 Kant 1960 p.56 
11 Kant 1960 p.56 
12 Kant 1960 p.119 
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records .... added as a sequel" to the public gospel records and which, taken literally, 
lead to problematic paradoxes. Kant prefers to interpret them through pure reason as 
symbolic accounts which "would signify the commencement of another life and 
entrance into the seat of salvation".13 In other words, Kant argues that if these 
supernatural events really did take place then they give rise to many perplexing 
problems and yet have no positive contribution to the fundamental purpose of religion. 
If they are understood as mythological ways of describing hope in an ultimate good 
realised in the after-life, the presupposition of the summum bonum, then they give 
pictorial expression to an idea already accessible through pure reason. Kant also treats 
the death of Christ in a similar way. He acknowledges that "in this mode of 
representation" the moral requirement for the "new man" to suffer and die to the old 
self each day "is pictured as a death endured once for all by the representative of 
mankind" .14 Consequently, Kant continues to use the language of atonement and 
vicarious suffering but identifies these as pictorial uses of language designed to 
convey truths accessible through the pure reason. 
Kant clearly engaged in a radical reappraisal of Christian belief in which he 
reinterpreted the importance of miracles and historical events in terms of their 
meaning for us. This should not be understood as simply an expression of his doubt in 
the possibility of miracles. Kant does not deny that miracles may occur and so he 
cannot be simply categorised as anti-supernaturalist. 15 However, he is sharply critical 
13 Kant 1960 p.119 
14 Kant 1960 p.69 cf. pp.119-120 
15 Kant 1960 pp.79-84. Kant claims that "sensible men" may "believe in theory that 
there are such things as miracles but they do not warrant them in the affairs of li.(e." 
(p.80) His point is that while one may believe in miracles. as a Pa.:t of theoretIcal 
reason, one cannot accept by practical reason that any partIcular mIracle has taken 
place for to do so would lead to all kinds of disruption in public order. 
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of any interpretation of religion that gives a necessary status to any alleged miracle or, 
indeed, to any historical event. The following quotation makes clear the place of 
miracles: 
If a moral religion (which must consist not in dogmas and rites but in the heart's 
disposition to fulfil all human duties as divine commands) is to be established, 
all miracles which history connects with its inauguration must themselves in the 
end render superfluous the belief in miracles in general .... 16 
Kant claims that it is morally wrong to demand miracles to attest the validity of moral 
commands. Valid moral commands are already engraved on the human heart as the 
seed of goodness and known through the exercise of reason as self-authenticating. 
Thus, miracles would be attesting only their own irrelevance. 
Universal Religion 
This treatment of miracles extends to Kant's treatment of all historical particularities. 
One essential feature of Kant's moral religion is its universal applicability. Runzo 
describes Kant's assumption that necessary knowledge must be universally accessible 
to the rational human: 
he feels that the claims of rational religion are universally valid, that any rational 
being who possesses the appropriate conceptual resources will arrive at the 
same, fully epistemically justified conclusions. 17 
The difference between moral (universal) religion and particular religions (described 
by Kant as ecclesiastical faiths 18) is that pure moral religion "can be believed in and 
16 Kant 1960 p.79 
17 Runzo 1993 p.1 02 
18 In contrast to modem terminology Kant defines "faith" as particular religions 
"Jewish Mohammedan, Christian, Catholic, Lutheran" but underlying these he 
, 
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shared by everyone" while "an historical faith, grounded solely on facts, can extend its 
influence no further than tidings of it can reach" .19 This point returns us once more to 
Kant's anthropology. Because moral transformation is accessible to all people through 
the exercise of pure reason, religion itself must be definable in universal terms. To 
restrict religion to its historical particularities, miracles and so forth, is to confuse the 
core of religion, moral transformation, with the external trappings in which it appears. 
Furthermore, to restrict religion to a particular faith is then to introduce the necessity 
of believing that factual and historical claims are true thus denying the self-
authenticating nature of moral religion and making it "dependent upon the capacity (of 
men) to judge the credibility of such tidings".20 It is for these reasons that Kant 
abandons the category of revelation at least in the sense commonly described as 
special revelation. The moral law is made known by reason not by revelation. To 
suppose otherwise is to deny its universality. If God revealed "statutory legislation" 
then it would be merely "contingent" and "something which never has applied or can 
apply to every man, hence as not binding on all men universally".21 So the demands 
of religion must be accessible to reason alone. If revelation were to supersede reason 
and introduce any element otherwise unknown then Kant's anthropology would be 
faulty. Kant proposes that religion be understood in terms of these universal moral 
categories rather than particular revealed doctrines, beliefs or dogmas: 
identifies the "one (true) religion" (Kant 1960 p.98). So faiths are particular examples 
of the universal, general category known as "religion". Compare with Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith 1963 who adopts the opposite terminology. By "ecclesiastical faith" 
Kant means the particularity of faith as a human institution in the form of a church 
with its clergy, rites, dogmas and so forth. He also describes particular faiths as 
"empirical faiths" (i.e. Kant 1960 p.100) in order to emphasise that a faith is the 
external observable form of moral religion. , 
19 Kant 1960 p.94 
20 Kant 1960 p.94 
21 Kant 1960 p.95 
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.... they who seek to become well-pleasing to Him not by praising Him (or 
his envoy, as a being of divine origin) according to revealed concepts which 
not every man can have, but by a good course of life, regarding which every-
one knows His will - these are they who offer Him the true veneration which 
He desires.22 
This abandonment of special revelation in favour of universal moral reason leads to a 
new assessment of particular faiths. The Bible is not to be identified as special 
revelation. Rather, it is "fortunate" that "along with its statutes" that claim to have 
been revealed, it contains "the purest moral doctrine of religion in its completeness".23 
Consequently, Kant holds a deep respect for the Bible without regarding it as either 
revelation or a witness to revelation. In fact, it is to be judged and interpreted by the 
moral dictates of pure reason: 
an exposition of the revelation which has come into our possession is 
required, that is, a thorough-going interpretation of it in a sense agreeing 
with the universal practical rules of a religion of pure reason.24 
Kant even concedes that the interpretation may be "forced" and completely depart 
from the literal interpretation of the text but if the resulting interpretation is more in 
line with moral reason then it must be preferred.25 He points out that this practice is, 
as a matter of fact, engaged in by Jews, Christians, Hindus and Muslims in order to 
reconcile their own scriptures with the moral commands of pure reason.26 
The problem Kant identifies for religious beliefs based on events in history or claims 
to special revelation is that the beliefs can only be contingent. Kant's anthropology 
22 Kant 1960 pp.95-96 
23 Kant 1960 p.98 
24 Kant 1960 p.I 00 
25 Kant 1960 p.I 01 
26 Kant 1960 p.I 02 
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describes salvation, moral transformation, as universal and, therefore, true religion 
must share this universal quality. Jesus Christ, the atonement and the Bible are all 
useful insofar as they enable us to come to terms with the moral law. Kant declares 
that the atonement "merely constitutes the vehicle for pure religious faith. ,,27 
Doctrines and beliefs serve useful, pragmatic functions but they are only ever optional 
and contingent. Their real end is the furtherance of pure moral religion and as this end 
becomes realised they may be dispensed with. This gives rise to Kant's vision for the 
future of religion. In order to describe this we will first step back and consider his 
account of the origins of religion. 
The History of Religion 
Kant's interpretation of Judaism is certainly faulty but, if we set aside the validity of 
his interpretation, the treatment he gives provides a useful outline of his own history 
of religions. He describes three important features of Judaism. 
(i) A Collection of laws 
Firstly, it is "a collection of mere statutory laws" .28 As we have seen, Kant describes 
statutory laws as particularities of only contingent validity. Because it is no more than 
this, Judaism fails to have universal validity: 
Judaism is really not a religion at all but merely a union of a number of 
people who, since they belonged to a particular stock, formed themselves 
into a commonwealth under purely political laws .... it was intended to 
be merely an earthly state .... 29 
27 Kant 1960 p.1 09 
28 Kant 1960 p.116 
29 Kant 1960 p.116 
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All the laws and dogmas of Judaism were bound up with preserving the political 
stability and order of a national race. They neither had nor intended to have universal 
validity. Thus the legislation in which the Ten Commandments are found do not 
display the dictates of pure reason, the transformation of the heart, but "are directed to 
absolutely nothing but outer observance". 30 Kant interprets Judaism as a faith that 
fails to meet his criteria for true religion. 
(b) Preoccupied with this world 
Secondly, Judaism portrays all judgements and rewards for moral behaviour as 
occurring in this world. The notion of an ultimate reward or punishment is missing. 
As Kant understands this to be a presupposition of morality, Judaism fails to embody 
the very core of the one true religion that underlies particular faiths. This leads on to 
the denial of a future existence beyond the grave: 
Furthermore, since no religion can be conceived of which involves no 
belief in a future life, Judaism, which, when taken in its purity is seen to 
lack this belief, is not a religious faith at all.31 
Once more, Kant defines religion in such a way as to exclude those that do not fit the 
conceptual scheme he is seeking to substantiate. The absence of an after life, implying 
with it the absence of a summum bonum undermines Kant's notion of morality and 
duty.32 Thus, any faith that fails to incorporate an after life cannot be an expression of 
the moral religion. 
30 Kant 1960 p.116 
31 Kant 1960 p.117 
32 For Kant duty is the categorical imperative, it is to act with no regard to b~nefit~ or 
effects of one's actions. Nonetheless, his ethics must be related to hIS WIder 
teleological conception of final reward and punishment. 
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(c) Exclusivist Assumptions 
Thirdly, Judaism fails in the requirements of universality because of its foundational 
belief in its status as the covenant community chosen by God. This form of 
exclusivism runs directly against Kant's anthropology. It was expressed by the Jews, 
according to Kant, as "enmity toward all other peoples and which, therefore, evoked 
the enmity of all".33 Essentially, Kant understood Judaism to be a form of political 
nationalism concerned primarily with maintaining racial purity through separatism. Its 
beliefs and dogmas share features with other faiths but, within the Judaic framework, 
do not have the purpose of displaying true moral religion. Rather, their function is to 
maintain order, stability and preservation in the face of chaos and disorder. 
Kantian Eschatology 
Such an estimation raises grave questions over the viability of the faith which owes 
most to Judaism. Kant accepts that Christianity arose historically from Judaism but 
claims that it was founded on "a wholly new principle" which replaced political 
nationalism with the seeds of "a purely moral religion".34 Most of the major world 
religions are, for Kant, faiths that embody, perhaps in embryo form, the one true 
religion. Within Christian prophetic writing, Kant believes that he finds the hope that 
one day pure moral religion will entirely replace the mythological forms in which that 
religion is currently found in the empirical faiths. There is an evolutionary schema 
underlying Kant's hope; "in the end religion will gradually be freed from all empirical 
determining grounds and from all statutes which rest on history.,,35 The particularities 
of special revelation or of history only fulfil an interim purpose of realising the good 
in people's lives. Yet, as we have seen, such particularities are only contingent and, 
33 Kant 1960 p.117 
34 Kant 1960 p.118 
35 Kant 1960 p.112 
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while provisionally useful, obstruct the realisation of true universality. Therefore, 
future history will be marked by their gradual abandonment and "at last the pure 
religion of reason will rule over all". 36 From the perspective of this ultimate end the 
value of empirical faiths is somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, a religion may 
have "useful influence as a vehicle" to moral transformation but on the other hand , , 
when their dogmas and rites are held to have universal validity then they encourage 
the "illusory duty of divine worship".37 It is the moral element of the faiths that is to 
be praised and will one day come to fruition. The doxological and doctrinal 
components are open to misinterpretation by the unenlightened who fail to see their 
pictorial status. However, Kant does suggest that a divine principle will be involved 
in this gradual evolution from empirical faiths to the one religion and this principle 
leads to a definition of revelation: 
The basis for the transition to that new order of affairs must lie in the 
principle that the pure religion of reason is a continually occurring divine 
(though not empirical) revelation for all men.38 
Thus Kant has a doctrine of revelation but it is in no way "special" or particular and 
must not be understood in spatial metaphors as if it came to us from without or 
beyond. As Wood notes, the recognition of our moral duties as divine commands and 
the rational faith in God this entails may be seen as; "a kind of 'revelation' to us by 
God himself, a revelation through universally communicable human reason, rather 
than through experience or feeling. ,,39 Because Kant understands revelation to be an 
inner experience of illumination there is no pressing need to understand revelation in 
36 Kant 1960 p.112 
37 Kant 1960 p.113 
38 Kant 1960 p.113 
39 Wood 1970 p.205 
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any personal or propositional terms as the disclosure of God. Rather, revelation 
occurs with the apprehension of pure reason. In effect, revelation and the activity of 
reason are indistinguishable. 
Conclusions 
We have now outlined the main lines of Kant's interpretation of religion as they are to 
be found in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. We may summarise the 
outline in the following form. Kant's anthropology presupposes libertarian free will 
and the inherent possibility of goodness in all people. The moral law is accessible 
through reason alone and provides the interpretation of all faiths and their claims to 
revelation. Empirical faiths are categorised as vehicles through which this universal 
moral law is made known. Kant's history of religions treats Judaism as an historical 
forerunner of empirical faiths but not as a religion itself, lacking as it does the three 
key elements in religion. Empirical faiths are themselves useful, conveying the moral 
law and the archetype of moral life through pictorial and representational language 
use. These faiths are passing as, with the rise of the Enlightenment, human beings 
find within themselves the moral imperative and a rational faith in the existence of 
God. These discoveries will make historical particularities in which faiths are bound 
up redundant. Through the historical process the one, true moral religion will replace 
these temporary, though useful, empirical faiths. Weare now in a position to draw out 
a more nuanced account of the connections between Kant and Hick's philosophy of 
religion. We will see that, fundamentally, they are engaged in exactly the same project 
and operate with largely the same philosophy of religion. 
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(d) Hick's Debt to Kant 
Hick's mature position as found in An Interpretation of Religion is structurally very 
similar to that of Kant in its basic philosophy of religion. In the light of this, 
differences between the two thinkers regarding epistemology are slight and, therefore, 
we will conclude that it is appropriate to describe Hick's work as Kantian and, 
therefore, a part of the same enlightenment project.} 
Freedom and Morality 
Kant is committed to a strong view of libertarian free will. This results from the close 
connection he makes between human responsibility and the origin of evil. For human 
beings to be capable of acting in an evil way presupposes that they have the freedom 
to choose between good and evil. Only the reality of freedom provides the necessary 
foundations for morality. In this way, morality also precedes religion. For Kant, 
moral commands are known through universal reason; they do not depend upon 
external authorities such as revelation or church councils. Johnson describes the 
connection Kant draws between morality and religion: 
[Kant] argues that morality cannot be based on God's will as the source 
of divine moral law, for that would reduce human freedom to a sham 
freedom to obey an 'other'. Yet he argues that morality can be based 
on universal law which we rationally give to ourselves .... we are free just 
insofar as we are autonomous, that is, just to the extent that we give 
} The Kantian influence on Hick is acknowledged by all but few press it as far as we 
shall here. For example, Eddy describes Hick's mature work as a neo-Kantian 
proposal but comments that "The term 'neo-Kantian' is used throughout this essay in a 
very general sense~ it implies no connection to the German philosophical movement of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries." (Eddy 1994 pA67). See also 
D'Costa 1991 pA, Loughlin 1987 pA97 -498 and Ramachandra 1996 pp.ll7 -125. 
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moral laws to ourselves of our rationality and freedom.2 
Kant did not ground moral perception in the revelation or will of God but in the 
universal reason of the human race. Salvation is, for Kant, the pursuit of the good 
rather than evil. Moral transformation of the self through right exercise of free will 
constitutes salvation. One of the great theological controversies of history is implicit 
in this problem. This is the question regarding the exact relationship between faith 
and works or, more accurately, between justification by faith and justification by 
moral behaviour.3 Kant grants that "saving faith" involves both "faith in an 
atonement" (understood as a representation of God doing something for people that 
they cannot do for themselves) and "faith that we can become well-pleasing to God 
through a good course of life in the future. ,,4 However, Kant resists admitting that 
some kind of paradoxical relationship holds the two together. If saving faith requires 
both atonement and good works then adherence to a historical faith such as 
Christianity will be necessary for salvation. If that is true then the non-Christian is 
unable to be saved and, if unable to be saved, not morally responsible for their 
exercise of free will. Kant resolves this paradox: 
Where shall we start, i.e., with a faith in what God has done on our behalf, 
or with what we are to do to become worthy of God's assistance (what-
ever this may be)? In answering this question we cannot hesitate in deciding 
for the second alternative.5 
2 Johnson 1993 p.25 
3 In the New Testament the focus of the controversy may be seen as one of how to 
harmonise Romans 4:4-5 and James 2:24. 
4 Kant 1960 p.106 
5 Kant 1960 p.1 08 
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Saving faith is identified with moral transformation. Moral transformation is through 
the increasing obedience of people to the commands of pure reason. Thus, religion is 
secondary to moral faith and the latter takes precedence over the former. 
Hick also presents this conception of saving faith as it is expressed both In his 
epistemology and in his soteriology. The three step diagram clarifies this point 
Figure 5 Faith and Works 
The order of each step is important for Hick. Without the natural interpretation of our 
environment there would be no situation to experience in moral or religious terms and 
so this must be the basic level of experience. The moral level of experience involves 
the free exercise of the will in responding to our environment. The religious 
interpretation of the universe is described by Hick as a total interpretation because 
while it involves its own distinctive religious experience it also subsumes the previous 
levels of experience. For both Hick and Kant, 'religion' (in Kant's own terminology 
we mean historical or ecclesiastical faith) arises from moral and natural experience. 
The only difference between them is that, for Hick, the religious interpretation also 
benefits from an extra element of experience. Nonetheless, they both maintain that 
even without the influence of religion anyone could still successfully interpret the 
moral and natural significance of the universe. Hick identifies the Golden Rule given 
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by Jesus Christ to do to others only what you would want them to do for yourself with 
Kant's description of pure morality. It: 
is a translation of Kant's concepts of a rational person as an end and of 
right action as action which our rationality, acknowledging a universal im-
partiality transcending individual desires and aversions, can see to be 
required.6 
Hick shares with Kant an assumption that morality is based upon universal truths 
arrived at through pure reason. There is no need for special claims to revelation, 
grace, historical events or rituals in order both to identify and to enact these moral 
commands. 
Justification By Works 
A consequence of their shared position is, in effect, an endorsement of a Pelagian view 
of salvation. Pelagius had been a critic of Augustine'S views on morality and grace. 
His statement of salvation was later rejected by the Church under the influence of 
Augustine. Pelagius attacked Augustine's notion of original sin on the grounds that it 
compromised human free will: 
Everything good and everything evil, in respect of which we are either 
worthy of praise or of blame, is done by us, not born with us. We 
are not born in our full development, but with a capacity for good and 
·1 7 eVI .... 
God, having given us the capacity for good, may be praised for the good that people 
do but Pelagius argues that the responsibility for doing good lies with the individuals 
6 Hick 1989a p.149 
7 Pelagius Pro libero arbitrio in Bettenson 1967 p.53. See further Berkhof 1991 
pp.132f. and for a reassessment ofPelagius see Ferguson 1980. 
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themselves. He identifies the same logical point as Kant would do centuries later that 
if one had no choice but to do evil then one would not be responsible for it. Pelagius 
declared that "[God] has not willed to command anything impossible, for he is 
righteous; and he will not condemn a man for what he could not help, for he is holy. ,,8 
Kant and Hick join Pelagius in his description of libertarian free will and its 
relationship to the possibility of salvation. They do so because they assume good 
moral behaviour to be autonomous and not dependent on any religion. As a result they 
both make clear distinctions between historical particularities of religion and the moral 
commands known through pure reason. Kant's hope for the future is that "in the end 
religion will gradually be freed from all empirical determining grounds", including 
doctrines, rituals and scriptures "which through the agency of ecclesiastical faith 
provisionally unite men for the requirements of the good; and thus at last the pure 
religion of reason will rule over all".9 The religion of reason is the religion of 
morality which Kant is able to distinguish clearly from the metaphysical doctrines of 
ecclesiastical faith in which it currently occurs. Hick makes the same distinction: 
In principle, then, and to a considerable extent in practice, we can separate out 
basic moral values from both the magical-scientific and the metaphysical beliefs 
which have always entered into their application within particular cultures. 10 
Kant and Hick both share the conviction that there is a universal moral code accessible 
to all people and distinguishable from the various particular religions of the world. 
Also, both grant the necessity of the freedom of the will in order to make sense of 
moral responsibility. For this reason, salvation is able to occur wherever there are 
human beings. If all people are morally responsible then it follows from the logic of 
8 Pelagius Epistle ad Demetriadem in Bettenson 1967 p.52 
9 Kant 1960 p.112 
10 Hick 1989a p.312 
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this position that all people are able to be morally good and, therefore, saved. This 
leads both thinkers to endorse a Pelagian view of salvation. Furthermore, it leads to a 
second major point of connection between them: the universality of religion. 
The Essence of Universal Religion 
In order to sustain the universal accessibility of salvation through moral behaviour 
Kant maintains that the core of religion lies in essential moral rules. He distinguishes 
between moral religion and historic faiths: "Pure religious faith alone can found a 
universal church; for only (such) rational faith can be believed in and shared by 
everyone" .11 Historical faiths dependent upon particular revelations or concepts have 
not been and cannot be shared by everyone. Therefore, such particularities cannot be 
of the essence of religion. Hick pursues this same line of thought and also 
distinguishes between the essence of religion and its particularities. An example of 
this is found in his treatment of conflicting historical truth claims. These could, in 
principle, be settled "by unbiased assessment of the historical evidence" 12 though, in 
practice, Hick points out that historical research is influenced by bias and not all the 
relevant data is accessible. However, he also relativises the status of these contentious 
historical claims. He argues that a growing number of people, himself included, "no 
longer regard such questions as being of the essence of their faith". 13 If one were to 
maintain that historical claims were in some way essential to faith then, Hick 
concedes, his entire project would be undermined: 
But it remains true that for many other believers [historical claims] are of 
the essence of their faith, so that no amount of evidence could ever change 
their conviction, and that for such persons the pluralist vision may well at 
II Kant 1960 p.94 
12 Hick 1989a p.364 
13 Hick 1989a p.365 
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present be inaccessible. 14 
Hick also applies this distinction to those trans-historical but still 'particular' beliefs 
such as reincarnation. Because moral transformation can be seen to happen among 
those who adopt very different trans-historical doctrines Hick claims that concerning 
their validity "the question is not soteriologically vital". 15 Soteriology is defined as 
moral transformation which both Kant and Hick identify with the dictates of a 
universal moral code. It then follows that all these historical particularities have a 
secondary status in their work. Whatever religion we assess, whether Buddhism, 
Christianity or Confucianism, Hick maintains that the universal moral law is 
identifiable: 
Implicit within these we can discern the utterly basic principle that it is 
evil to cause suffering to others and good to benefit others and to alle-
viate or prevent their sufferings. This is so fundamental and universally 
accepted a principle that it is seldom formulated. 16 
Hick identifies much of the particularities of faiths with mythology17 and, in so doing, 
draws a distinction between the secondary and primary components of faith. The 
primary are those that are necessary for his anthropology. These are the universal 
moral laws embodied in the golden rule. 
The History of Religions 
Another example of their shared commitment to the reality of a universal religion is 
found in their parallel descriptions of the history of religions. Hick treats the history 
14 Hick 1989a p.365 
15 Hick 1989a p.369 
16 Hick 1989a p.312 
17 See Chapter 5 (b). 
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of religions in terms of two stages. The first stage of religion is "pre-axial". 18 These 
are the very ancient, often pre-literate, religions that still exist today in some parts of 
the world. Pre-axial religions are excluded from Hick's pluralist account because they 
have a much more limited function than the great world religions which occurred after 
the flowering of religious consciousness in the axial age. There are two dimensions to 
pre-axial religion. Firstly, there is the psychological function of religion: 
an attempt to make stable sense of life, and particularly of the basic 
realities of subsistence and propagation and the final boundaries of 
birth and death. 1 9 
Secondly, they have a sociological function described by Hick as: "preserving the 
unity of the tribe or people within a common world-view and at the same time of 
validating the community's claims upon the loyalty of its members. ,,20 Pre-axial 
religions enable their members to make coherent sense of life in terms of the 
boundaries of birth and death along with creating a coherent society where people find 
stability in union with one another. Pre-axial religion was clearly not concerned with 
metaphysical doctrines about a transcendent being or even life after death. Hick notes 
that some sense of life being extended beyond the grave "seems almost always to have 
been assumed" but describes this sense as "shadowy" and the "shades" who populated 
this death world were to be "pitied"21 rather than envied. 
18 Hick 1989a p.22 
19 Hick 1989a p.23 
20 Hick 1989a p.23 
21 Hick 1989a p.27 
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Primitive Religion 
Kant describes Judaism in remarkably similar terms to Hick's treatment of pre-axial 
religion. Hick would place Judaism in the axial period but in this discussion the 
accuracy of Kant's description of Judaism is not at issue. We have already seen that 
Kant denies Judaism to really be a religion at all. Early, or pure, Judaism was "a 
collection of mere statutory laws upon which was established a political 
organisation" .22 The laws of Judaism are understood to be "a prudent device for 
creating docility" .23 Judaism fails to count as a religion for Kant for the same reasons 
that Hick denies pre-axial religions a place in the pluralist scheme. It is concerned 
with the outer appearances of social cohesion and tribal security. It safeguards racial 
purity in the face of the chaotic and pluralist forces ranged against it. According to 
Kant, Judaism does not offer worship to the transcendental being which is a necessary 
postulate of pure reason. The Jewish God is "merely an earthly regent making 
absolutely no claims upon, and no appeals to, conscience."24 In addition to this, Kant 
describes Judaism as devoid of belief in any future life. 
The Evolution of Religious Consciousness 
The axial period is the second stage in Hick's history of religion. It gave rise to a new 
era of cosmic optimism in religion. Hick notes that during this period all the major 
religious options were formed and each share a common assumption that moral 
transformation is both necessary and possible: "Thus all these post-axial faiths are 
soteriologically oriented.,,25 The common essence of post-axial faith is the golden 
rule of moral duty to one's neighbour. According to Kant, Christianity marks a 
22 Kant 1960 p.116 
23 Kant 1960 p.ll 7 
24 Kant 1960 p.116 
25 Hick 1989a p.33 
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complete break with Judaism on this point. Its defining feature is that it "was to 
comprise a religion valid for the world"26 and not just a tribal or local political 
grouping. While Kant leaves little doubt that Christianity is the most effective vehicle 
for spreading universal religion, he maintains that the universal religion is present in 
all historical faiths. Its universality rests in its soteriological core of moral duty which 
is accessible without reference to revelation through the activity of pure reason: 
The one true religion comprises nothing but laws, that is, those practical 
principles of whose unconditioned necessity we can become aware, and 
which we therefore recognise as revealed through pure reason (not 
empirically).27 
Matters of history, dogma and ritual may be constituitive of a faith but, for Kant, 
religion is moral duty and that duty is known through reason not special experience of 
any sort. Hick and Kant both identify moral duty as the heart of religion. 
The Reducibility of Metaphor and Religious Language 
Hick and Kant maintain the reducibility of metaphysical and metaphorical language to 
a form largely compatible with naturalism or the physical sciences. They both regard 
the great, distinctive doctrines of Christianity as representational or symbolic uses of 
language. We will consider Hick's philosophy of language in more detail a little 
later28 but here we may describe in outline form his treatment of key Christian 
doctrines. 
26 Kant 1960 p.118 
27 Kant 1960 p.156 
28 Chapter 5 (b). 
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Hick maintains that in the New Testament descriptions of Jesus he can identify "both 
the optional and the mythological character of this traditional language" .29 He 
identifies the literal person of Jesus as a man "intensely and overwhelmingly 
conscious of the reality of God" and, in his presence, others "felt the absolute claim of 
God" confronting them.30 The metaphor, Son of God or God the Son, is a linguistic 
device which "offers a way of declaring his significance to the world; and it expresses 
a disciple's commitment to Jesus as his personal Lord. ,,31 The metaphors are ways of 
representing elements of experience of, or response to, the historical figure of Jesus. 
Hick also treats the atonement as an example of pictorial language. The theological 
doctrine of original sin, for which atonement is required, is rejected by Hick "except as 
a mythological way of referring to the fact of universal human imperfection". 32 Hick 
claims that belief in a historical fall "is totally unbelievable for educated Christians,,33 
in the light of findings in anthropology and geology. However, he concedes that the 
language is still permissible in the sense that "we can say that the earliest humans 
were, metaphorically speaking, already 'fallen' in the sense of being morally and 
spiritually imperfect". 34 While rejecting any theory of the atonement, Hick maintains 
the representational value of the language insofar as it conveys metaphorically a range 
of universal truths about human nature. 
Hick has failed to give any sustained treatment to the doctrine of the Trinity but given 
his remarks on other related Christian beliefs it is not difficult to surmise the appraisal 
29 Hick 1977b p.168 
30 Hick 1977b p.172 
31 Hick 1977b p.178 
32 Hick 1993a p.115 
33 Hick 1993a p.116 
34 Hick 1993a p.116 
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he would make. He denies that God could be "ontologically three" but interprets the 
Trinity as informing us that there are at least "three ways in which the one God is 
humanly thought and experienced".35 God does not have "three centres of 
consciousness and will" but there are "three ways in which the one God is humanly 
known - as creator, as transformer, and as inner spirit".36 This is a simple form of 
modalism. Hick's treatment bears no relation to Trinitarian theology and we must 
conclude that his analysis is simply a way of using the Trinity as illustrative material 
for a picture of the Divine drawn from his philosophical pluralism. This final example 
is more a case of complete abandonment of the doctrine of the Trinity than a concerted 
attempt to reduce it to a non-mythological core. 
A clear pattern emerges in Hick's account of the Biblical narrative and the creeds, 
confessions and doctrines built upon it. If these beliefs when taken literally give rise 
to logical problems or to religious exclusiveness37 then they must be reinterpreted in 
mythological or metaphorical categories. Logical problems cannot be admitted by the 
principles of universal reason and religious exclusiveness is not compatible with the 
principle of the universality of religion. 
Kant pursues a similar hermeneutic. Particular, historical knowledge is not universally 
accessible and, consequently, cannot be universally necessary: 
We have noted that a church dispenses with the most important mark 
of truth, namely, a rightful claim to universality, when it bases itself upon 
a revealed faith. For such a faith, being historical .... can never be uni-
35 Hick 1993a p.149 
36 Hick 1993a pp.152-153 
37 Hick 1993a p.162 
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versally communicated so as to produce conviction.38 
For this reason Kant also engages upon a reductive analysis of key Christian beliefs so 
that particular claims related to distinctive historical events or cultural circumstances 
can be shed of such particularity in favour of their universal truth. 
Christ Our Archetype 
Concerning the incarnation Kant describes Jesus as the "archetype" of moral 
perfection. 39 While not denying the historicity of Jesus, Kant affirms Jesus as a 
representation or an example of the moral standards expected of all people. As we 
have noted, Kant understood the archetype to be present in each one of us and so the 
example Jesus gave is certainly not unique and our knowledge of it not dependent on 
revelation.40 Concerning the atonement, Kant interprets this doctrine as pointing to 
the need for God to have "a means of supplementing, out of the fullness of His own 
holiness, man's lack of requisite qualifications" for salvation.41 Whatever unique 
significance this might suggest for the atonement is undermined by the fact that moral 
transformation, the human contribution to salvation, is accessible to all and pursuit of 
it does not require knowledge of it. 
Modalism and the Trinity 
Regarding the Trinity it is significant that Kant has little more to say than Hick. 
Where Hick describes the function of the Trinitarian 'symbol' in terms of our 
experience of God, Kant describes it in terms of our moral experience: 
38 Kant 1960 p.l 00 
39 Kant 1960 p.54 ff. 
40 cf. Kant 1960 p.56 
41 Kant 1960 p.134 
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God wills to be served under three specifically different moral aspects. 
The naming of the different (not physically, but morally different) persons 
of one and the same Being expresses this not ineptly.42 
Kant describes it as a mistake to regard the doctrine of the Trinity "as an extension of 
the theoretical knowledge of the divine nature" for to do so would give rise to a 
mystery both "incomprehensible" and "anthropomorphic" and, therefore, of no use for 
moral improvement.43 The value of such symbolic language for Kant is its moral 
value rather than its ability to depict metaphysical reality. 
The Reducibility of Religion 
Both thinkers relate the function of what they take to be representational language to 
the moral transformation of the human life. This is the final bar at which all doctrines 
must be evaluated. Their analysis of language is part of a general reductionist 
treatment of religion which leads them both to assert no more than three metaphysical 
beliefs that are necessarily part of the universally valid faith. 
Hebblethwaite has identified what he describes as the three residual truth-claims that 
remain in the wake of Hick's distinction between noumenal and phenomenal reality. It 
is instructive to note that these, at least in general terms, are also the residual content 
of Kant's universal religion. 
1. There is an ultimate transcendent Reality, to which all human religions, 
in their very different modes, are historically and culturally shaped 
responses. 
2. Salvific religious experience, leading to transformation from self-
centredness to Reality-centredness, is not a purely human possibility. 
Religion, in all its different forms, involves spiritual resources from 
42 Kant 1960 p.132 
43 Kant 1960 p.133 
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beyond. 
3. Human life will be extended, beyond death, towards some form 
of perfected consummation in the end.44 
Truth claims must remain embedded in Hick's analysis if he is to remain a critical 
realist. However, the realist reach and explanatory power of the remaining truth 
claims are clearly very limited in content. The God of religious pluralism must remain 
an undefined "transcendent Reality" in order to include all non-materialist or non-
secular world views. Salvation means moral transformation and occurs through some 
form of undefinable spiritual influence. The third truth claim relates the process of 
moral transformation to its eschatological dimension. Each truth claim simultaneously 
distances Hick from secularism while favouring no particular religion. 
Conclusions 
As we have seen, Hick maintains that the justification for holding these beliefs rests 
upon the religious experience of the individual and the community to which they 
belong. However, it is also important to note that none of these beliefs are known 
through experience directly. They are, in fact, the product of theology. Theology, 
according to Hick is the second-order theoretical reflection upon the awareness given 
through religious experience.45 Therefore, each truth claim is no more than a 
postulate of religious experience. This draws Hick's position sharply into line with 
that of Kant. Kant maintained two central postulates: the existence of God and 
continued personal existence beyond physical death in which the summum bonum will 
be realised. The difference between Kant and Hick is that for the latter these are 
postulates of religious experience whereas for the former they are postulates of 
44 Hebblethwaite 1993 p.331 
45 Loughlin presents evidence for this distinction between first and second order 
discourse in the work of Hick in Loughlin 1986a pp.1 OOff. 
178 
practical (moral) reason. However, even this difference is muted when it is 
acknowledged that, for Hick, religious experience is continuous with practical reason. 
Having established this connection between Hick and Kant we may turn to assess the 
more general project of which Kant is a formative part. 
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Chapter 5 The Enlightenment Project 
(a) The Encyclopaedist Vision 
The number of significant connections we have established between the work of Hick 
and Kant permit us to locate them both in the same broad movement of thought. We 
will first examine Kant's description of the broader project he was engaged in and then 
consider MacIntyre's account of liberalism. 1 We will argue that Hick's pluralist 
theology is a modem example of the Encyclopaedist Vision and then be in a position 
to deploy MacIntyre's incisive analysis of liberalism against Hick. 
What is Enlightenment? 
Kant saw his own times as marking a radical break with the past. Most commentators 
date the movement known as modernism from the work of Descartes.2 It may be 
more accurate to say that the seeds of modernity were sown in Descartes but that he 
remained a part of the late mediaeval worldview rather than truly originating 
something new.3 It is with Kant that one can identify a decisive break with the past. 
We may begin with his demand for such a radical break: 
Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is 
man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from an-
other. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason 
but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. 
Sapere aude! "Have courage to use your own reason!" - that is the motto 
I In particular MacIntyre 1987, 1988 and 1990 
2 So Middleton and Marsh 1995 p.41, Newbigin 1989 p.28, Allen 1989 p.3 7, Kling 
1991 p.5ff. 
3 Hence Gellner draws out the significance of the Cartesian method in which the 
existence of God is necessary to provide a basis for philosophy. This distances 
Descartes from "pure" Modernism (Gellner 1992 pp.1-22). 
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of enlightenment. 4 
In this call to the Enlightenment5 Kant makes clear two key features in the movement. 
First, it is a break with the past. By "tutelage" Kant identifies any movement that 
imposes truth, meaning or ethics from without. Tutelage is the imposition of authority 
upon the human subject. It could be despotic in form but Kant is clear that the 
tutelage facing humankind as eighteenth century Prussia drew to a close was self-
incurred because people wanted it that way. They wanted it that way because, just as a 
child who is spoilt by parents becomes lazy, humanity comes to relax into an easy way 
of life. Enlightenment would be the intellectual act of breaking ranks with such 
imposed authority. It was to be humankind's coming of age. Tutelage is the grip that 
tradition may hold upon those unable to think for themselves. Whether Protestant or 
Catholic in form Kant identified the traditions of ecclesiastical Christianity with such 
tutelage and called for their demise. 
Second, "Sapere aude!" (Dare to Know!) is a claim to the supremacy of human reason. 
Knowledge and understanding are available to all not through the dictates of tradition 
but through the exercise of autonomous reason. Kant even describes the summons to 
the exercise of reason as a call to "go alone" in contrast to the effect of tradition on 
people who Kant compares to "domestic cattle" - dumb, placid and conformist.6 The 
contrast is between the autonomy of the Enlightenment Man,7 walking a lonely path to 
4 Kant 1963 p.3 
5 Translations of Kant employ the term without the capital letter. While quotations 
from Kant retain this form our preferred use will be as a proper name in common with 
most contemporary writers and in order to distinguish the term from the more limited 
salvific connotations of the verbal form (i.e. as used in Hick's pluralist interpretation 
of religion). 
6 Kant 1963 p.3 
7 "Man" is the appropriate noun in discussing Kant's thesis. He declared all of the 
"fair sex" to be opposed to the Enlightenment (Kant 1963 p.3). 
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personal knowledge, and the cattle of tradition who are herded along in their 
communities believing only what they are told by others. These are the two key 
features of the Enlightenment; the end of tradition and the autonomy of reason. 
The traditions with which Kant takes Issue are religious traditions rather than 
traditions of art or science: 
I have placed the main point of enlightenment - the escape of men from their 
self-incurred tutelage - chiefly in matters of religion because our rulers have 
no interest in playing the guardian with respect to the arts and sciences and 
also because religious incompetence is not only the most harmful but also the 
most degrading of all. 8 
Kant perceives religion as receiving special protection from authorities, a protection 
not extended to art or science. Art and science are freely the subject of public debate 
and open to revision and reformulation wherever necessary. In contrast, religion is 
harmful and the main source of tutelage because it exercises a form of authority 
removed from public debate and closed to revision. The difference between religion 
and the art/science world is a matter of neutrality. Religion is simply not hospitable to 
neutral, autonomous reason. In the light of Kuhn's philosophy of science this is a 
seriously problematic position to take. Scientific discussion relies upon philosophical 
presuppositions of enormous importance and takes place in a context of political and 
financial pressures which inevitably slant what mayor may not be researched and 
restricts the paradigms scientists may inhabit. Religion, art and science are all 
examples of traditions of enquiry but Kant fails to connect the disciplines together. 
Therefore, only religion is treated as the focus of imposed authority from which the 
enlightened must break free. 
8 Kant 1963 p.9 
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The Encyclopaedist Vision 
The Gifford lectures were instituted by a key figure in the Enlightenment. Gifford is 
identified as an exemplar of one version of moral enquiry in MacIntyre's own 
contribution to the lecture series.9 According to MacIntyre, Gifford and his 
contemporaries were dominated by the: 
guiding presupposition of thought that substantive rationality is unitary, 
that there is a single, if perhaps complex, conception of what the standards 
and the achievements of rationality are, one which every educated person 
can without too much difficulty be brought to agree in acknowledging. 10 
This presupposition informed both the method and the goal of those involved in 
producing a catalogue of knowledge in the late nineteenth century: the ninth edition of 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica. The possibility of a universal understanding of human 
knowledge relied upon the assumption that there was one unitary rationality. 
Therefore, the compilation of information in science, religion, politics or morals could 
be undertaken in strictly objective terms such that "any attentive and honest observer, 
unblinded and undistracted by the prejudices of prior commitment to belief, would 
report the same data, the same facts." 11 Knowledge was understood in terms of 
progress and all the sciences had progress as "their central subject matter and 
conceptions of progress and of its inevitability are among their most important 
unifying conceptions. " 12 All knowledge could be characterised in terms of a 
progressive accumulation of information. For Gifford, religion was a branch of 
9 MacIntyre 1990. Concerning Hick 1989a Badham writes "Lord Gifford would have 
been delighted by this book. It is hard to think of any previous Gifford Lectures which 
more precisely fulfilled the terms of his will." (Badham 1991 p.86) 
10 MacIntyre 1990 p.14 
11 MacIntyre 1990 p.1 7 
12 MacIntyre 1990 p.21 
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scientific study and the lectures were instituted so that religion could be studied by the 
same canons of reason and empirical enquiry as astronomy or chemistry. The 
progression of enquiry toward the unity of knowledge assumed the accessibility of a 
comprehensive neutral criteria for rationality. The encyclopaedist ideal of presenting 
objective "knowledge rather than opinion"13 gave rise to the hope that in the post-
enlightenment world the "Encyclopaedia would have displaced the Bible as the 
canonical book .... of the culture." 14 
Behind the drive toward a comprehensive conception of knowledge and the 
distinction between knowledge and opinion lay the quest for neutrality in research. 
This becomes a key theme in MacIntyre's assessment of the Enlightenment project. 15 
Philosophers of the Enlightenment, of which Kant would be an example, argued for a 
method which would purge rationality of its biases and prejudices. Their proposal 
was: 
that we first divest ourselves of allegiance to anyone of the contending theories 
and also abstract ourselves from all those particularities of social relationship in 
terms of which we have been accustomed to understand our responsibilities 
and our interests. 16 
The virtue claimed by this method is that of gaining a universal point of view 
untainted by bias. The attempt had been launched to replace the authority of tradition 
with that of human reason. In order to do so it was necessary to describe a form of 
reasoning untainted by the prejudice inherent in tradition: 
13 Encyclopaedia Britannica (9th Edition), Vol. 1, p.viii. Cited in MacIntyre 1990 p.19 
14 MacIntyre 1990 p.19 
15 Particularly in MacIntyre 1988. 
16 MacIntyre 1988 p.3 
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It was a central aspiration of the Enlightenment, an aspiration the formulation of 
which was itself a great achievement, to provide for debate in the public realm 
standards and methods of rational justification by which alternative courses of 
action in every sphere of life could be adjudged just or unjust, rational or 
irrational, enlightened or unenlightened. 17 
These proposed standards would provide the key to the neutral, universal vantage 
point from which all religious, moral and scientific claims could be adjudicated. The 
use of the judicial metaphor is helpful here as it draws attention to the degree of 
autonomous, impartial value invested in the principle of reason. Human reason would 
be handed the reigns of power as arbitrating judge in place of the tutelage of tradition. 
The necessary rational principles were understood to underlie, in some fashion, the 
worldviews of all humanity and, like seams of coal, would yield themselves to careful 
intellectual mining. Thinkers of the Enlightenment took "cultural particularities" to be 
"the mere accidental clothing of reason in particular times and places" 18 under which 
lay the universal rationality and morality of humankind. The figures who provided, 
developed and published this Enlightenment quest for neutrality include Kant, 
Bentham, Rousseau and, of course, the editors of the Encyclopaedia. 
The Advantages of Modernism 
The attraction of universal impartiality is clear in matters of conflicting claims to truth 
or morality. Such a rationality would be able to function as an acultural court of 
appeal to which all humanity might appeal. Parochial claims to authority were hardly 
avoidable in the Greek city states or isolated European nations but, in the light of 
global pluralism with its diverse seats of authority, the liberalism of the Enlightenment 
offers two great attractions. 
17 MacIntyre 1988 p.6 
18 MacIntyre 1988 p.6 
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A Universal Language 
Firstly, there is the possibility of a universal discourse for expressing and deciding 
truth. MacIntyre describes the cosmopolitan mentality as offering: 
the confident belief that all cultural phenomena must be translucent to under-
standing, that all texts must be capable of being translated into the language 
which the adherents of modernity speak to each other. 19 
This universal language then offers the possibility for common understanding of 
concepts, values and beliefs. It is the cultural equivalent to the symbolic language of 
mathematics, enabling its practitioners to transcend cultural particularities and 
understand the concepts of others. 
A Universal Rationality 
The second attraction of liberalism is illustrated by MacIntyre with reference to Reid's 
argument, against Hume, that "there are certain truths evident to almost every human 
being".20 The universal translatability of concepts is complemented by their universal 
testability. All truth claims may be submitted to a universal, formal logic the 
justification for which can only be offered by appeal to the empirical fact that almost 
every human being assents to their validity. In matters of rationality or morality the 
Enlightenment presupposition is that there is an agreed standard implicit in all cultures 
only waiting to be identified and extracted. Any exceptions to these standards result 
from an "unsound mind" or "unsound philosophical theory".21 In moral matters, 
19 MacIntyre 1988 p.327 
20 MacIntyre 1988 p.329 
21 MacIntyre 1988 p.329 
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deviation must be accounted for in terms of mental illness rather than the possibility 
that there is a genuine alternative value system to that of European Liberalism. 
The anti-tradition Tradition 
The Enlightenment project which "begun as an appeal to alleged principles of shared 
rationality against what was felt to be the tyranny of tradition"22 has itself become a 
tradition. However, in its contemporary form this tradition has undergone one 
substantial modification. Whereas in its youth the failure to actually identify these 
proposed principles had been considered "a grave defect to be remedied as soon as 
possible"23 this failure has turned into a cardinal value for modem liberalism. Social 
pluralism, far from being a mark of intellectual immaturity, is now considered to be a 
virtue. It allows the individual to freely choose and live by "whatever conception of 
the good he or she pleases".24 Such social pluralism must be affirmed in keeping with 
the golden rule of tolerance. Any conception of the good may be adopted but only so 
long as it does not affect the conceptions of the good held by others in the same 
society. 
The Encyclopaedist vision, as MacIntyre describes it, may be summarised in the 
following way. It is the project stemming from the Enlightenment to the present day 
which attempts to replace religious, civil or sovereign authority with human reason. It 
presupposes a common rationality and morality underlying all human behaviour other 
than deviant behaviour which is the product of illness. The method of the project 
depends upon the production of a tradition free language of enquiry into which all 
parochial languages may be translated and all/acts disentangled from the opinions that 
22 MacIntyre 1988 p.335 
23 MacIntyre 1988 p.335 
24 MacIntyre 1988 p.336 
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obscure them. The aim of the project, in common with the presupposed unitary nature 
of knowledge, is the systematisation of true beliefs into their one, coherent whole: the 
encyclopaedic presentation of knowledge. This is the aim of Kant's call to 
Enlightenment. In throwing off the shackles of tutelage in favour of reason one is 
attempting to discard the particularities of belonging to a community of enquiry with 
its own norms of authority in favour of a universal notion of reason. 
What is a Tradition? 
In order to understand MacIntyre's history of ideas and apply its findings to our present 
study it is necessary that we unpack exactly what he means by "tradition" and how it 
relates to the work of philosophy and theology.25 
The traditions with which Macintyre is concerned are, at least, "traditions of 
intellectual enquiry". 26 Intellectual enquiry is a part of "the elaboration of a mode of 
social and moral life"27 as expressed in the public institutions of which that tradition 
is a part. Hence, MacIntyre describes traditions as homogenous communities in which 
human thought occurs; communities involving political structures, social 
arrangements and conceptions of justice. Furthermore, it is only in the context of such 
traditions that intellectual enquiry may occur. Traditions are not optional patterns of 
belief which may be assessed by other standards: 
There is no standing ground, no place for enquiry, no way to engage in the 
practices of advancing, evaluating, accepting, and rejecting reasoned argu-
25 There are a number of useful discussions of these issues in Horton and Mendus 
(eds.) 1994. See also McMylor 1994 pp.l47-173. 
26 MacIntyre 1988 p.349 
27 MacIntyre 1988 p.349 
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ment apart from that which is provided by some particular tradition or other.28 
Traditions provide the necessary standpoint for all moral and rational enquiry. It is 
only within such a tradition that moral and rational concepts find their meaning and 
suitable models of how they should be applied. Furthermore, the "data" or "facts" 
such as morally perplexing situations or disputed physical evidence can only be 
perceived in terms of a tradition. According to MacIntyre traditions "are always and 
ineradically so some degree local, informed by particularities of language and social 
and natural environment". 29 Thus, traditions are particular communities of human 
beings and must be understood in terms of those particularities rather than in the light 
of any proposed general or universal categories. An important implication of this 
approach is that any attempt to describe the diversity of belief must of necessity be a 
'narrative' rather than a catalogue or encyclopaedia. The reason for this implication is 
that no general features of thought may be isolated from competing traditions in order 
to produce a systematic account. Instead, traditions may only be narrated in terms of 
their particular features. This is, in effect, the project with which MacIntyre is 
concerned: a narrated history of ideas. 
Morality and rationality must also be understood through particular narratives. There 
simply is no non-tradition or a-tradition moral code or rational standard available: 
since there are a diversity of traditions of enquiry, with histories, there are, 
so it will tum out, rationalities rather than rationality, just as it will tum out 
that there are justices rather thanjustice.30 
28 MacIntyre 1988 p.350 
29 MacIntyre 1988 p.361 
30 MacIntyre 1988 p.9 
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MacIntyre is arguing, contra Enlightenment, for a genuine pluralism of reason and 
morality. This means that while "rationality" and "morality" are useful categories to 
shape a discussion of tradition, in reality they are empty categories. There is no 
rationality or morality but only rationalities and moralities which are dependent upon 
traditions. 
The essential constitution of traditions must be construed in terms of their particular 
determinative beliefs rather than in tenns of epistemology or some other general 
philosophical category. In describing differences between Aristotelianism and 
Augustinianism, MacIntyre stresses that they "differ from each other over much more 
than their contending accounts of practical rationality and justice: they differ in their 
catalogs of the virtues, in their conceptions of selfhood, and in their metaphysical 
cosmologies. ,,31 Such differences are even more pronounced in the case of religious 
pluralism where conceptions of selfhood and cosmology diverge so radically. 32 
An objection to this account might be that as traditions are constantly changing and 
refonnulating beliefs in the light of new developments they cannot be identified 
simply in tenns of detenninative beliefs.33 In fact, if it is the case that all beliefs are 
31 MacIntyre 1988 p.349 
32 Hick acknowledges this. Concerning the diversity of "primary affirmations" 
(cosmology, selfhood) he writes "They conflict in the sense that they are different and 
that one can only centre one's religious life wholeheartedly and unambiguously upon 
one of them" (Hick 1989a p.373). Hick's theoretical devices to overcome these 
differences include the mythological interpretation of language and the primacy of 
ethical categories over the intellectual. 
33 This objection is implicit in Ward 1994 pp.42-45. Though not specifically directed 
at MacIntyre, his suggestion that social membership may not be explicable in terms of 
adherence to an intellectual framework is pertinent to MacIntyre's work; "Especially in 
the case of religious institutions, the reality of social membership is so complex and 
the reasons for membership so diverse that it would be quite false to think it was a 
matter of intellectual assent to all the declarations of the institution." (Ward 1994 
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in a state of flux and open to endless possible revisions then it would be inappropriate 
to deem any particular beliefs 'determinate'. 
This objection also relates to MacIntyre's own account of the development of a 
tradition. According to his account there are various crises, encounters and 
developments with which a tradition must deal and through which a tradition may 
change. There are identifiable "stages in the initial development of a tradition". 34 
However, it would be wrong to suggest that a tradition could ever change out of all 
recognition. Such a radical change must be characterised as conversion and not 
development. Instead, MacIntyre notes that "Some core of shared belief, constituitive 
of allegiance to the tradition, has to survive every rupture. ,,35 The picture of traditions 
in constant flux without identifiable core beliefs is simply inappropriate. There are 
core beliefs and if allegiance to them is lost then conversion has occurred. 
Hick against Tradition 
Hick's work shares with Kant a commitment to a transcendent rational and moral 
framework for the interpretation and evaluation of religion. Hick is convinced that his 
epistemology can provide an analysis of religion in general, universal categories. This 
conviction leads him to apply an epistemology originally offered as an account for 
Christian belief to religious belief in general. Hick is continuing Kant's project in 
undermining the role of tradition specific enquiry in favour of a neutral account of 
religious knowledge that relies on no external authority other than a natural belief in 
reason and morality assumed to be held by all people.36 It is important to note that 
pp.43-44) 
34 MacIntyre 1988 p.355 
35 MacIntyre 1988 p.356 
36 Apczynski 1992 
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Hick's three step epistemology gives primacy to naturaVphysical and moraVpersonal 
categories over the religious level of interpretation. Tradition, for Hick, belongs to the 
second and third steps of interpretation. In contrast, we might diagrammatically 
represent the implications of MacIntyre's treatment of tradition in the following way. 
Figure 6 A Critique of Hick's Epistemology 
Figure 6 demonstrates the reversal of Hick's methodology that MacIntyre's thesis 
implies. The religious perspective is provided by the tradition to which one belongs 
and this is the context in which moral and physical evaluative procedures will occur. 
The diagram shows a descending pattern in order to highlight the "total" perspective of 
a tradition within which moral and physical discourse are only subsets. It might be 
retorted that this alternative diagram is unhelpful because it makes a tradition, in all its 
complexity, already a 'given' and fails to show how anyone actually comes to believe 
in a tradition in the first place. This objection arises from the basic individualistic 
approach to knowledge inherent in the Enlightenment tradition from Kant to Hick. In 
contrast, MacIntyre's scheme emphasises the communal nature of knowledge. It is not 
individuals who are justified or not justified in their beliefs (Hick) but communitie of 
faith (traditions) that are justified or not. We will return to asse further a 
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communitarian approach to religious knowledge and apologetics further below37 but 
first we must clarify Hick's relationship to the Enlightenment. We shall do so in terms 
of his treatment of language, rationality and experience. This analysis will allow us to 
submit Hick's work to a range of post Enlightenment critiques.38 
37 See Chapter 6 (d) . 
38 Cook identifies Hick as postmodern (Cook 1993 p.lO). In contrast, our thes~s 
locates Hick in the modernist tradition and finds postmodern resources to fault hIS 
position. Hick notes the idiosyncrasy of Cook's claim (Hick 1994 p.20). 
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(b) Language and Rationality 
It is the contention of this thesis that Hick is committed to developing an 
Enlightenment conception of rational justification that will provide a defence of 
religion in general though not of Christianity in particular. We have analysed in detail 
Hick's epistemology. Its essential features are empiricist, sceptic and Kantian. 1 These 
features entitle it to be classed as an Enlightenment project. The primary criticism of 
this approach concerns its poor treatment of the role of tradition in enquiry. It is 
tradition that provides a cultural and linguistic setting in which reason and belief find 
their particular meaning. Hick undermines the significance of cultural and linguistic 
contexts in order to produce a neutral epistemology capable of subsuming all plurality. 
We will now present this feature of Hick's work in relation to his treatment of 
language which most clearly demonstrates his location in the Enlightenment. 
Definitions of Myth and Metaphor 
Hick has often emphasised certain literary forms in the course of his work without 
devoting great space to discussing the exact sense in which he uses them.2 It will be 
necessary to briefly trace Hick's conception of religious language through the corpus 
of his work in order to identify his position. The literary forms we shall discuss are 
those of myth and metaphor. 3 
These are the claims of chapters 3 and 4. It must be noted that the form of 
empiricism to which Hick is indebted is in its revised, post-Kantian, form. We 
acknowledge that there is a substantial difference between the use of empiricism he 
makes and that of the classical empiricists such as Locke and Hume. 
2 Perhaps it is particularly surprising that even Hick 1990a" which has a chapter on 
religious language also fails to provide an analysis of these terms in any detail. 
Primarily the chapter outlines and critiques various noncognitive and symbolic 
accounts of religious language but Hick offers little nuance for his own description of 
religious language use. 
3 Hick uses these terms somewhat interchangeably. 
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Hick has consistently claimed, as we have seen, that religion is essentially fact-
asserting in its very nature. However, not all religious truth claims can be understood 
as simple assertions of fact for this would give rise to profound internal contradictions 
within Christianity apart from the irresolvable problems for the relationship between 
Christianity and other religions. Hick has developed an account of religious language 
use that helps overcome this dilemma. 
In some of his most early work Hick notes that the basic fact-asserting model of 
religion which he employs at this stage leaves: 
ample scope for the non-factual language of myth, symbol and poetry 
to express the believer's awareness of the illimitable mysteries which 
surround that core of religious fact.4 
Myth, symbol and poetry are language uses that Hick clearly distinguishes from the 
literal language use which comprise the basic fact-asserting character of religion. 
Hick describes myth as non-factual but of value in forming the religious outlook on 
life. He describes the network of literal beliefs as containing "gaps which have to be 
filled, if at all, by myth". 5 Hick is here describing the areas of theological discourse 
more often described as mysteries. These mysteries he identifies as gaps in literal 
knowledge and the function of myth is to fill those gaps. The relationship of myth to 
literal language is one of supplement and adornment to factual language. 
Hick accepts that debates will always continue concerning the exact demarcation 
between myth language and literal language. Though the lines may be redrawn from 
4 Hick 1988b pp.22-23 
5 Hick 1988b p.23 
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time to time he maintains that this basic language distinction will always remain. 
However, it would not be the case that all religious beliefs could be classified as myth. 
If all beliefs were mythological in character then they would not relate to an objective 
order of existence but would "merely define an imagined realm of their own" and a 
religion "thereby forfeits its cognitive value".6 If an initial assumption is made that 
religion does not relate to an objective order of existence then the mythological 
account of language may be adopted but Hick describes this not as a revision of 
Christianity so much as an obituary for it: 
The faith embodied in the biblical writings, and the faith of the church 
as an extension of this, depend upon the conviction that God exists, not 
merely as an idea in some men's minds, but as the creator and sustain~r 
of the universe .... 7 
According to Hick, Christian faith has always rested on the assumption that the reality 
of God is mind-independent or an objective fact. This empirical fact about the nature 
of Christianity is Hick's prime motive for retaining the core factual account of 
religious language. However, the description Hick provides of where a non-factual 
account of religion would lead helps define what he means by mythological (non-
factual) language. Myths are imaginary, of noncognitive value and "merely ideas" in 
some people's heads. 
Hick's contribution to the collection of essays he edited on Christology8 builds upon 
the work of his fellow contributors to draw out the implications of the historical 
arguments many of them had made concerning the non-historical nature of high 
6 Hick 1988b p.24 
7 Hick 1988b p.25 
8 Hick 1977a 
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Christologies. Hick makes use of these claims in order to sustain his pluralist 
argument. However, he also devotes some space to outlining what he means by the 
claim that "the idea of divine incarnation is a mythological idea". 9 Hick argues that 
one cannot understand the incarnation to be a literal truth claim because its literal 
sense is illogical: 
For to say, without explanation, that the historical Jesus of Nazareth was 
also God is as devoid of meaning as to say that this circle drawn with a 
pencil on paper is also a square. 10 
By "without explanation" Hick means without spelling out what kind of language use 
one is adopting in terms of the canons of Enlightenment empiricism. Only when such 
a claim is spelled out in these terms does it constitute a literal truth claim. If any claim 
cannot be understood coherently as a "literal claim" it must, urges Hick, be construed 
as a myth: 
a myth is a story which is told but which is not literally true, or an idea 
or image which is applied to someone or something but which does not 
literally apply, but which invites a particular attitude in its hearers. 11 
Hick is not interested in the former sense of myth, which simply means a fable or 
story. The latter sense of myth is not necessarily narrative as it may include any idea 
or concept that does not merely teach or entertain but also invites a dispositional 
response. While the truth of a literal claim is to do with its relationship to an objective 
reality, the "truth of a myth is a kind of practical truth consisting in the appropriateness 
of the attitude to its object." 12 This definition provides a clear account of why Hick 
9 Hick 1977b p.178 
10 Hick 1977b p.178 
II Hick 1977b p.1 78 
12 Hick 1977b p.178 
197 
chooses to use the term "appropriate" in this discussion. It may be said that a literal 
truth claim could be judged in terms of its appropriateness. In that case it would be 
the appropriateness of the claim to the reality about which it speaks. However, in the 
case of a mythological claim, the sense of appropriateness is secondary or derived. A 
myth is true if it evokes the appropriate attitude and consequent behaviour in the 
hearer or user towards something else. Hick clearly demarcates these two types of 
language use both of which are necessary for a religion to maintain its cognitive status. 
Literal truths are attempts to describe objective reality and may be tested in terms of 
their correspondence to that reality. Mythological truths fill the gaps left by the literal. 
They supplement and adorn the literal component of religion and have the function of 
evoking appropriate dispositional responses. 
The MythlLiterai Distinction 
Hick provides a more sustained treatment of the myth/literal language distinction in 
his later work. 13 Here he states that his definition relies upon "a distinction between 
literal and mythological truth" .14 He arrives at the distinction by spelling out the truth 
tests relevant to the respective categories. A belief is literal if the truth test that it 
requires "consists in its conformity or lack of conformity to fact". 15 However, myth is 
not literally true but "tends to evoke an appropriate dispositional attitude". 16 Hick's 
definition of myth does not depend on an account of a literary type but on the function 
and effect of its use. Myth includes story forms and also concepts within theological 
systems. One problem that arises here is that though Hick has intended to "fix our use 
of the term" 17 by an initially specific definition he now extends the term to include a 
13 Particularly Hick 1989a. 
14 Hick 1989a p.348 
15 Hick 1989a p.348 
16 Hick 1989a p.348 
17 Hick 1989a p.347 
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whole range of literary devices, figures of speech and theological concepts. His 
weakly specified definition allows him to treat both the "Hebraic story of the fall of 
Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden" and the "idea of the transsubstantiation [sic] of 
bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ" as mythologies. I8 This weak 
definition leads to a discussion in which metaphor, analogy, allegory, parable and even 
interpreted history are rolled into one under the general category of myth. An 
example of this is found in Hick's suggestion that he is speaking in "mythological 
terms" when he describes a "viciously devious" committee meeting as "the work of the 
devil" .19 This is clearly an example of a metaphor but because Hick's account lacks 
nuance he describes it as a myth. In effect, Hick's discussion leaves only two language 
types in operation; the literal (fact) and the non-literal (myth). All concrete examples 
of language use must be either one or the other. 
Myth and the Literal as Universal Categories 
This discussion of language use employs the leading assumptions of the 
Enlightenment tradition. Hick intends his definition to function as universal 
categories for the assimilation of all the available data from the world religions. 
Whether we are discussing Hinduism, Shinto or Southern Baptist Christianity, any 
truth claims that are not amenable to a certain type of truth testing are bound together 
under the term "myth". Furthermore, the type of testing Hick employs is nothing but 
the standards of empiricism: the evidential value of sense experience to authorise 
belief. In this language analysis Hick has posited a set of standards not specific to any 
tradition but in terms of which he is able to systematise all traditions into their literal 
18 Hick 1989a p.349 
19 Hick 1989a p.348 
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and non-literal components. Here is the encyclopaedist vision in its late twentieth 
century form. 
This dualist treatment of language relies upon a radical dichotomy between myth and 
literal truth which in tum echoes the Kantian epistemology. Hick's definition not only 
emphasises the existential significance of myth as practical truth but also isolates this 
aspect as the exclusive function of myth. In contrast, Marshall describes the 
relationship between myth and truth as one that can only be settled with reference to 
particular cases: "To say that a story is a myth is not to pronounce on its historical 
truth or falsity .... A myth mayor may not employ historical materials. ,,20 Hick 
defines myth in such a way that he does make a pronouncement on the historicity of 
mythological claims. If a claim conveyed historical truth it would not be a myth but a 
literal truth claim: 
in addition to literal truth there is also mythological truth. A statement 
or set of statements about X is mythologically true if it is not literally true 
but nevertheless tends to evoke an appropriate dispositional attitude to 
X. Thus, mythological truth is practical or .... existential. 21 
This definition does not allow the possibility of religious language that evokes 
appropriate dispositional attitudes because it is literally true. Furthermore, it excludes 
the possibility of other ways in which language may properly be said to refer (such as 
through metaphor or analogy) without in any normal sense being literal. Hick closes 
this avenue of discussion by isolating mythology from literalism and defining the 
former as strictly non-referential.22 
20 Marshall entry "Myth" in Ferguson 1989 pA50 
21 Hick 1989a p.348 
22 Hick's account has no place for Soskice's project of theological realism which 
affirms that "the models and the metaphorical terminology [of the Christian tradition] 
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The specific understanding of myth with which we are dealing in the case of Hick's 
pluralism is non-literal (being a different type of language use from the literal) and 
defined in terms of function (the emotive impact) rather than genre (it may be either 
narrative or non-narrative). We may now consider the function of myth in Hick's 
interpretation of doctrine and its implications for apologetic discourse. 
The function of Myth 
The main function of myth is as a "resource required for the discussion of religious 
beliefs. ,,23 There are certain claims made in religion about matters truly beyond our 
comprehension and Hick claims that it is our use of myths that enables us to speak of 
them. He categorises myth in terms of two types. The first are "expository myths,,24 
and the second are attempts to express the inexpressible described as "mysteries".25 
1. Expository Myths 
Expository myths are attempts to express a basic truth about human existence in 
imaginative terms. They are optional and reducible for they "say something that can 
also be said non-mythologically, though generally with markedly less imaginative 
impact".26 In this case, the function of a myth is ornamental. Hick is optimistic about 
our ability to discern the underlying purpose of such myths and to disentangle the 
mythological garb with loss to nothing but its imaginative impact. For example, Hick 
interprets the "mythic story" in the Garden of Eden as an ornamental way of infonning 
us of "the fact that ordinary human life is lived in alienation from God and hence from 
.... may nonetheless be reality depicting." (Soskice 1987 p.118) 
23 Hick 1989a p.347 
24 Hick 1989a pp.348-349 
25 Hick 1989a pp.349-353 
26 Hick 1989a p.348 
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one's neighbours and from the natural environment".27 This interpretation is certainly 
open to criticism when offered as a substitute for the Hebraic account. Hick admits 
that "imaginative impact" and the images it "engraves in the imagination" are lost in 
such a translation but he does not acknowledge two significant problems his construal 
raIses. Firstly, there is the problem of drastic selectivity in his 'definitive' 
interpretation of the Genesis story. Secondly, there is the underlying problem that 
Hick is guilty, on his own account, of substituting one myth for another. This latter 
problem is one we shall return to in our alternative account of myth further below. At 
this stage we note that the function of the expository myth is an optional 
embellishment or ornamentation of a teaching which can quite adequately be 
expressed non-mythologically. 
2. Mystery Myths 
The second type of myth deals with ultimate mysteries. This is the most useful type 
for maintaining the pluralist hypothesis in the face of apparent contradictions. It is 
offered on the basis of the Kantian epistemology already considered.28 In essence, the 
epistemic framework which distinguishes between the Real as we know it and the 
Real an sich requires an account of language which recognises the limitations of word 
and concept to describe the unlimited nature of the Ultimate Reality: 
Thus it cannot be said to be one or many, person or thing, substance or 
process, good or evil, purposive or non-purposive. None of the concrete 
descriptions that apply within the realm of human experience can apply 
literally to the unexperiencable ground of that realm.29 
27 Hick 1989a p.349 
28 Expressed primarily in Hick 1989a pp.236-249. 
29 Hick 1989a p.246 
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There are two problems that Hick is responding to. These are the limitations of 
language as a vehicle for describing Ultimate Reality and the limitations of cognition 
in attempting to conceive what that reality could be. In handling these problems Hick 
is keen to preserve a realist interpretation of religious language. Regarding meaning 
he does so through the verification principle. Regarding the cognitive nature of 
religious experience he can only do so in terms of postulation. The basic postulate is 
"the Real as the ground" of "religious phenomena". 30 This postulate affirms the 
cognitive nature of fundamental religious beliefs such as the existence of the Ultimate 
Real. Attempts to describe the postulate are mythological; "None of the descriptive 
terms that apply within the realm of human experience can apply literally to the 
unexperiencable reality that underlies that realm. ,,31 Mythological language may be 
expressed in either literal or analogical pictures but, argues Hick, neither apply to the 
Ultimate Real in itself. Literal myth descriptions are those which apply to divine 
activity within the realm of space and time such as the Lord bringing his people out of 
Egypt. Analogical myth descriptions are those which attempt to describe the Ultimate 
Real in its very nature such as God is wise or Brahman is satchitananda. However, 
the differences between literal and analogical myth language remain internal to the 
broader definition of myth with which Hick works. Whatever type of myth is being 
employed it bears only an indirect relation to the Real: 
And as such it functions mythologically: we speak mythologically about the 
noumenal Real by speaking literally or analogically about its phenomenal 
manifestations. 32 
30 Hick 1989a p.350 
31 Hick 1989a p.350 
32 Hick 1989a p.351 
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Hick's definition of myth becomes ever more encompassing as he extends its range of 
usage. Not only does myth include stories, concepts and metaphors but here it extends 
its range to include literal and analogical language use. Myth is understood neither in 
terms of literary genre nor what believers think they mean by their choice of language. 
Rather, myth is distinguished from literal language by Hick's distinction between the 
Real as it is in itself and the Real as it is perceived. Consequently, most religious 
language use is mythological in character despite protestations from believers that they 
intend their language use to be literal, analogical or metaphorical. 
The De-Mythologisation of Religion 
Myth becomes an all-encompassing hermeneutical device for Hick. Through its use 
he is able to reinterpret the language use of all religions in terms of a neutral standard 
of enquiry. We may summarise his definition of myth in the following way. 
Myths do not carry the direct relationship to the Real that purely formal literal claims 
do. Myths relate to human religious experience rather than to the Real itself. The core 
content of a myth may be isolated in terms of its function in the believers life but not 
in terms of its validity in describing or disclosing reality. All types of myth serve to 
guide our response to the Real by evoking in us the appropriate behaviour. The 
"expository" type is simply the embellishment of a statement concerning human 
existence and is reducible to that statement with loss only to its emotive impact. The 
second type of myth attempts to describe the Ultimate Real directly and cannot be 
reduced to something else because they are identical to their emotive impact. To lose 
the emotive impact of "God is wise" is to lose its very meaning. In fact, when the 
expository myth is de-mythologised it becomes a myth of the second sort. For 
example, Hick classifies the doctrine of transubstantiation as an expository myth 
which "can be seen as a mythological way of making the communicant's reception of 
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[the elements] an occasion of special openness to God as known through Christ".33 
However, such phrases as "God as known through Christ" or even "openness to God" 
fail, in Hick's account, to constitute literal claims. Such phrases describe the believers' 
experience of and response to phenomenal manifestations of the Real and are 
identifiable with their emotive impact. Therefore, this example of myth is also one of 
Hick's second type. Considered in terms of function the two-fold distinction of myth 
outlined above is not significant. 
Myth as a Basis for Pluralism 
In order to sustain the pluralist hypothesis it is imperative that Hick relativise the 
various doctrinal claims of the world religions. He does so by re-framing the primary 
purpose of religious language use. Hick claims that religious language use is not 
primarily concerned with postulating metaphysical descriptions of supernatural reality 
but with inspiring certain forms of behaviour. Therefore, religions are not to be 
compared in terms of doctrinal content but in terms of the kind of behaviour those 
doctrines inspire: 
Thus the eastern and western paths constitute different forms of self-
transcendence in response to the Real and it may well be that their 
differing eschatological mythologies serve the same soteriological 
function. 34 
Hick's argument finds evidential support in the apparent similarities among the 
religions in the type of moral 'fruits' they tend to produce. Characteristics of the great 
religious saints are shared by them all even those who belong to very different 
33 Hick 1989a p.349 
34 Hick 1989a p.356 
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religious traditions.35 Hick is able to make this connection because his use of myth 
enables him to relativise the literal significance of truth claims in favour of their 
functional value. 
Hick does not think that there are many "absolutely pure" examples of incompatible 
truth claims because most rival claims can be understood in terms of "historical 
nuances" and as "marginal exceptions".36 However, he concedes that, broadly 
speaking, there are many examples of apparent doctrinal contradictions among the 
world religions. These are doctrines that could not be rationally held simultaneously 
by the same individual. The belief in the personal nature of God is in opposition to the 
impersonal Nirvana of Buddhism and cannot simply be reconciled. Disagreements 
like these are classified by Hick in three types.37 Firstly, there are divergent views 
about historical facts. Secondly, there are disagreements over trans-historical ideas. 
Thirdly, there are stories or pictures which attempt to disclose some kind of 
information about the Ultimate Real. 
In each of these cases Hick establishes a pragmatic criterion for truth and resolution of 
conflicting truth claims. F or the first type of disagreement, appeal must be made to 
"unbiased assessment of the evidence". 38 Such a resolution is only possible in 
principle. The demand for unbiased evidence is, in most important cases, impossible 
to meet. Hick is concerned to maintain that in such matters of doctrinal dispute one 
must have an open-minded attitude as to their truth or falsehood. This is a 
35 This is the thesis of Hick 1989a pp.299-314 
36 Hick 1989a p.363 
37 Hick 1989a p.363 
38 Hick 1989a p.364 
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consequence of his Scepticism. Given that absolute truth is inaccessible it would be 
wrong to be too dogmatic over historical matters. 
Trans-historical truth claims concern metaphysical questions which can only be 
answered in principle and for which we lack the necessary data. Examples include 
what actually took place in the creation of the universe. Hick argues that beliefs about 
this process are only speculative and cannot contribute to the process of 
salvation/liberation: 
Thus not only do we not know whether the universe is eternal, but this 
ignorance does not constitute a bar to attainment of liberation; and, further, 
to treat it as though it were soteriologically essential would only be likely 
to hinder the salvific process.39 
Hick enVIsages the pnmary goal of religion as the transformation of human 
consciousness from self-centredness to Reality-centredness or from selfishness to 
selflessness and, consequently, "the basic criterion .... for judging religious phenomena 
is soteriological. ,,40 Trans-historical claims may be construed as myths because their 
significance is not in the disclosure of metaphysical information about the universe but 
in their influence on moral dispositions. They are to be tested according to their 
soteriological affect rather than their literal correspondence to reality.41 All the 
central doctrines of Christianity, including the incarnation, the atonement, the 
resurrection and the Trinity, Hick describes as "possible candidates for mythological 
interpretation" .42 
39 Hick 1989a p.367 
40 Hick 1989a p.309 
41 Hick 1989a p.370 
42 Hick 1989a p.370 
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The interpretation of religious doctrines as myths permits a possible resolution of the 
problem of conflicting truth claims. Hick's definition of myth enables such claims to 
be interpreted in terms of their soteriological effectiveness and also give due 
consideration to their culturally conditioned form: 
Thus the pluralist hypothesis suggests that a number of trans-historical 
beliefs, which are at present unverifiable and unfalsifiable, may well be 
true or false myths rather than true or false factual assertions.43 
In particular Hick subjects the doctrine of the incarnation to this interpretation. It is 
the incarnation perhaps above all that provides a Christian example of a truth claim 
that is rooted in geographical and historical matters but is radically incompatible with 
any of the alternative world religions. The traditional doctrine, interpreted literally, 
has caused Christians to assume a unique privilege in relation to the rest of the world. 
This drives Hick to strip the doctrine of its mythological garb and declare the 
following literal core: 
as indicating an extraordinary openness to the divine presence in virtue of 
which Jesus' life and teachings have mediated the reality and love of God 
to millions of people in successive centuries.44 
This construal of the doctrine clearly emphasises its effects or function in history 
rather than any ontological significance it might have. The resulting de-mythologised 
statement is compatible with most rival claims and loses connection with its actual 
history. 
Myth and Apologetics 
43 Hick 1989a p.371 
44 Hick 1989a p.372 
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In apologetic endeavour Hick focuses not on the particularity of tradition but upon the 
generality of religion. Hick offers his account as an attempt to defend religion against 
naturalism without privileging any particular tradition. There are two strands to his 
apologetic. The first is the role of religious experience and the second is the 
transforming power of religious belief. Neither depend for specification on any 
particular tradition. Religious experience is explicable in terms of his neutral 
epistemology and any distinctive religious beliefs are filtered through his notion of 
myth. Both his epistemology and his philosophy of language are examples of the 
continuing project of the Enlightenment to systematise knowledge in terms of neutral 
rational and linguistic factors. Before we re-evaluate myth and metaphor we will 
consider a further element of Enlightenment methodology that has shaped Hick's 
foundationalism. 
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(c) Experiential Expressivism 
Hick's basic apologetic for religious faith is the self-authenticating nature of religious 
experience. For this reason epistemology becomes the primary interpretative tool for 
religion. Within his epistemological account it is religious experience that offers 
access to the religious world view and provid~s the foundations for all subsequent 
(and secondary) doctrinal truth claims. Experience has a prior place to doctrine as 
the interpretative key to religion. This prioritising will now be the focus of our 
discussion. 
Lindbeck's major work on doctrine arises from his own "dissatisfaction with the usual 
ways of thinking about those norms of communal belief .... generally spoken of as the 
doctrine or dogmas of the churches." 1 The problems of ecumenical discussion focus 
on the disagreements over doctrinal matters. Doctrines split the Christian Church and, 
of course, its relationship with the world religions. Lindbeck contends that a theory of 
doctrine is interdependent with a theory of religion and the aim of his book is to 
present a fresh theory of religion, using insights gained in non-theological fields, 
which will make clear this relationship. 
1. The Cognitive-Propositional Model 
Lindbeck gives short treatment to this first of the two models he describes as the 
traditional approaches to the nature of doctrine. It is a model that Hick also rejects in 
his account of Catholic Propositionalism. This model: 
1 Lindbeck 1984 p. 7. This dissatisfaction marks Lindbeck's work such as in Lindbeck 
1967 and 1996. 
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emphasises the cognitive aspects of religion and stresses the ways in which 
church doctrines function as informative propositions or truth claims about 
objective realities.2 
Religion is then categorised as a philosophy or science. The ideas of religion can be 
analysed as a set of truth claims that picture objective reality. On the basis of this 
model, the aim of religious dialogue is to compare truth claims and test which best 
corresponds to reality.3 The issue of truth is the issue of which claims correspond best 
to an independent reality about which they speak: 
the primary question when comparing religions in the classically cognitivist 
approach of traditional orthodoxy is the question as to which faith makes the 
most significant veridical truth claims and the fewest false ones.4 
Lindbeck describes the cognitive-propositional approach as the accepted orthodoxy. 
The traditional debates concerning orthodoxy and heresy have been understood to 
concern the nature of reality and the resolutions of such debates as statements with 
ontological truth value. 
Lindbeck dismisses this theory with little comment. He scorns the approach as 
belonging mostly to people who "combine unusual insecurity with naivete".5 Despite 
this weak ad hominem argument Lindbeck concedes that the model has in fact been 
held by many of the most orthodox believers for much of Christian history. This 
makes his scant treatment of the position all the more surprising as, of course, his 
chief aim is to facilitate dialogue among believers and by excluding the majority by 
2 Lindbeck 1984 p.16 
3 Representatives of this approach would include Christian 1972 and 1993, Anderson 
1984 and Netland 1991. 
4 Lindbeck 1984 pA 7 
5 Lindbeck 1984 p.21 
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his own admission he has seriously undermined any alternative offering he may 
propose. 
It seems that the substantial problem with propositionalism that Lindbeck has 
identified is the treatment of religion as a unified category alongside and similar to 
science and philosophy. The assumption of the approach is that religious truth claims 
are competing attempts to describe the common ontological reality which they all 
revolve around. Whether the person engaged in dialogue is a Muslim from Saudi 
Arabia or a Christian from California their conflicting claims about the nature of God 
really are disagreements about the same thing; as if Allah and Yahweh were no more 
than different words with a common definition. The same criticisms could be brought 
to bear in relation to doctrines of salvation, human nature and eschatology. This 
substantial criticism follows the same trajectory as MacIntyre's critique of the 
Enlightenment: the model fails to give due consideration to the role of tradition in 
forming our perception, rationality and language. However, for all the validity of this 
objection it does not constitute sound reasons for abandoning entirely the cognitive-
propositional model. The reason Lindbeck will not countenance this model of 
doctrine is that it he does not take it to be compatible with his own cultural-linguistic 
account which does not grant truth status to individual doctrines but only to the 
tradition as a whole of which they form a part.6 However, we shall have reason to 
note that this distinction between the cognitive-propositional and the cultural-
linguistic models has caused confusion that has not helped Lindbeck's case.7 
2. Experiential Expressivism 
6 Lindbeck 1984 pp.63-69 
7 Chapter 5 (d) 
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The second mainstream category of religious theory is the experiential-expressivist 
account. According to Lindbeck this has become the dominant liberal model for the 
interpretation of religion. The assumption of this approach is that "the scholarly study 
of religious phenomena on the whole supports the crucial affirmations of the basic 
unity of religious experience. ,,8 Religious experience becomes the key for the 
interpretation of the wide variety of beliefs and practices both within the Church and 
in relation to religious pluralism. The need for such a key came in the wake of Kant's 
devastating account of religion. Kant achieved the "reduction of God to a 
transcendental condition of morality".9 Lindbeck ascribes the classical experiential-
expressivist position to the attempt by Schleiermacher to restate religion by 
developing Kant's insights further. The result was a theory of religion that emphasised 
experience as the core of religious belief. 1 0 This account was markedly different from 
that of the propositionalists. Doctrines were no longer to be assessed only in terms of 
ontology. Instead, doctrines had to be directly related to the experience of the 
individual subject. 
Assessment of Experiential-Expressivism 
There are a range of obvious attractions and advantages in the experiential-expressive 
model for the ecumenical movement and for inter-faith dialogue: 
Such models are particularly well fitted to supply a rationale for the inter-
religious dialogue and co-operation that is so urgently needed in a divided 
yet shrinking world. 1 1 
8 Lindbeck 1984 p.32 
9 Lindbeck 1984 p.21 
10 Schleiermacher 1960 pp.131-141 
11 Lindbeck 1984 p.23 
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The success of this approach to doctrine in modem times is due to its power in 
resolving or, at least, marginalising, contradictory beliefs. Incompatible statements 
which conflict under the cognitive propositional approach are subjected to a 
significant reformulation. Experiential-expressivism interprets doctrines in terms of 
symbols that express deeper common religious experience. This model underlies the 
theologies of religious pluralism: 
The rationale suggested, though not necessitated, by an experiential-
expressive approach is that the various religions are diverse symbolisations 
of one and the same core experience of the Ultimate, and that therefore 
they must respect each other, learn from each other, and reciprocally 
enrich each other. 12 
Though Lindbeck engages directly with the work of Rahner, Hick provides a clear 
example of the expressivist approach. Though Rahner and Hick develop entirely 
different theological accounts of pluralism they do share a common heritage in the 
work of Schleiermacher. This common thread roots them both in the post-
Enlightenment tradition and, with it, to the experiential-expressivist model. 13 
Expressivism places emphasis on religious universals and attempts to isolate the 
common denominators of religious doctrines. Lindbeck gives this model his most 
sustained critique and we may analyse it in terms of the problems raised for Hick's 
position. 
One problem with the method of arriving at a pluralist theology is that it sets out to 
prove by empirical observation a conclusion that must already be assumed in its 
12 Lindbeck 1984 p.23 
13 To be precise Lindbeck characterises Rahner as a representative of a hybrid 
category rather than mainstream experiential-expressivism. Hick needs no such 
qualification to locate his position. 
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methodology. Writing of Heiler and his claim that common ideas such as 
righteousness, mercy, repentance and prayer are evidence of the single source 
underlying the world religions, Lindbeck comments: ".... if one wants to find 
similarities in the world's major religions, and if one looks at them through Christian 
eyes, then this is a defensible list of the elements they have in common."14 However, 
as Lindbeck points out, if a Buddhist were to embark on a similar investigation then he 
or she may draw up a very different list of common elements and Christianity may 
sound rather like Buddhism. The attempt to state in propositional terms what the 
common core actually is leads to a fundamental difficulty: 
Because this core experience is said to be common to a wide diversity of 
religions, it is difficult or impossible to specify its distinctive features, and 
yet unless this is done, the assertion of commonality becomes logically 
and empirically vacuous. 15 
Lindbeck argues that Rahner makes this mistake by assuming the existence of a 
common experience. It is impossible to show how this can be the case because any 
attempt to specify the experience must be in such general categories that it lacks any 
informative definition. The evidence itself is interpreted by this neutral category 
rather than supporting it and hence the conclusion of expressivism is assumed in its 
methodology rather than arising from it. 
An even stronger objection to expressivism concerns the relationship of individual 
experience to the doctrines of the community. The cognitive model emphasised the 
truth of religious belief in terms of the correspondence of statement to reality. This is 
not the definition of truth used by experiential-expressivists for whom" 'truth' is a 
14 Lindbeck 1984 pAl 
15 Lindbeck 1984 p.32 
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function of symbolic efficacy" .16 Religious beliefs are to be compared in terms of 
how well they express the inner experience of believers rather than their superficial 
descriptive content. This strategy underlies Hick's pluralism. For Hick, the test of 
many central religious truth claims does not lie in a test of correspondence but "in the 
appropriateness to the myth's referent of the behavioural dispositions it tends to evoke 
in the hearer". 17 This mythological understanding of beliefs interprets them in terms 
of experience not ontology. The variety of religious beliefs and doctrines are only 
different ways of expressing the same core experience: 
When we speak of a personal God, with moral attributes and purposes, 
or when we speak of the non-personal Absolute, Brahman, or of the 
Dharmakaya, we are speaking of the Real as humanly experienced: that 
is, as phenomena. 18 
This pluralist account of religious belief makes belief a product of human experience 
and illustrates the fallacy which Lindbeck identifies. 19 Experiential-expressivism 
assumes that religious experience underlies and informs religious belief and its 
formulation as doctrinal statements and creeds. Lindbeck's alternative model reverses 
this relationship and conceives religion to be a "linguistic framework" that "shapes the 
entirety of life and thought" .20 The mistake of experiential-expressivism lies in the 
illusory attempt to "locate ultimately significant contact with whatever is finally 
important to religion in the prereflective experiential depths of the self'. 21 The 
16 Lindbeck 1984 pA 7 
17 Hick 1989a p.348 
18 Hick 1989a p.246 
19 Hick's position is a qualified expressivism: he accepts the realist cognitive account 
of religion insofar as he would posit an objective reality as the object of religious 
devotion. However, our only contact with that presupposed objective reality is 
mediated through the common core experience. 
20 Lindbeck 1984 p.33 
21 Lindbeck 1984 p.21 
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articulation of these experiences are then understood to be objective symbols for inner 
experiences. This definition is similar to Hick's use of myth to categorise certain 
forms of doctrine. Lindbeck calls into question, as Wittgenstein had done with more 
general language use, this Kantian "tum to the subject".22 The tum to the subject is 
the hallmark of the Enlightenment intellectual movement and the reason for the 
development of epistemology as the foundational theory for knowledge and the key to 
all intellectual problems. 
In certain accounts of experiential-expressivism the attempt was made to maintain the 
superiority of Christianity over non-Christian religion.23 Lindbeck argues that this is 
inconsistent. Expressivism leads inexorably to some form of philosophical pluralism: 
When religions are thought of as expressively rather than propositionally 
true, this possibility of complementarity and mutual enrichment is increased, 
but it also becomes hard to attach any definite meaning to the notion of 
'unsurpassably true'. 24 
The possibility of 'mutual enrichment' is strongest in this model because it 
presupposes the existence of a common core of experience. The different world 
religions are different symbolic accounts of the same objective reality. However, 
Lindbeck demonstrates that if one accepts this model then it becomes untenable to 
maintain that Christianity is "unsurpassably true". Knowledge of the divine is, 
according to this model, a matter of degree among the people of the world not a matter 
of kind. Some may have a greater degree of religious knowledge than others but it is 
inappropriate to speak of anyone having knowledge of a different kind. This implies 
22 cited in Lindbeck 1984 p.21 
23 One thinks of Rahner and Schleiermacher but not Hick. 
24 Lindbeck 1984 p.49 
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that there can be no qualitative difference between Christianity and other religions. 
The most that might be claimed is that Christianity currently holds a greater degree of 
knowledge and that this is a provisional status. Having dropped the cognitive 
propositional case for there being a quantity of information available of which 
Christianity could possibly have the most important, the expressivist can only claim a 
quality of experiential knowledge which, as a matter of degree, is never exhaustive. 
Expressivism has no resources to maintain the uniqueness of Christianity. Hick does 
not proceed in this direction, preferring to remain uncertain which religion may hold 
the greatest degree of religious knowledge and affirming that so far as we can tell all 
major religions are in a roughly equal state.25 
A further failing of expressivism is its implicit antidoctrinalism. It is true that because 
so many conflicting truth claims are held even within the community of those claiming 
allegiance to Christ the modem mood is to take none of them seriously. Expressivism 
gives theoretical articulation to this mood. Instead of doctrines conveying crucial 
ontological truth they are "experienced as expressions of personal preference" .26 
Some people prefer Buddhism while there are others who prefer Christianity. This 
view of doctrine leads to "religious privatism" and the consignment of historic 
doctrines held for hundreds of years "to the junk pile of outgrown superstitions" .27 
During the sixties this led to the secularisation of Christianity and its death of God 
theology. Since then the process has, ostensibly at least, reversed its direction and 
become more syncretistic than reductionist. Yet the same underlying model of 
religion is at work throughout these movements. Along with his incisive analysis of 
the logical outcome from expressivism Lindbeck highlights a major inconsistency 
25 Part of the argument in Hick "On Grading Religions" in Badham 1990 
26 Lindbeck 1984 p.77 
27 Lindbeck 1984 p.77 
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with such antidoctrinalism. This inconsistency anses because doctrines are 
indispensable for the identity and coherence of any community: 
the 'creedless Christianity' professed by a number of groups .... is not 
?enu~nel~ creedless. When creedlessness is insisted on as a mark of group 
IdentIty, It becomes by definition operationally creedal. 28 
Such an inconsistency is obvious in Hick's pluralist framework which, on the one 
hand, denies the creedal status of key religious doctrines, preferring to demythologise 
them and, on the other hand, affirms its own status as non-mythological. The formal 
claims regarding the Real, eschatology and human purpose along with the procedural 
claims regarding the limitations of knowledge and the true status of doctrines all form 
the pluralist creed. 
According to Hick not only does experience justify belief it also structures belief. 
This fact is not always clear in Hick's work because it suggests a tension in his 
epistemology. For example, in a brief summary of the pluralist hypothesis Hick 
claims: 
Experience of the transcendent is structured either by the concept of 
deity, which presides over the theistic traditions, or by the concept of 
the absolute, which presides over the non-theistic traditions.29 
This suggests that Hick is not subscribing to a form of expressivism: here, experience 
is structured by something else. That something else, being a "concept of deity" or "of 
the absolute", must be doctrine. However, this apparent prioritising of doctrine over 
experience must be evaluated in the light of what is his over-arching epistemology. 
28 Lindbeck 1984 p.74 
29 Hick 1989a p.14 
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For example, he describes the two main doctrines of the Real as its personal or non-
personal status. Such doctrines clearly shape one's experience of the Real. However. 
the very fact that we can state the doctrine-experience relationship in this way shows 
that doctrines themselves arise from the total netWork of experience: 
But when human beings relate themselves to [the Real] in the mode of I-Thou 
encounter they experience it as personal .... When human beings relate them-
selves to the Real in the mode of non-personal awareness they experience it 
as non-personal30 
Hick here describes two modes of "awareness" or two kinds of experience through 
which people interpret the Real. These are not doctrines structuring experience but 
lower level experience (prereligious) structuring higher level experience (religious) as 
part of the total package of experience that the religious interpretation of the universe 
is understood by Hick to be. Doctrinal statements are derived from these. 
Conclusions 
Because Hick endorses expresslvlsm it is also fair to note the creedless form of 
Christianity that he champions. However, as Lindbeck points out, such creedlessness 
itself is nothing but a creed. This result is inevitable if Hick is to maintain both that 
particular religions are realist in epistemic intent and that his general pluralist 
interpretation is a description of the true status of humankind's religious knowledge. 
This incoherence Lindbeck identifies in antidoctrinalism is structurally the same 
problem as MacIntyre identifies with the liberal project of abandoning tradition while 
forming a tradition of its own. This inner incoherence lies unresolved at the heart of 
Hick's thesis. Furthermore, Hick's disjunction of language between various polarities 
(myth and literal, poetic and formal, descriptive and evaluative) suggest that he is 
30 Hick 1989a p.245 
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working with seriously limited categories for the interpretation of language. In the 
final section of this chapter we will outline a range of post Enlightenment objections 
to the kind of language analysis Hick is engaged in. 
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(d) Metaphor and Reality 
We have now seen that Hick develops a pattern for the justification of religious belief 
and the interpretation of religious language in terms of the underlying religious 
experience of the believer. It is pre-theoretical experience that gives rise to faith and 
doctrine. Lindbeck construes this expressivist approach as essentially a part of the 
Enlightenment tradition stemming from Kant. Hick's epistemology and subsequent 
pluralist hypothesis are firmly embedded in the Kantian tradition of philosophical 
theology. In the light of the critical work of both MacIntyre and Lindbeck we are able 
to place Hick's apologetic for Christianity in the Enlightenment school with its themes 
of neutral criteria, the systemisation of knowledge, the priority of epistemology and its 
sceptic roots. The failure of the Enlightenment is reflected in the poverty of Hick's 
philosophical position. We shall now begin offering a constructive proposal for 
Christian apologetics based upon the alternatives offered by some critics of 
Enlightenment thought. In this section we will reconsider Hick's treatment of 
metaphor and religious language. It will be shown that the Enlightenment tradition 
failed to treat the context dependent nature of language and rationality adequately and 
this led inevitably to the reductionist account of religious language so central to Hick's 
work. 
The Cultural-Linguistic Model 
Lindbeck's alternative proposal considers religion in terms of its "cultural and/or 
linguistic framework" and it is this framework, rather than religious experience, that 
"shapes the entirety of life".! For this reason doctrine is given a prior place to 
experience in understanding how a religion works: 
! Lindbeck 1984 p.33 
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Like a culture or language, it is a common phenomenon that shapes the 
subjectivities of individuals rather than being a manifestation of those sub-
jectivities.2 
By this reversal of the relationship between inner experience and religious belief 
Lindbeck overcomes certain failings of expressivism. According to this model it is the 
stories, myths and liturgies of a community that will shape and evoke the experience 
of its members. This differs from either of the previous models. The feature that 
distances it from experiential-expressivism is that "instead of deriving external 
features of a religion from inner experience, it is the inner experiences which are 
viewed as derivative. ,,3 Lindbeck's model also differs from the cognitivist theory 
because it provides a basis for a variety of types of religious truth claims "only one of 
which is the formulation of statements about reality.,,4 Symbols may function in a 
number of ways and reality-depiction is not the only valid function. The theologian 
must assess the function of each religious belief case by case rather than assuming 
them all to be attempts at reality-depiction. 
There is a significant implication of Lindbeck's account for religious pluralism. The 
cultural-linguistic approach undermines the possibility of any common core 
experience underlying the diverse conceptual schemes of the world religions: 
There can be no experiential core because, so the argument goes, the exp-
erience that religions evoke and mould are as varied as the interpretative 
schemes they embody. Adherents of different religions do not diversely 
thematize the same experience; rather they have different experiences.s 
2 Lindbeck 1984 p.33 
3 Lindbeck 1984 p.34 
4 Lindbeck 1984 p.35 
5 Lindbeck 1984 p.40 
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Lindbeck's proposal underlines the need to take seriously religious doctrines, 
scriptures, histories and liturgies in inter-religious dialogue and understanding. They 
provide the only possible access to the claimed religious experience of believers. It is 
doctrine, not experience, that discloses the identity and self-definition of a religious 
community. Lindbeck does not offer this analysis to curtail dialogue but to invest that 
encounter with real meaning. The starting point for encounter between adherents of 
different religions will be the comparison of what they actually claim and not a 
theoretical perspective that will already systematise all apparent rivals into one 
coherent narrative: 
They can regard themselves as simply different and can proceed to 
explore their agreements and disagreements without necessarily en-
gaging in the invidious comparisons that the assumption of a common 
experiential core make so tempting. 6 
The comparIson of religious beliefs is often misleading because what is often 
identified "is not a common quality, but a set of family resemblances"'? The reason 
this mistaken identification is made is that a false expressivist assumption has been 
made that, whatever may be claimed by believers themselves, they share a common 
experience. Lindbeck's model is clearly better able to account for the empirical reality 
of conflicting truth claims than expressivism. Also, contra cognitivism, Lindbeck 
points out that this model does not demand that one assumes the superiority of one's 
own tradition over all others. 
6 Lindbeck 1984 p.55. The characteristics of a postliberal approach to dialogue are 
discussed in DiNoia 1990b and to apologetics in Kamitsuka 1996. 
7 Lindbeck 1984 p.49 
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The significance of doctrine in this framework is its regulative function. The first 
order discourse of believers is the discourse of prayer, hymn and tradition (worship). 
The work of theologians is to formulate second order religious language use; 
particularly doctrinal claims. Doctrines explain, analyse and regulate the diverse first-
intentional or first order uses of religious language. Doctrines function as the 
grammar of religious language: 
Just as grammar by itself affirms nothing either true or false regarding the 
world in which language is used, but only about language, so theology and 
doctrine, to the extent that they are second-order activities, assert nothing 
either true or false about God and his relation to creatures, but only speak 
about such assertions. 8 
This analysis leads Lindbeck to dispense with the truth testing of doctrine in terms of 
correspondence with the supposed common ontological referent: reality. Doctrine can 
only be tested in terms of their internal coherence within the wider framework of 
religion in which they were formulated. Lindbeck points out that this wider 
framework is more than just further statements of belief but also the coherence of 
doctrines with the whole life and discipleship of the religion in question.9 Lindbeck 
does not seem to deny the epistemologically realist thrust of a religion as a whole nor 
the ontological significance of certain beliefs. However, specific doctrines cannot be 
isolated from that religion and made the objects of correspondence truth testing. 
Lindbeck describes the proper way to test a doctrine as to take it as part of a "gigantic 
proposition". 1 0 The Christian doctrine of the Trinity cannot be tested by standards of 
empiricism or Aristotelian logic alone. It can only be tested as part of a gigantic 
8 Lindbeck 1984 p.69 
9 Lindbeck 1984 p.64 
10 Lindbeck 1984 p.51 
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proposition, the Christian tradition, including Christology, pneumatology, doctrine of 
revelation, language, ontology and so forth. 
When some doctrines are isolated from the 'gigantic proposition' of which they are a 
part they can give the misleading impression that they are doctrines common to many 
religions. For example, Lindbeck concedes that "all religions recommend something 
which can be called 'love' " but points out that this "is a banality as uninteresting as the 
fact that all languages are (or were) spoken." 11 Concepts, doctrines, ethics and so on 
are not to be taken in isolation from their tradition-specific contexts; "The significant 
things, are the distinctive patterns of story, belief, ritual, and behaviour that give 
'love' and 'God' their specific and sometimes contradictory meanings." 12 This claim 
goes to the heart of the problem of defining justification in terms of epistemology. 
Epistemology is an attempt to define beliefs apart from the narrative setting in which 
they are found. This is notable in Hick's treatment of faith. Faith is a neutral category 
of experience accessible to all people everywhere and only expressed in doctrinal form 
as a second-order discipline. In contrast, Lindbeck points out that the very meaning of 
faith and its objects are disclosed through narratives, or patterns, that give such words 
their significance. In a conscious echo of Kuhn's discussion of paradigm shifts in 
science, Lindbeck notes the way that beliefs change within religious traditions: 
Religious traditions are not transformed, abandoned, or replaced because 
of an upwelling of new or different ways of feeling about the self, world or 
God, but because a religious interpretative scheme develops anomalies in 
its application in new contexts. 13 
11 Lindbeck 1984 p.42 
12 Lindbeck 1984 p.42 
13 Lindbeck 1984 p.39 
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It is true that Lindbeck is not entirely clear in what distinguishes "new contexts" from 
new feelings. However, it is clear that he identifies the communal sense in which 
anomalies are encountered. A hallmark of Enlightenment expressivism as exemplified 
by Hick is the privatised version of religion it promotes. Anomalies arise within 
personal experience which, in tum, demand modifications in doctrine. In contrast, 
Lindbeck draws attention to the communitarian context in which anomalies occur and 
are resolved. 
The relationship between hearing and converSIOn IS a direct implication of the 
connection Lindbeck makes between language and experience. He is concerned to 
make a clear connection between the content of the gospel message and conversion: 
The communication of the gospel is not a form of psycho-therapy, but rather 
the offer and the act of sharing one's own beloved language - the language 
that speaks of Jesus Christ - with all those who are interested 14 
Thus becoming a Christian is inseparable from learning to use a new language and 
understanding the meaning of new stories. However, Lindbeck distances this position 
from intellectualism. He does not mean that only the literate, sophisticated 
intelligentsia are candidates for salvation. Rather, he is asserting that becoming a 
Christian involves the process or transition into a new system of symbols and 
vocabulary in which new experiences and behaviour are made possible. It is 
interesting to note that if the cultural linguistic model appears to privilege a group, the 
experiential-expressivist model does so too. While some form of language use is 
necessary to become a Christian according to Lindbeck, according to expressi vism 
some kind of religious experience is necessary. As a matter of fact, language use is 
14 Lindbeck 1984 p.61 
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common to human communities whereas a particular form of religious experience 
does not seem to have such universality. 1 5 
An Analysis of Hick's Philosophy of Language 
We are now in a position to analyse Hick's treatment of myth and religious experience. 
Hick is concerned to argue that there are two types of religious language: the literal 
and the non-literal. The key feature of non-literal religious language is that it arises 
from religious experience and is designed to evoke right dispositions toward Ultimate 
Reality. Hick then assigns most tradition specific beliefs to the non-literal category. 
This permits him to deny that apparent conflicting truth claims undermine his pluralist 
hypothesis. Our concern here will be to demonstrate the great limitations in Hick's 
approach to religious language already noted in the previous section and the way in 
which this naturally arises from expressivism. I6 We shall see that the main error in 
Hick's work on language is the basic error of the Enlightenment tradition: language 
looses its moorings in any particular context to float freely but empty of meaning. 
Furthermore, it will be noted that Hick's case for myth and metaphor undermine his 
attempt to provide a basis for a realist epistemology. 
The History of Metaphor 
Historical treatments of metaphor are instructive at this point. As we have seen, Hick 
includes metaphor as a use of language open to demythologisation. The metaphorical 
device is itself optional because the content "can also be said non-mythologically" 17 
15 Hick seems to concede this in his concentration upon mystics and "great saints" as 
his examples (cf. Hick 1989 pp.300-309) . . 
16 Gillis 1989 provides a lengthy critique of Hick's "unnuanced" approach to relIgIOUS 
language. 
17 Hick 1989a p.348 
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without loss of meaning. This point has been the subject of great debate in literary 
studies and some strands of that debate will shed light on our present enquiry.18 
Hawkes identifies two fundamental views of metaphor that underlie the history of 
these discussions. The first is the classical view that finds its roots in the philosophy 
of Aristotle. Metaphor was understood to be "one of the means of giving decorous 
'effect' to speech". 19 It was then treated as an expendable ornamentation to language 
by most writers until the Eighteenth century. Hawkes identifies the Romantic 
movement in literature as a turning point in the understanding of how metaphor works. 
Partly in reaction to the Aristotelian view Romanticism, inspired by Platonic thought, 
considered metaphor to have an "organic" relationship to language.20 Metaphor was 
both indispensable and irreducible. 
Soskice uses a similar categorisation of metaphor. She classes the classical account of 
metaphor as substitutionary. 21 The substitutionary account treats metaphor in terms of 
its ornamental function: 
Metaphor has the virtue of clothing tired literal expression in attractive new 
garb, of alleviating boredom, and, as Aquinas says, of being accessible to 
the uneducated.22 
The essential meaning of a metaphor can be expressed in non-metaphorical terms 
without loss to its significance. Indeed, non-metaphorical literal expressions are given 
18 Hick fails to refer to this debate in any detail reinforcing the impression that his 
argument lacks weight (i.e. the discussion in Hick 1993 pp. 99-111). 
19 Hawkes 1984 p.11 
20 Hawkes 1984 p.34 
21 Soskice 1988 pp.24-26 
22 Soskice 1988 p.24 
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prior place. These expressions are only clothed in metaphor when they lose interest or 
fail to be understood. Soskice distinguishes a further category which, in Hawkes 
scheme, had been classed as a part of the classical model. This is the emotive theory of 
metaphor.23 The emotive theory shares the substitutionary account assumption that "a 
given metaphor could be suppressed with no detriment to the cognitive content of the 
text in which it was found. ,,24 However, the emotive theory gives a more positive role 
to the embellishing function of metaphor than merely that of ornamentation or 
"alleviating boredom". This account attributes metaphor with a significant emotional 
content which while providing no new cognitive content does lend emotional import 
to a literal statement. 
Both these accounts of metaphor express aspects of Hick's account of myth in 
religious language. Hick distinguishes myth from literal truth and claims that the 
function of the former is not to communicate cognitive content inaccessible through 
literal language but to evoke an appropriate dispositional response in the hearer. This 
is a substitutionary account because it assumes that a non-mythological statement 
could be substituted for a myth with no loss to cognitive content. An example would 
be the rendering of the belief that the Qur'an was dictated by the archangel Gabriel as a 
way of "affirming that the Qur'an constitutes an authoritative divine revelation".25 
Furthermore, Hick's account of myth also shares the central features of the emotive 
theory of metaphor the function of which is to produce appropriate response. Hick 
interprets the function of myth in emotive terms: "True religious myths are 
accordingly those that evoke in us attitudes and modes of behaviour which are 
23 Soskice 1988 pp.26-31 
24 Soskice 1988 p.27 
25 Hick 1989a p.349 
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appropriate to our situation vis-a-vis the Real. ,,26 Hick's account of myth is 
substitutionary and emotive. The cognitive content of a myth may be expressed in 
literal terms. The ornamentation a myth provides serves further emotive purposes. 
Recent thought on the nature of metaphor has highlighted the serious limitations in 
Hick's approach. 
The substitutionary account is reductionistic. It allows for the program of 
demythologisation where narratives or statements that rely on myth or metaphor are 
translated into supposed equivalent statements devoid of such optional literary 
devices. All realist truth claims can be stated in non-metaphorical terms. However, 
such a formulation is too narrow to be of use in most fields of discourse. Macquarrie 
points out that "there are degrees of clarity, and it may be the case that some things can 
be said only obscurely or obliquely" .27 If clarification means the representation of 
ideas in straightforward, literal sense-experience terms (demythologisation) then 
Macquarrie suggests: "the possibility of any meaningful theological language would 
seem to be excluded from the start". 28 While clarity is a virtue it is not clear why 
geometry or mathematics, for example, should represent the paradigm of clarity to 
which all other forms of discourse must attempt approximation. The reductionist 
assumptions with which Hick works can be clearly drawn out by returning to our three 
step diagrammatic presentation of his epistemology. Figure 7 relates his epistemology 
to his philosophy of language. 
26 Hick 1989a p.351 
27 Macquarrie 1967 p.17 
28 Macquarrie 1967 p.18 
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Figure 7 Epistemology and Language 
Each step in Hick's epistemology builds on those previous to it. Religious experience 
is a total interpretation moving one step beyond the moral and two steps beyond the 
physical but being a reinterpretation of those primary levels of experience. As regards 
language, religious language is a way of describing the preceding steps of experience, 
the moral and physical, in terms of a higher level total interpretation offered by 
religion. Consequently, the literal core of religious language are those aspects which 
refer either to the natural world (such as the historicity of Jesus or the possibility of 
continuing existence after death) or to moral affairs (such as the categorical imperative 
or golden rule). Religious language does not refer to some extra "things" that have not 
already been expressed in these former levels because it is a level utterly dependent on 
those previous to it. Religious experience is a way of interpreting the preceding 
levels, not access to an entirely new order of knowledge. In fact, the same relationship 
exists between the second level and the first. There is a literal component of moral 
language because such language is only an interpretation of primary, natural world, 
experience. The second level may be expressed in literal language at the cost of its 
emotive value (i.e. its moral compulsion) without affecting the literal sense of uch 
language. So too, the religious level of language may be expressed in moral or natural 
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language at a cost to its emotive value (Le. its religious compulsion) but not to its 
literal sense. 
Soskice's alternative account of metaphor is similar to the "high" view described 
briefly in Hawkes' description of the Romantic view of language. Metaphors, she 
claims, are irreducible and "can only be redescribed in terms of other metaphors".29 
This observation does not apply solely to religious metaphors but it is particularly 
appropriate to them. A feature of irreducibility shared by all metaphors is "their 
relational nature". 30 A metaphor implies "limitless suggestions that are evoked"31 
through the model or network of images that is being drawn upon. F or example, to 
say that "Roger is a chicken" is to engage in a whole related realm of discourse, 
images and ideas which cannot be accessed by simply saying "Roger is a coward". 
More significantly, to say "God is my Rock" is to relate God to a whole realm of ideas 
and cross references within the network of Biblical and even non-Biblical imagery. 
Instead of a reductionist approach to metaphor Soskice argues that the significance of 
metaphor can be endlessly extended in ways that a reduced, literal statement could 
not. 32 
The irreducibility thesis may be explained in terms of a critique on Hick's treatment of 
myth. To return to the example of the "story" of the garden of Eden, Hick suggests 
that an adequate demythologised rendering would be "the fact that ordinary human life 
is lived in alienation from God. ,,33 We may question this rendering in two ways. 
Firstly, it is doubtful whether such a statement does convey the full meaning of the 
29 Soskice 1988 p.94 
30 Soskice 1988 p.94 
31 Soskice 1988 p.95 
32 Soskice 1988 p.51 
33 Hick 1988a p.349 
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Genesis narrative. Secondly, it can be shown that Hick's alternative account fails to 
be, by his own standards, non-mythological. 
Concerning the first question, Hick has identified one aspect of what we should learn 
from the narrative. However, he offers his gloss as the literal statement of the 
meaning of what is otherwise a mythological story. He expresses no discomfort with 
the implication that the great wealth of images, events, words, pictures, people and 
places in the Genesis account are simply ornamentation designed to evoke the proper 
dispositional response to the literal truth that day to day life is lived in alienation from 
God. Clearly the first three chapters of Genesis cannot be read as the same kind of 
literature as a modern text on cosmology. If only such a reading were to permit the 
narrative the honour of being a "literal" text then it would fail to be literal. However, 
this is not the point. Because of its place within the context of the Old Testament and 
ancient near eastern culture, scripture accesses a whole network of ideas and images 
lost when one reduces the account to a simple "literal" sentence. The web of ideas and 
images are not an ornamentation of the "literal" meaning - they are its literal meaning. 
The narrative may be considered in terms of what it tells us about alienation, but so 
too it may be considered in terms of human nature, God's character, the purpose of 
creation, early history, near eastern non-Abrahamic beliefs and even the origins of 
humanity itself. This contrasts with the basic reductionist error of Hick and the 
classical treatment of metaphor. Soskice expresses the error thus: "In so far as a 
metaphor suggests a community of relations (and all active metaphors do), its 
significance is not reducible to a single atomistic predicate. ,,34 Hick fails to consider 
this "community of relations" in his program of demythologisation. By substituting 
his modern literal alternative for the Genesis account he breaks the relationship that 
34 Soskice 1988 p.95 
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the narrative has with the scriptural and ancient near eastern traditions. In so doing he 
cannot possibly be describing the 'real meaning' of the Garden of Eden but is 
describing something entirely different. It is a message of his own making, sharing 
scriptural themes, but cut off from its true context. 
The second question we must pose is whether Hick does succeed in giving a non-
mythological account of a myth. To speak of "alienation from God" appears to be 
simply another, though briefer, example of what Hick wants to class as myth. He uses 
the term "alienation" metaphorically. Hick takes the word from more ordinary 
language use of human relationships, cultures and economics and applies it to the 
unique situation of the human existential feeling of separation from Ultimate Reality. 
A similar line of criticism of the classical position can be found in an important work 
by Barbour in which he compares religious and scientific language use.35 Hick 
considers scientific language to be a paradigmatic example of literal language. This is 
because science belongs to the first step of his epistemology: the interpretation of the 
physical world. Barbour argues that metaphor is an essential element in all language 
use, not least in scientific discourse. He asserts that "a metaphor cannot be replaced 
by a set of equivalent literal statements" because it is, by nature, "open-ended".36 By 
open-ended Barbour identifies the same feature of metaphor Soskice describes as 
relational. Metaphor exists not as a closed, atomic particle of language to be removed 
from its context and understood in isolation. Metaphor has what Soskice calls 
"associative networks,,37 of meaning within the context that it is used. Barbour also 
35 Barbour 1966 and 1974 
36 Barbour 1974 p.14 
37 Soskice 1988 p.51 
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highlights the associative nature of metaphor by drawing attention to the potentially 
endless comparisons metaphors may suggest: 
No limits can be set as to how far the comparison might be extended; it 
cannot he paraphrased because it has an unspecifiable number of potent-
ialities for articulation.3 8 
Hick denies this point. He is confident that it is possible to exhaustively specify and 
limit the purposes or functions of the comparisons that make metaphors possible. In 
doing so he denies the open-ended character of metaphor and the possibility of such 
language use disclosing new, unique knowledge. 
Loughlin had specifically applied the problem of irreducibility to Hick's treatment of 
myth.39 He claims that Hick's account is reductionist "in a bad sense" because it 
renders "myth redundant" .40 The cognitive content of myth may be extracted and the 
mythic garb discarded.41 Metaphor is the indispensable means of entering into the 
Christian narrative and message but, having located oneself within it, Hick demands 
that we 'demythologise' those metaphors into terms that do not depend upon the 
Christian framework for their meaning. Loughlin rejects this treatment of myth on the 
grounds that the meaning of the myth is itself a part of the myth: "we cannot discard 
the text of myth, for we have only the one" .42 Myth and its meaning are not two 
components but one. The metaphors of Christianity are essential to what Christianity 
is. To discard the metaphors is to discard Christianity. This is the effect of Hick's 
pluralist hypothesis. It constitutes at best a marginalising but at worst a disposing of 
38 Barbour 1974 p.14 
39 Loughlin 1986b 
40 Loughlin 1986b p.271 
41 Loughlin 1986b p.272 
42 Loughlin 1986b p.273 
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Christian faith in favour of religious faith. Hick's attempt to do so stands in the 
Enlightenment tradition of placing indeterminate experience and neutral language 
above the determining power of the historic scriptures, confessions and creeds. 
Cultural-Linguistic Apologetics 
Lindbeck's alternative model of doctrine does provide a basis for apologetics in which 
the irreducible nature of language is affirmed. This alternative apologetic construes 
rationality as intrasystematic. Christian doctrine is not itself to be subjected to the 
canons of Enlightenment rationality but constitutes its own alternative rationality: the 
grammar of faith. Lindbeck's rejection of cognitive-propositionalism has not helped 
his case at this point because it has given the impression that his model permits no 
extra-linguistic reality.43 However, the cultural-linguistic model does have an 
ultimate realist intent. Marshall draws upon Lindbeck's comment that scripture 
"absorbs the world" in order to demonstrate his account of realism.44 Scripture is the 
basic point of justification for religious knowledge. The two basic criteria for truth are 
intrasystematic coherence and categorical adequacy.45 Both of these criteria connect 
truth claims to scripture. However, Lindbeck does not restrict the scope of these 
criteria to internal Christian claims: "The Christian community will naturally strive to 
'internalize' initially alien discourse" .46 Marshall describes this process of absorbing 
the world as redescription. Alien discourse is redescribed in scriptural categories in 
order to identify it as either true or false.47 The basic test for the truth of any religion 
43 i.e. Carson 1 996 p.480 n.72 
44 Marshall 1990b p.69 cf. Lindbeck 1984 p.118 
45 Marshall 1990b p.7l 
46 Marshall 1990b p. 74 
47 Marshall1990b pp.75-77. According to internal Christian criteria (the principle .of 
charity) the aim is~ if possible, to redescribe those alien claims in a way that permIts 
them to be held as true. 
237 
is its "assimilative powers,,48. Therefore, the essential element in the justification of 
Christian belief is its ability to absorb apparent anomalies into its universe. Lindbeck 
does not deny the scope for apologetics concerning the ontological nature of reality.49 
We shall consider this model of apologetics further below50 but first we must consider 
the basis for identifying scripture as fundamental criterion and this will be done 
through an analysis of the status of revelation in religious knowledge. 
48 Lindbeck 1984 p.13l 
49 Lindbeck credits Marshall's interpretation of his work elsewhere as helpfully 
clearing up the confusion concerning ontology (Lindbeck 1989). 
50 Chapter 6 (c) 
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Chapter 6 After Modernism 
(a) Religion Without Revelation 
Hick's philosophical project is essentially a modernist interpretation of religion. One 
central presupposition of his work and the movement of which he is a part is the 
absence of revelation. 1 The essential argument of this section is that Hick's pluralist 
hypothesis is strictly a non-revelatory account of religion. The significance of 
revelation for apologetics will become particularly clear in the next section. 
Models of Revelation 
We will use the models outlined by Dulles2 as a useful typology for discussing Hick's 
position. There will be reason to refute Dulles own locating of Hick's position within 
his proposed typology. 
Modell: Doctrinal Propositional Revelation 
The first model is doctrinal. Proponents of this position include "Conservative 
Evangelicalism and Catholic neo-Scholasticism".3 Characteristic of this position is 
the twofold understanding of revelation as natural and supernatural. According to the 
former proponents only supernatural (special) revelation can lead to any significant 
knowledge of God whereas according to the latter even natural (general) revelation 
may lead to partial but valid knowledge of God. A further theme of this model is the 
verbal propositional form of revelation. According to Evangelicals "the Bible IS 
objectified revelation" alone4 while the neo-Scholastics "hold that revelation IS 
1 We must refrain at this point from offering a definition of revelation as each of the 
models to be considered defines the term in different ways. 
2 Dulles 1992 
3 Dulles 1992 p.37 
4 Dulles 1992 p.44 
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contained in two sources, namely the Bible and apostolic tradition". 5 Proponents of 
this model place great stress on the verbal form of revelation in scripture itself and 
assert that salvation requires knowledge of the contents of this saving revelation. 6 
Dulles criticises this model for being "highly authoritarian"7 and not "favourable to 
dialogue with other churches and religions". 8 It is this model that Hick identifies and 
rejects in his discussion of the Thomist-Catholic model of faith.9 Clearly his own 
thesis cannot be compatible with this model. 
Model 2: Revelation as History 
There is overlap between the first model and the second. God reveals himself through 
significant events in history which are, normally, known to us as the verbal records of 
scripture. Cullman provides just such a mediating position. Though he affirms the 
priority of events over interpretation he affirms the necessity of those interpretative 
records for us to have access to revelation. 10 Pannenberg, on the other hand, offers a 
strictly non-propositional account of revelation history where "the events are self-
interpreting" 11 and do not require an independent interpretation for them to count as 
revelation. Pannenberg adopts a significantly universal account of revelation: 
5 Dulles 1992 p.45. "When they use the word 'revelation' without qualification, these 
authors are referring to supernatural revelation." (Dulles 1992 p.41). 
6 Helm affirms this model of revelation (Helm 1982) but without asserting that 
salvation requires knowledge of that revelation (Helm 1992). There is no necessary 
connection between this doctrine of revelation and a restrictivist account of salvation. 
Contrasting references to this point are found in Cotterell 1990, Marshall 1993. 
Pinnock 1992 and Sinkinson 1996a. 
7 Dulles 1992 p.50 
8 Dulles 1992 p.51 
9 See Chapter 2 (a). 
10 Dulles 1992 p.57 
11 Dulles 1992 p.59 
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Revel~tion, .he hold~, is not to be found in a special segment of history but 
rather In unIversal hIstOry - the history of the whole world as it moves to its 
appointed consummation. 12 
It is problematic to state the historical model without presupposing some sense of 
propositional revelation 13 but the distinctive character of this model is that the locus 
of revelation is primarily historical event and only secondarily written or spoken 
interpretation. Though Hick would be more sympathetic to this model than the first, 
he would maintain that historical events themselves cannot be revelatory because of 
their fundamental ambiguity. For example, he claims that "Jeremiah was conscious of 
the downfall of the kingdom in the seventh century BeE as God's just disciplining of 
the erring Israelites" .14 As a matter of historical fact Israel had been invaded by a 
foreign army. The religious dimension of the event is not historical but is the 
interpretation arising from a special kind of experience of the event (religious seeing-
as). 
Model 3: Revelation as Inner Experience 
The third account departs entirely from the objective sense of revelation marking the 
former accounts. Revelation occurs in the personal experience of individuals as a form 
of mystical encounter rather than spoken word. Dulles identifies Rahner as a 
representative of this position. For Rahner "revelation initially occurs in a mysterious 
experience with God, called in his system 'transcendental revelation' ".15 According to 
this model revelation is not communication of objective truths but encounter with a 
person. Dulles' example of Sabatier indicates that Schleiermacher might be a classic 
12 Dulles 1992 p.59 
13 Warfield's criticism to this effect is noted in Dulles 1992 p.62. 
14 Hick 1989ap.155 
15 Dulles 1992 p.70 
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example of this model. 16 The prophets represent peak examples of this experience of 
personal familiarity with God. No distinction is made between revelation and response 
to revelation; revelation is itself the salvific event. Dulles locates Hick in this model: 
The great founders of religions, [Hick] holds, are persons on whose conscious-
ness the Transcendent has impinged in new ways with special intensity and 
power. Since the same infinite Spirit presses in continually on every individual, 
it is possible, Hick contends, for others to find meaning and credibility in what 
the mystics claim to have experienced. 17 
This characterisation of Hick's position emphasises the theme of universality in his 
work. In keeping with the philosophy of Kant, Hick shares the assumption that 
religious experience is universal. Hick asserts both that religious experience may be 
identified with divine revelation and that religious experience is universal. The result 
of this double assertion is that revelation must be a universal phenomena. Dulles also 
places Hick's position in his fifth model and this will shed further light on Hick's 
understanding of revelation. Before we tum to that final model we will briefly 
consider the fourth model 
Model 4: The Dialectical Model of Revelation 
The fourth model is that of revelation as dialectical presence and is foundational to the 
theology of Barth, Brunner and Bultmann. 18 Proponents of this model locate 
revelation in an event which is neither an objective "thing" (such as the Bible) in 
16 "Sabatier's position is close to that of Schleiermacher" Dulles 1992 p.73 cf. 
Schleiermacher 1960 pp.49-52. Schleiermacher writes "Any proclamation of God 
which is to be operative upon and with us can only express God in his relation to us". 
He argues that "a consciouness of God" wherever it arises may still "b~ really a 
revelation" because revelation resides in inner experience rather than doctnnal form 
(Schleiermacher 1960 p.52). See further Clements 1987 pp.66-1 07. 
17 Dulles 1992 p.70 
18 Dulles 1992 p.85 
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isolation from the response of people nor a subjective happening (such as inner 
illumination) in isolation from the sovereign action of God. The alternative is a 
dialectical relationship between the objective and subjective poles of reality: 
Revelation, according to Barth, is never complete with the objective element 
of God's self-disclosure through his Son, for the fact of that disclosure is not 
apparent without the subjective transformation by which the Holy Spirit ren-
ders us capable of acknowledging what has happened. 19 
According to this model objective factors, such as scripture, are classed as witnesses 
to revelation. Revelation itself is a dialectical event of God's self-disclosure which 
creates its own response in the recipient. For this reason revelation is itself salvific.20 
Apologetics is an invalid activity within the parameters of this model though the 
model itself does have apologetic impact: "denying the need to make faith plausible, 
dialectical theology in fact removed many objections based on the alleged 
implausibility of the Christian message. ,,21 This account poses revelation as beyond 
or incompatible with rational dispute and analysis. Hick's account of revelation 
clearly bears no relation to it. In terms of both method and content the dialectical 
model is profoundly exclusivist as revelation is identified with Christ as God's self-
disclosure. Such a specification destroys the possibility of universal revelation in the 
way proposed by Kant and Hick. The dialectical model describes revelation only in 
terms of Christian theology and not in terms of any general philosophical categories. 
19 Dulles 1992 p.89 
20 In the case of Barth there is an ambiguity in this connection discussed by Colwell 
"The Contemporaneity of the Divine Decision: Reflections on Barth's Denial of 
'Universalism' " in Cameron 1992. See also Hart 1992. 
21 Dulles 1992 p.93 
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Model 5: Revelation as New Awareness 
The fifth model departs from the previous In granting to the human subject a 
significantly active role in the creation of revelation. Revelation as new awareness 
departs from the notion of revelation as something given to humanity from outside; 
"According to this approach revelation is a transcendent fulfilment of the inner drive 
of the human spirit toward fuller consciousness. ,,22 
Proponents of this model relate revelation to human progress. Revelation 
accompanies the progressively developing human faculties. Like the third model 
human experience is the central theme, however it "finds revelation not in withdrawal 
from the world but rather in involvement. ,,23 Discourse concerning the contents of 
revelation do not identify a self-existing, independent God but identify self-
conscIOusness. Because revelation is tied to human consciousness it is easy to 
universally extend the range and application of this model. Revelation as 
consciousness requires no particular doctrinal pattern but only the consciousness of 
human subjects and is, hence, not unique to Christianity. Dulles locates Hick in this 
model along with his location in model three: 
Hick's recognition of revelation in the non-Christian religions rests on the 
premise that revelation does not essentially consist in doctrine but in en-
counter and awareness.24 
The fifth model offers an interpretation of revelation not dependent on any particular 
tradition and ideally suited to the pluralist project. Revelation "has no fixed content" 
22 Dulles 1992 p.98 
23 Dulles 1992 p.l 02 
24 Dulles 1992 p.l 07 
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and past doctrines are "subject to continual reinterpretation".25 This model shares 
with the third and fourth models a sense of the contemporaneity of revelation but. in 
contrast to them, does not allow any non-subjective source to act as a control over 
claims to revelation. Dulles treats it as a model of Christian revelation even though it 
gives no special status to the norms of the Christian faith: 
It encourages Christians to believe that their own faith could undergo a 
further development in the distinction of universality by appreciating the 
perspectives of other human faiths.26 
However it is this very openness that is problematic for the fifth model. The Christian 
form of this claim27 is that it is Christ who reveals himself even through the unfolding 
consciousness of non-Christian people. The claim is problematic in two significant 
ways. First, it creates a sharp distinction between the historical Jesus and the super-
historical Christ. 28 Second, it empties the name 'Christ' of all particular meaning; 
"One wonders in some cases whether Christ is being made into a mere cipher for an 
epochal advance in human consciousness."29 Taken together, these problems suggest 
that the model simply uses Christ and other Christian terms as useful labels for an 
otherwise non-Christian or even secular set of concepts and ideas. 'Christ' becomes 
simply a token to describe a broad movement of consciousness only loosely related to 
the historical figure of Jesus. 
Models of Revelation in Hick's Religious Apologetic 
25 Dulles 1992 p.l 09 
26 Dulles 1992 p.lll 
27 i.e. Teilhard de Chardin or Gregory Baum (Dulles 1992 p.ll 0). 
28 Dulles also notes this difficulty with the dialectical model; "they are far from clear 
as to how the Christ of faith is related to the Jesus of history." (Dulles 1992 p.95) 
29 Dulles 1992 p.112 
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We have now considered five models of revelation and Hick's possible location within 
them. He would reject the basic theme of models one, two and four. In each case he 
must reject the implicit or explicit exclusivity and normativity the models give to 
Christian revelation. The essence of Hick's rejection would be that the pluralist 
hypothesis depends upon the universal accessibility of revelation and its ambiguity in 
relation to the interpretative faculty of human cognition. His sympathies would 
certainly lie with models three and five as they share a noetic picture of revelation 
arising from the universal human experience of religious people. However, we shall 
now see that Dulles is mistaken to categorise Hick even within these models. For the 
pluralist hypothesis to be successful Hick must maintain that there is no such thing as 
revelation in any of these senses. In maintaining this Hick is simply extending the 
Enlightenment interpretation of religion begun by Kant. 
Dulles argues that Hick uses a verSIOn of the third model: revelation as inner 
expenence. According to the third model a distinction is drawn between non-
propositional knowledge and conceptual or propositional knowledge. Revelation is 
knowledge of the former variety. Hick has always aligned himself with this model of 
religious knowledge and his first major work is a defence of this position.30 Indeed, 
some early statements of his experience centred model show an important resemblance 
to the fourth model: "revelation is only real or actual in so far as it becomes so by 
being responded to". 31 While Hick maintains the primacy of a disclosure from the 
divine as revelation its reality only becomes actual when people respond to it. Hick 
ties together revelation and response such that the locus of revelation is an inner 
experience rather than an objective word or act. 
30 Hick 1988a 
31 Hick 1974b p.145 
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The historical account of the axial age suggests that Hick is a proponent of the fifth 
model. According to this model, revelation is closely allied to the evolution of human 
consciousness. Hick describes a major transition in personal awareness that occurred 
at that time. The transition was from the identification of self with tribe or society 
(pre-axial consciousness) to self-identity in relationship to others and to a greater 
Other (axial consciousness). It is ambiguous whether the Divine instigated this 
transitional period or whether it is a natural stage in the evolution of human 
conscIousness. 
The plurality of revelation claims leads Hick to ask "whether we should not expect 
God to make his revelation in a single mighty act, rather than to produce a number of 
different, and therefore presumably partial, revelations".32 This question assumes that 
the meaning of revelation includes the act of God doing something. He characterises 
the discussion of revelation as God choosing to do one of two things; either to 'make' 
one universal revelation or 'produce' several revelations. God might 'act' in one 
definitive way or reveal in a partial way. According to Hick, God chooses to produce 
partial revelation as this fits most neatly with the moral requirements of faith that 
ultimate truth is universally accessible and epistemically uncompelled. Nonetheless, 
the underlying image of Hick's description is of God doing something to reveal 
Him/Her/Itself. 
It is significant that the word "revelation" is absent from a later account of the axial 
period.33 This reflects the superfluous nature of the concept in Hick's work. Despite 
32 Hick 1988a p.136 
33 Hick 1989a pp.12, 21-33. 
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occasional reference that Hick continues to make to God's revealing activity we may 
identify five reasons why Hick's philosophy of religion must be understood as strictly 
non-revelatory. Hick's and Dulles' own claims notwithstanding, Hick has developed a 
philosophy of religion without revelation. 
1. The Epistemic Impossibility of Revelation 
In considering Hick's debt to Kant's epistemology we have noted the problems that 
attend the adoption of the basic Kantian insight that the noumenon and phenomena 
sharply divide reality. The main difficulty is that to be consistent one must maintain 
that noumena bear no causal relationship, influence or otherwise, upon the 
phenomena. It remains possible to describe a formal connection between noumena 
and phenomena but, being a postulate and belonging to the phenomenal order of 
knowledge, such a formal connection provides no epistemic access to anything beyond 
phenomena. Normally, this problem is applied in terms of the inability of the human 
mind to penetrate beyond appearances to know the thing-in-itself, but the problem is 
symmetrical. It is also impossible for the thing-in-itselfto reveal itself as phenomenon 
or as the thing-for-others. The barrier is insurmountable from either side because it 
supposes that all knowledge is conditioned by the mind and therefore never 
knowledge of noumena but only of phenomena. The object of all knowledge is 
appearances, never reality. So just as realism presupposes that at least some aspects of 
reality are accessible to the human mind, so revelation presupposes that at least some 
significant qualities of God may be made known to the human mind. Philosophical 
realism and theological revelation both assume the possibility of a relationship 
between knower and known. The absolute separation of appearances from reality 
makes this connection an impossibility. The Kantian insight rules out the possibility 
of an epistemic relationship between revealer and the recipient of revelation. The 
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price of Hick's use of Kant is the possibility that the Ultimate Real might disclose 
'Realself in any way whether personal or propositional. 
2. The Non-Personal Deity 
In order to sustain his pluralist proposal Hick must maintain that the Ultimate Real is 
beyond the categories of the mind, just as Kant's noumenon could not be 
conceptualised in terms of the categories of the mind. The categories of the mind 
according to Hick include the concepts of personal and non-personal deity. Examples 
of the personal include God the Father and of the non-personal Nirvana. Hick notes 
the widespread "personification" of the Real in both religions of Semitic origin and in 
the religions identified by the west as "Hinduism".34 However, to be personal is, in 
essence, to be in personal relationship with other centres of consciousness. While the 
phenomenal manifestations of the Real may be described as personal, such a quality 
cannot apply to the Real-in-itself: "It follows from this that the Real an sich cannot be 
said to be personal. For this would presuppose that the Real is eternally in relation to 
other persons. ,,35 Personality and relationship are categories belonging to human 
beings and therefore they are categories that belong necessarily and exclusively to the 
order of phenomenon. The reason why the Real is so often conceived in personal 
terms is that, as Hick often points out, things are known by the knower according to 
the mode of the knower. This seems a tidy explanation for the widespread ascription 
of personality to the divine being. 
However, a difficulty arIses because of the widespread image of the Real as 
impersonal and this requires Hick to extend his analysis to incorporate this apparently 
34 Hick 1989a pp.252-253 
35 Hick 1989a p.264 
249 
rival point of view. The great example of the impersonae of the Real is the Buddhist 
goal of Nirvana which Hick describes as "the Real experienced in an ineffable ego-
lessness" in which personal identity is extinguished.36 Other examples include 
Brahman and Sunyata. Hick denies that such an impersonal reality is a closer 
approximation to his idea of the Ultimate Real than the images of theism. He 
recognises that his work might suggest such a conclusion for he admits that, to a point, 
"our pluralistic hypothesis runs parallel to this central strand of Mahayana 
Buddhism. ,,37 The difference between pluralism and Mahayana Buddhism is that the 
latter identifies its impersonae with the Real-in-itself, accessible through mystical 
experience, but accords only other images with the status of representation. Hick 
claims that this identification between phenomenal manifestation and Real is not made 
by the pluralist hypothesis because all manifestations are given the status of 
representations. According to Hick, the impersonal images too are phenomenal 
representations of the noumenal Real. Thus, the phenomena appear in varied and even 
contradictory forms but each are understood to be representations of the same reality 
behind them all. Pluralism accords no religion with superior epistemic status and this 
means that no manifestation of the Real can cancel out the validity of rival 
manifestations. 
The conclusion of Hick's argument is that the Real is neither personal nor impersonal, 
though such images are essential in order to experience the Real. This raises a 
problem. His attempt to steer clear of privileging any tradition requires that he deny 
the ultimate validity of any specific descriptions of the Real. He must then deny the 
personal attributes accredited to God by Christians. Love, will, faithfulness and 
36 Hick 1989a p.287 
37 Hick 1989a p.292 
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relationship are not compatible with the attributes of Brahman or Nirvana and so must 
be denied ultimate validity. They function as myths or metaphors, not as literal truth 
claims. While Hick is not affirming the impersonae qf the Real over the personae he 
is affirming the non-personal nature of the Real. He must affirm this because the 
category of the "personal" belongs only to the phenomenal realm. The category cannot 
apply to the noumenal. Because in Kant's epistemology quantity, quality, space and 
time are all judgements made by the mind they cannot apply to the noumenal order of 
reality. They are only categories for reality-as-perceived. Analogously, the personal 
attributes of God belong to the character of human experience and are not applicable 
to the thing-in-itself. It then follows that the category of "revealer" which itself 
assumes personal attributes of, minimally, relationship and will to disclose though, in 
Christian terms, includes also purpose, faithfulness and love, cannot apply to the Real-
in-itself. The noumenon, whatever else it is, cannot be a revealer.38 
3. Cognitive Freedom 
We have described Hick's epistemology in terms of its three component steps. Each 
step of interpretation involves increased complexity as it relates to greater ambiguity 
in the basic data of knowledge. Also related to each step is an increasing cognitive 
freedom on the part of the believer as to how he or she may choose to interpret his or 
her environment. At the level of natural interpretation one may describe belief as 
coerced. At the level of religious faith, however, interpretation is uncoerced because 
this dimension is ambiguous, permitting a plurality of interpretations. One major 
reason for this ambiguity is in the mind. It is within the structure of the mind that there 
is a separation of knowledge from reality because the mind is simply unable to grasp 
38 Brunner argues that revelation is essentially a personal self-manifestation of God 
(Brunner 1947 pp.23-25). 
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religious reality in the way that it is able to grasp natural reality. However, Hick also 
maintains a set of theological or moral reasons for this ambiguity and it is these that 
provide the third reason for the impossibility of revelation. According to Hick's 
theodicy human beings must learn to use their cognitive apparatus properly and this 
means turning from self-centredness to Reality-centredness: "This greater cognitive 
freedom at the religious level is correlated with the greater claim upon us of the aspect 
of reality in question. ,,39 The Real has a claim upon our lives but permits us the 
epistemic freedom that ensures the ethical value of any response we make. In order to 
ensure that human beings are truly responsible for their actions in this regard the 
Ultimate Real must not compel or coerce the proper response. The transformation can 
only be morally significant if people have the basic cognitive freedom to exercise 
autonomous decisions. We have already noted the anthropology Hick shares with 
Kant.40 This common anthropology requires libertarian free will as a presupposition 
for human responsibility. As a result, for faith to be a good moral action on the part of 
the human subject, it must be uncompelled. 
This feature of Hick's thought rules out revelation. If the divine were to disclose 
anything to us it would in some measure compromise the freedom of our response. 
Revelation, in any model, implies an act on the part of the revealer that makes clear 
something otherwise hidden. Hick cannot tolerate this implication because it would 
compromise true cognitive freedom. Revelation would dispel, at least to some extent 
and to some recipients, the ambiguity of the universe. In so doing, a human subject 
would have less freedom to choose not to believe. The greater the extent to which 
revelation occurs the more akin to natural interpretation the religious level becomes. 
39 Hick 1989a p.161 
40 Chapter 4 (d). 
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While human categories and concepts are still being brought to bear it would then be 
the divine reality compelling a certain response. For Hick's proposal to work there 
must be no revelation from the Ultimate Real to human heings. 
4: The Distinction Between Myth and Fact 
Mythological language serves a non-fact bearing function which facilitates 
soteriological transformation.41 Its use helps orientate the lives of hearers and users 
toward Reality-centredness. Its use does not and cannot disclose new features of 
reality. This latter function is the exclusive domain of factual language use. However, 
according to Hick, the nature of Ultimate Reality is too great, complex and different to 
be expressed in human language. Statements that purport to be about the Ultimate 
Real must then be interpreted as helpful myths rather than cognitive truth claims. The 
exceptions that we noted are those purely formal descriptions of the postulates of 
religious life: that there is an Ultimate Reality and that life extends beyond death. 
This has serious consequences for any claim that revelation has occurred. Revelation, 
understood to be the disclosure of some information, could be conceived as occurring 
through words, emotions or behaviour. However, whatever the mode of its occurrence 
for it to count as the disclosure of information it must be possible to state it in 
propositional form.42 Yet, according to Hick, informative statements about the Real 
or about supernatural reality can only be either formal, logical postulates or 
mythological. Such statements are excluded from the role of fact assertion for the 
reasons already discussed. Furthermore, the purely formal statements are not 
revelation but postulates of human experience. All "revelation" and claims to 
41 Chapter 5 (b) 
42 Helm 1982 pp.21-27; Goldingay 1994 pp.299-313 
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revelation must be mythological language use or false literal claims. Hick's distinction 
between myth and fact necessarily means that the contents of revelation cannot be 
divine disclosure of information but must be an attempt to evoke a proper attitudinal 
response on the part of the human subject. Within Hick's scheme revelation cannot be 
classed as any other language type than myth. This classification disqualifies 
revelation from having any significance other than the self-referential role of shaping 
the emotional response of users and hearers to the ambiguous universe. 
5. A History of the Universe 
A final feature of Hick's philosophy also destroys the possibility of revelation. His 
description of the history of religions is nothing more than a history of the evolution of 
the human consciousness and, for this reason, has no place for the revelatory activity 
of the Real. 
The phenomenological account of religious history offered by Hick is presented in 
three stages of awareness. First, there is the pre-Axial age of corporate spirituality 
where religion serves the social function of preserving harmony and where individual 
spirituality has no function because no distinction exists between corporate and 
personal identity. Second, the axial age was the period of enlightenment when 
personal identity was discovered and human beings related themselves to a higher 
dimension of love and purpose. Third, the post-axial age includes some retrogressive 
steps but, on the whole, the pnmary discovery of the axial age, the I-Thou 
relationship, is preserved and spread across the globe. 
The reason why Dulles locates Hick in the fifth model is that Hick's history of 
religions is apparently a history of revelation arising from the development of human 
conSCIousness. It was the growing awareness of individuality within society that led to 
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a new awareness of the divine Reality indwelling all of the universe and offering 
purpose and goodness to individuals. Revelation is identified with the activity of 
human subjectivity and, in this model, requires no sense of revelation from without. 
The sense of revelation as divinely initiated communication is absent from this model. 
Dulles critiques the model in terms of Christian theology for its vacuous use of 
Christology. However, this objection may be extended to note that the concept of 
revelation itself becomes vacuous. The term 'revelation' identifies the discovery of 
new consciousness through the cognitive activity of the human subject. It has none of 
its normal meaning or suggestive power because it is emptied of any reference to a 
"revealer". This is why Hick's position has most in common with the fifth model. 
However, unlike the fifth model Hick does not invest eschatological hope for the 
developing consciousness of humanity in this life.43 Other clear proponents of the 
fifth model do assert such eschatological hope by specifying the necessary conditions 
and mechanisms that would lead human beings into a greater mystical awareness.44 
·9 
However, Hick is more concerned with the impact of the past than any predictions of 
the future. This lifetime is marked by reference to the high point of the axial age and 
its ripples into our own lives but not by a continually developing realisation of the 
cosmic dimension of life. According to Hick's scheme the 'new consciousness' has 
ceased development or at least its development has been postponed until some future 
scenario beyond the grave. 
43 The "eschatological vision" of Hick 1988b p.146 is offered only as ~ possibility. 
44 Teilhard suggests evolutionary energetics as the necessary mechanIsm for the self-
evolution of humanity to the new stage of consciousness. Given: t?e blend o~ natural 
processes (evolution) and mystical awareness a new stage of relIgIOUS conSCIOusness 
will be born. See King 1980 pp.186-191. 
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Conclusion of these Objections 
The point of these five objections is to demonstrate that Hick's system has no place for 
divine revelation. The character of faith is essentially a rational activity and this is 
why epistemology has the prime place in Hick's work. Religious experience is itself a 
rational response to the perception of reality. Faith is not in any significant sense a 
response to a divine revelation. Revelation cannot occur within the Kantian 
epistemology because the concept must assume a personal Revealer. Revelation 
compromises cognitive freedom. It breaks the barriers of the myth/fact distinction and 
it has no place in the history of religions. Hick has followed through the implications 
of the Enlightenment project to its conclusion and described a religion without 
revelation. Because there is no revelation he is able to maintain the universality of 
faith which does not need the particular forms it may take such as Christian belief. 
The place of God in the work of Hick and Kant is not as revealer but as a necessary 
presupposition for what they consider to be the more fundamental fact of existence: 
morality. 
The benefits of an account of religion without revelation must be compared to the 
attendant problems for any attempt to make substantial claims concerning religious 
truth. Hick leaves himself without any grounds or authority for asserting anything 
positive about the Real. The proper object of Hick's study is not the knowledge of 
God but human epistemology itself: the knowledge of human consciousness. In the 
light of this analysis any theological claims he makes regarding the existence of a 
divine being, such as her/his/its goodness and love, or life beyond death have only the 
status of postulates. 
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(b) Reason Within Revelation 
In deliberate contrast to Hick's proposal we shall now consider in outline a basis for 
apologetic dialogue which relies upon the assumption that there is divine revelation. 
There is not the space here to argue in detail for the coherence of any particular model 
of revelation in detail. Some preliminary remarks will be made regarding a general 
category of Christian revelation upon which the rest of the discussion will be based. 
Various writers have offered reappraisal's of revelation in which an element of 
propositionalism is considered central. 1 We may consider some of their arguments in 
order to make our case for the verbal-propositional component of revelation. It must 
first be noted that revelation always supposes a wider cultural linguistic context. To 
describe revelation as the divine disclosure of information does not imply that we 
must ignore the cultural factors that were part of that revelation. The information will 
be communicated through words, people, historical actions and so forth. To this 
extent, there is little reason to deny Hick's argument that all knowledge is known by 
the knower according to the mode of the knower. We might say that all revelation is 
revealed according to the context of those revealed to. This point is of little interest. 
All teachers convey information in appropriate form and idiom depending on the 
supposed recipients. Divine revelation might simply follow this pattern. God would 
then convey information in a form appropriate to those being revealed to. The wider 
1 Helm 1982, Abraham 1982, Swinburne 1992 (cf. Byrne 1993), Wolterstorff 1995. 
According to the Dulles typology these may fit best with the first model of revelation. 
However, they are more nuanced accounts than those considered by Dulles. For 
instance, Helm incorporates some valid insights from the Barthian critique of 
propositionalism which would fit Dulles' model four. He distinguishes between the 
objective order of public revelation and the need for illumination on the part of those 
who recognise revelation for what it is (Helm 1982 p.20). See further Frame 1986. 
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cultural linguistic context is important to the form that revelation takes but it does not 
count against the possibility of revelation taking place. 
Abraham argues that no account of revelation is possible which is not a propositional 
account of revelation. His argument is that propositionalism best expresses the notion 
that revelation is "the view that God has spoken to particular individuals to reveal His 
intentions and purposes".2 The possibility of speech, information, intentions and 
purposes being expressed depends entirely on this activity of God being verbal in 
form. Furthermore, central Christian understandings of God's activity depend upon a 
propositional possibility: 
a theology without the concept of divine speaking has of necessity a God who 
cannot forgive, command or make promises. The reason for this is that 
forgiving, commanding, and promising are performative utterances. 3 
A God who does not or cannot speak does not or cannot forgive, command or 
promise. This conclusion follows from the very definition of those terms. So divine 
speech is not only possible but necessary for the Christian doctrine of God. Abraham 
poses the possibilities in stark terms: either God communicates verbally or the 
alternative "is not just a tentative, carefully qualified guessing at what God is doing, 
but a radical agnosticism. ,,4 Abraham expresses well the dilemma that arises directly 
from Hick's work and we may analyse these implications with reference to his three 
level epistemology before offering an alternative. 
2 Abraham 1982 p.10 
3 Abraham 1982 p.21 
4 Abraham 1982 p.21 
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The non-revealing Ultimate Reality postulated in Hick's system requires agnosticism 
in response. If God does not speak, then God's character, intentions, purposes and 
existence are outside the scope of human knowledge. The result of Hick's project is a 
philosophical position directly contrary to the alternative revelation-constituted 
apologetics we shall consider in a moment. This result may be shown with reference 
to the step diagram. 
Figure 8 Hick's Model for the Knowledge of the Divine 
The knowledge of God, according to Hick, arises with the human response to the 
environment as a total interpretation of experience. The total interpretation brings 
together experience of physical reality, moral reality and divine reality into a whole 
that yields the basis for postulating the existence of an Ultimate Real and human life 
extending beyond death. Clearly, there is no divine initiative in revelation and 
certainly no divinely communicated information: 
Faith is an element within this totality in that it is the human recognition of 
ambiguous events as revelatory, and hence the experiencing of them as 
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mediating the presence and activity of God. 5 
Revelation arises from human experience rather than from divine initiative. While in 
his early work Hick does still describe God as active, this element was never necessary 
and its subsequent abandonment does not alter this basic epistemology. Hick then 
draws a faulty distinction between revelation and the propositional formulation of 
revelation: 
The theological propositions formulated on the basis of revelation have a 
secondary status. They do not constitute the content of God's self-revelation 
but are human and, therefore, fallible verbalizations, construed to aid both 
the integration of our religious experience into our minds and the communi-
cation of religious experience to others.6 
Propositional revelation would be a contradiction in terms for Hick's systematic 
experiential-expressivist analysis. Propositions are necessarily second-order reflection 
upon revelation. They are a product of reason in response to the act of faith. The 
revelation to which primary faith responds is non-propositional religious experience. 
Thus Hick draws a sharp distinction between initial revelation and subsequent 
linguistic formulation. In this way he is able to empty Christian theology of any 
privileged access to truth but only at the price of denying the possibility of revelation 
in any real sense. Revelation without any propositional component would not be a 
case of communication and thus not personal revelation in any ordinary sense of 
personal. 
5 Hick 1988a p.28 
6 Hick 1988a p.29 
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Against Hick's Agnosticism 
Without revelation as divine communication Hick's philosophy remaIns agnostic 
regarding the existence and will of God. This is a necessary step in order to adopt the 
full global pluralist scheme with its inclusion of non-theistic religion. It is also a 
profoundly non-Christian position to take. We may now consider a Christian 
approach to apologetics in which revelation does not have this dispensable status but, 
in contrast, is foundational to the whole tradition of enquiry. 
According to this alternative model revelation provides the foundations upon which 
the interpretation of spirituality, morality and even the natural order are based. Rather 
than being a peak in the development of human awareness, as in Hick's model, 
revelation is the very basis from which the understanding of both spiritual reality, such 
as the will of God, and natural reality, such as the origin and purpose of the earth, is 
developed. Revelation has a prior epistemic status in human knowledge and 
awareness. The first step in this scheme is the divine disclosure of information. That 
information might include the will, character and love of God7 along with the purpose, 
origin and future of humanity. This information will in some sense be propositional in 
form. It is only on the basis of this revelation that any properly Christian 
interpretation of morality and even the natural universe can take place. Such a model 
offers a tradition-constituted approach to knowledge which places prior status to the 
linguistic and cultural context of believers. That context is formed by revelation itself. 
While it is natural to construe revelation in terms of its cultural-linguistic form, the 
exact locus of revelation is debated as Dulles' models of revelation show.8 Wherever 
7 The existence and personal nature of God is bound up in the revelation. Hence, the 
writings of the Bible contain no arguments for the existence or character of God. They 
are better understood as a display of His existence and character. 
8 See also the historical account of models in McDonald 1959 and 1963 who traces 
the course of doctrines of revelation through two hundred years of Christian thought. 
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the exact locus is specified it must be closely related to scripture itself and so it is the 
Bible that is most obviously foundational to the Christian apologist.9 Because science 
and morality are themselves dependent on this revelatory first step they cannot 
themselves provide the basis for justification. This suggests that the place of 
epistemology is not quite so foundational to Christian faith after all. As we will 
explore in the next and final sections, a better place to start if one would speak of 
foundations would be the contents of revelation themselves: the narrative of Scripture. 
It is in the light of this that a Christian theology of faith, knowledge, other religions 
and apologetics can be developed. The methodology that led Hick to espouse 
pluralism is flawed. It is not surprising that the conclusion of his corpus as expressed 
in An Interpretation of Religion should be the relativisation of religious truth claims 
because the introduction to his corpus as expressed in Faith and Knowledge already 
relativise the source of Christian knowledge. As D.Z.Phillips has described the impact 
of foundationalism on theology: 
we are asked to accept as the only appropriate philosophical method for 
establishing the rationality of religious belief, a method which actually distorts 
the character of religious belief. 1 0 
The method that Hick outlines for the justification of Christian faith in his earliest 
work is one that would inevitably reconstruct Christian belief. The main reason for 
this is that it was based upon a philosophical foundationalism independent of 
revelation. 
See further Baillie 1956 
9 In recent years this has become an increasingly viable P?siti?n.to take. To reco~n.ise 
the authoritative role of scripture in forming the cultural hnguIstlc context of ChrIstIan 
thought (Lindbeck 1984) requires some sense in which that scripture is to be taken as 
revelatory. See particularly Thiselton 1980 and Goldingay 1994. 
10 Phillips 1988 p.12 
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Revelation and Apologetics 
The revelation constituted model for knowledge implies a tradition constituted mode 
of enquiry. Apologetic encounter and theological reflection all take place within a 
community shaped not by neutral data of nature or supposed general beliefs about 
God, morals and the world but within a community shaped by the narrative of 
scripture. The verbal structure of revelation implies that some of Lindbeck's basic 
insights in the cultural-linguistic model must be correct. Experience and awareness do 
not occur raw, but only within a framework that is necessarily verbal. Language 
shapes the patterns of the mind and communal behaviour giving it a natural 
precedence over reason and reflection. Revelation occurs at this point. God creates 
the linguistic framework in which reality can be understood aright. 
It will be objected that this alternative model fails to take seriously Hick's main point 
that the operation of culture as a cognitive filter rules out the possibility of direct 
access to any revelation untainted by prejudice and bias. Hick would object that this 
alternative pattern of knowledge is seriously naive. He would claim that revelation 
cannot occur outside of a pre-existing framework of knowledge, morality, awareness 
and values. Furthermore, according to Hick, revelation can only be identified as such 
on the basis of pre-conceived experience. The main reply to this possible objection is 
that his problem arises only because he already prioritises experience over language. 
His cognitive picture is one in which there are pre-theoretical, non-verbal experiences 
which give rise to a framework that must precede revelation. This alternative model 
may support the fact of a pre-existing cultural framework (though affirming that this 
framework is profoundly linguistic in nature) but it rejects the notion that this cultural 
framework can itself give rise to revelation. Revelation is the result of divine 
initiative: the world is confronted, challenged and transformed by God's revelation. 
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This is why the church is ekklesia: it is a community "called out" of the world by the 
summons of divine revelation. Verbal revelation presupposes certain language uses 
but also recreates them. This is the unfolding pattern of the Biblical narrative - at least 
when understood as a whole. 1 1 It is the unfolding narrative of God's creation of a 
community for Himself with its fulfilment in Christ. 12 
In contrast to the essentially Kantian nature of Hick's project the revelation-constituted 
model will conceive apologetics as only possible within the context of revealed truth. 
Neither reason nor morality may act as arbiters apart from revelation. Rather, reason 
and morality will themselves be defined by and used in the service of revelation. As a 
basis for apologetics this raises several questions. Griffiths suggested three basic 
assumptions upon which any meaningful apologetic will be based. 13 The first of these 
is the possibility of identifying and formulating conflicting truth claims. The second 
assumption is that at least some religious truth claims make reference to universal 
reality; including the reality of the unbeliever. The third assumption is that the reality 
that these truth claims refer to is distinct from the claims themselves. Each of these 
assumptions involves some kind of presupposed point of contact between Christianity 
and unbelief. A revelation constituted form of enquiry raises difficulties for the notion 
of a point of contact. If revelation forms the basis for all Christian thinking then 
Christian thinking seems to be sui generis. If this does follow then the claim that 
Christianity is true is tautologous. 'Truth' has a specific Christian meaning which 
applies nowhere else. The only activity remaining for the Christian apologist is to tell 
the Christian story: to repeat the revelation narrative of scripture. According to the 
11 For example, Carson 1996 p.193-345. 
12 Narrative is used here in the sense of the story, expressed in verbal linguistic form, 
contained in the Bible. The term is not used here in the more technical sense of 
'narrative theology' to which we shall return in Chapter 6 (d). 
13 Chapter 1 (a) 
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definition offered by Griffiths this is not apologetics. However, this conclusion need 
not follow. Certainly, the strategy for a non-foundationalist apologetic will be more 
complex and perhaps less hopeful in securing its objectives than the kind of apologetic 
offered by Hick. A number of thinkers have developed a non-foundationalist 
approach to apologetics and we shall consider the relationship of epistemology to 
religion found in their work. 14 This will lead to the possibility of an alternative 
strategy for apologetics and pluralism. 
14 Representatives would include Clark 1990, Clouser 1991, Frame 1987, 1994, 
Mavrodes 1970, Newbigin 1989, Plantinga 1983, 1992 and Wolterstorff 1964. 1983. 
The basic non-foundationalist (or non-classical-foundationalist in the case of 
Plantinga) point underlying this range of thinkers should not obscure the great variety 
and differences between them on a whole range of issues including the implications 
for apologetics. D.Z.Phillips argues that the tradition identified here is not truly non-
foundationalist and we shall take issue with his interpretation (Phillips 1988 pp.38-
52). 
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(c) Christian Apologetics 
We have now outlined and analysed Hick's attempt to justify Christian belief. His 
work has been taken to constitute a model of modernist apologetics. His epistemology 
provides a basic statement of the nature of religious knowledge and the means for its 
justification. Though this epistemology has developed we have shown that it has 
never had to be radically revised despite the revolutionary changes in his theological 
position. This is because his epistemology quite naturally leads to the pluralist 
hypothesis. In effect, the form of apologetics commended by Hick is one that empties 
Christian theology of all particular content. It does so because the content of Christian 
revelation is relativised in favour of a prior authority given to his account of 
epistemology. Theology begins, according to Hick, with the human knower, not with 
the divine revealer. For this reason Hick is not and never has been an apologist for 
Christianity. The position he outlines is a "religious apologetic" or an apologetic for 
religious knowledge in general whatever specific form it takes. Therefore, it has little 
to offer the construction of a properly Christian model for apologetics. In contrast we 
shall now consider two proposals for a Christian apologetic. 
Plantinga understands Christian philosophy to be a distinct discipline. 1 He describes 
Augustinian Christian philosophy as a perspective inherently shaped and formed by 
Christian belief. Philosophy, far from being a neutral practice, is always grounded in a 
faith perspective of ultimate commitments.2 This is the central idea in the movement 
known as Reformed epistemology.3 A central feature of this movement, similar to the 
See especially Plantinga and Wolterstorff 1991. W olterstorff 1964 discusses in 
detail the primary role of faith in shaping all philosophical traditions. 
2 Parallel arguments concerning wider disciplines in the sciences are to be found in 
Clouser 1991. 
3 A helpful discussion and analysis of this movement from a Roman Catholic 
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claim of the non-foundationalists, 4 is the claim that the primary presuppositions of 
faith, such as the claim that God exists, are "basic". 
Natural Theology and Foundationalism 
Plantinga rejects the possibility and the necessity of natural theology and natural 
atheology (the denial of theological claims from the evidence of the physical universe, 
reason and so forth). Both forms of thought are, according to Plantinga, examples of 
classical foundationalism. Natural atheology takes the form of the claim that "belief in 
God is irrational or unreasonable or not rationally acceptable or intellectually 
irresponsible or somehow noetically below par because, as they say, there is 
insufficient evidence for it. "5 This objection is stated in various ways including the 
internal incoherence of the concept "God" and the logical incompatibility or 
improbability of God's existence with the existence of evil. 
Plantinga offers Aquinas as the example, par excellence, of a natural theologian.6 
Aquinas, following Aristotle, distinguishes between two forms of knowledge: "what is 
viewpoint is offered in a range of essays contained in Zagzebski 1993. A sustained 
critique of the work of Plantinga is found in Messer 1993. 
4 Malcolm and Kuhn in Chapter 1. Phillips argues that this connection is superficial 
(Phillips 1988 p.38). It is true that at many crucial points Plantinga's language is very 
different from that of Wittgenstein. In particular, Phillips is critical of the way that 
Plantinga isolates basic beliefs from the surrounding context of belief (p.41). 
However, the real difference between Plantinga and Phillips is that the latter rules out 
the practice of apologetics. He commends Wittgenstein only because his "is a 
conception of philosophy and epistemology which is neither for nor against religion" 
whereas Reformed Epistemology "remains captive to an apologetic conception of 
epistemology." (p.113). Topping 1991 details the anti-foundationalist status of 
Reformed epistemology. On Phillips see Frei 1992 pp.46-55. 
5 Plantinga 1983 p.16 
6 Plantinga 1983 p.40. Wolterstorff, in an extended treatment of natural theology. 
provides a contrasting perspective. He argues that the project Aquinas is engaged in 
has much more in common with the tradition of faith seeking understanding. He 
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self-evident, or known through itself (per se nota)" is distinguished from "what is 
known through another (per aliud nota)"'? Self-evident knowledge is known 
immediately while the latter, science or scientia, is known mediately. Scientific 
knowledge is known by inference from self-evident knowledge. 
So the basic picture of knowledge is this: we know what we see to be true 
together with what we can infer from what we see to be true by arguments 
we can see to be valid.8 
Concerning the existence of God, Aquinas believes that most Christians believe this 
by faith but that some Christians may come to know that God exists by inference 
through the proofs: "so natural knowledge is possible".9 While most people rely upon 
faith and trust that God exists, some have time and intellect to come to know that God 
exists. Such knowledge, not being self-evident, must be arrived at through evidence 
available to us. While Plantinga's exposition of Aquinas is debatable 1 0 this account 
does provide a picture of the foundationalist approach to the knowledge of God. 
suggests Locke as a better example of a natural theologian (Wolterstorff 1983). We 
shall not be concerned here with the accuracy of Plantinga's exposition of Aquinas but 
will assume its validity in order to draw from it the main characteristics of natural 
theology. 
7 Plantinga 1983 p.41 
8 Plantinga 1983 p.44 
9 Plantinga 1983 p.44. "I do not in fact hold that the proposition God exists is self-
evident in itself: for God, we shall argue, is his own existence. But because this is not 
evident to us the proposition is not self-evident to us. It needs to be made evident by 
means of things less evident in themselves but more evident to us, namely, God's 
effects." (Aquinas 1992 p.11) 
lOIn particular, Velecky 1994 argues for a different appraisal of the function of the 
five arguments in the Summa. Velecky demonstrates that the arguments were never 
intended as proofs but as groundwork so that "Christian and non-Christian 
Aristotelians could engage in fruitful conversations" (Velecky 1994 p.63). Indeed, 
Plantinga himself does briefly acknowledge that Aquinas considers belief in the 
existence of God to be intuitive or immediate knowledge but he writes "It is not 
entirely easy to see how to fit this suggestion into his generally Aristotelian way of 
looking at the matter; perhaps here we must see Aquinas as an early Cah·inist." 
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Plantinga writes that according to Aquinas "belief in God is rationally acceptable only 
if there is evidence for it". 11 He describes this as a religious expression of 
foundationalism: "some propositions are properly basic and some are not; those that 
are not are rationally accepted only on the basis of evidence, where the evidence must 
trace back, ultimately to what is properly basic".12 The crucial point about natural 
theology is that it construes the proposition "God exists" as non-basic and, therefore, 
as requiring evidential support from the foundations. 
Plantinga takes issue with foundationalism not because of its basic twofold division of 
knowledge but because of the limitations it places on what may count as properly 
basic belief. Plantinga describes the classical foundationalist conditions for proper 
basicality as: "A proposition p is properly basic for a person S if and only if p is either 
self-evident to S or incorrigible for S or evident to the senses for S." 13 He points out 
the striking limitations that such a condition places upon what may count as basic 
beliefs and the ultimately self-destructive nature of the condition. Firstly, the 
condition excludes a number of otherwise groundless beliefs such as "there are 
enduring physical objects, or that there are persons distinct from myself, or that the 
world has existed for more than five minutes".14 There are many things that we 
believe on the basis of no other beliefs that would not be permitted given such a 
normative rule. Furthermore, such a rule is itself groundless, having the status of a 
(Plantinga 1983 pA 7) However, Zagzebski, herself a Roman Catholic, accepts 
Plantinga's basic interpretation of Aquinas as a natural theologian (Zagzebski 1993 
p.3). In contrast see Lindbeck 1965 and Marshall 1989. 
11 Plantinga 1983 pA 7 
12 Plantinga 1983 pA8 
13 Plantinga 1983 p.59 
14 Plantinga 1983 p.59. The uses of examples here are very similar to those offered by 
Malcolm in Chapter 1 (b). 
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basic belief, and yet neither self-evident nor evident to the senses. So it "is either false 
or such that in accepting it the foundationalist is violating his epistemic 
responsibilities" .15 
Plantinga rejects both the necessity of natural theology and the coherence of the 
foundationalist noetic picture that the project is founded upon. The reason for this is 
that he argues that belief in the proposition "God exists" has the status of a basic 
belief. Following an exposition of Calvin he claims that one may believe in the 
existence of God because the belief is self-evident: 
It is not that such a person is justified or rational in so believing by virtue of 
having an implicit argument .... No; he does not need any argument for justi-
fication or rationality. His belief need not be based on any other proposition 
at all .... 16 
It is rational to believe in the existence of God without believing it upon the basis of 
any other propositions whatsoever. Certain religious beliefs, such as belief in God's 
existence, are as much basic, self-evident beliefs as the belief that 2+2=4 and the 
existence of an external world. 17 Plantinga is not so much challenging the 
foundationalist position as extending the range of candidate beliefs for proper 
basicality. 
15 Plantinga 1983 p.61. Meynell comments that "one of the more immediate reasons 
for the present vogue of anti-foundationalism is that the foundations of knowledge 
proposed by the logical positivists have turned out to be self-destructive." (Meynell 
1993 p.85) 
16 Plantinga 1983 p.67 
17 Plantinga develops this point at much greater depth in Plantinga 1990 where he 
maintains an analogical relationship between our belief in the independent existence 
of other minds and belief in the existence of God. 
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We have noted that in accordance with Plantinga's exposition of Aquinas, basic beliefs 
also provide grounds for inferring other beliefs. All non-basic beliefs are derived, 
ultimately, from basic beliefs. Therefore, basic beliefs are the presuppositions of any 
world view: 
What the Reformers held was that a believer is entirely rational, entirely within 
his epistemic rights, in starting with belief in God, in accepting it as basic, and 
in taking it as premise for arguments to other conclusions. 18 
This description of the knowledge of God presents serious difficulties for apologetics. 
If belief in God is basic then it is a presupposition of a world view rather than an item 
of a world view open to debate. Such an extensively revised version of 
foundationalism shares with Malcolm's non-foundationalism an apparent move to 
withdraw key presuppositions of religious knowledge from the scope of rational 
debate. However, Plantinga does not think that this destroys Christian apologetics. 
Indeed, the continued presence of apologetics in Plantinga's work is lamented by 
Phillips: 
Yet the possibility of defeating arguments is supposed to be forever present. 
On this view, even if the foundations are not destroyed or shaking, there is 
always the threat of earthquakes. In Plantinga's epistemology, the trial of 
faith's rationality never ends for one simple reason: justification never comes 
to an end either. 19 
However, the apologetic task of the Christian community does follow the assimilative 
power of the Christian story and the possibility of anomalies in the Christian life. To 
abandon the apologetic task of Christianity is to abandon its realist intent. We will 
18 Plantinga 1983 p.72 
19 Phillips 1988 p.52 
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now consider an outline of how he theorises apologetics and how we might pursue this 
use of apologetics in response to pluralism. 
The Great Pumpkin 
Plantinga considers the possibility of someone adopting the belief that the Great 
Pumpkin returns to earth every Halloween as properly basic. His response to this 
rather odd possibility is indirect. He states that "certain beliefs are properly basic in 
certain circumstances". 20 What those circumstances are will depend upon a great 
many other things. In fact, the relevant rational criteria will depend most of all upon 
the particular community within which one lives and from within which those criteria 
emerge: 
Accordingly, criteria for proper basicality must be reached from below 
rather than above; they should not be presented ex cathedra but argued 
to and tested by a relevant set of examples. But there is no reason to 
assume, in advance, that everyone will agree on the examples.21 
Plantinga does not state what actual criteria do exclude the Great Pumpkin belief and 
presumably this is because those criteria would be necessarily Christian criteria and 
beliefs. The only point he wishes to make in his philosophical writing on this theme is 
that the construal of certain key Christian beliefs such as the existence of God as basic 
does not imply that one must give equal credence to any and every claim that a 
particular belief is properly basic. For while the Christian may agree that belief in 
God is self-evident: 
Followers of Bertrand Russell and Madelyn Murray O'Hare may disagree; 
20 Plantinga 1983 p. 74 
21 Plantinga 1983 p.77 
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but how is that. relevant? Must my criteria, or those of the Christian community. 
conform to then examples? Surely not. The Christian community is responsible 
to its set of examples, not theirs.22 
This claim emphasises the importance of the wider project of developing an 
Augustinian Christian philosophy that Plantinga is concerned with. To step further 
into the debate and spell out what the criteria of belief actually are demands a more 
explicit statement of the Christian faith. For example, in outlining a possible Calvinist 
rejection of the Great Pumpkin belief he demonstrates the important role of Christian 
presuppositions: 
God has implanted in us a natural tendency to see his hand in the world around 
us; the same cannot be said for the Great Pumpkin, there being no Great 
Pumpkin and no natural tendency to accept beliefs about the Great Pumpkin.23 
There is something seriously dissatisfying in Plantinga's response. The problem is that 
he only informs us why a Calvinist Christian would not accept the existence of the 
Great Pumpkin as a basic belief. This provides no resources for arguing the case with 
a Great Pumpkinite to whom the objection above would be simply a case of begging 
the question. The problem is even more pronounced if the belief in question does not 
concern the Great Pumpkin but the belief that there is no God but Allah and 
Mohammed is His prophet. Plantinga can provide reasons why the Christian may not 
accept this belief as basic but he is not clear what reasons might be given to a non-
Christian. 
Griffiths identifies this problem in Reformed epistemology with his distinction 
between positive and negative apologetics. Reformed epistemology does permit 
22 Plantinga 1983 p.77 
23 Plantinga 1983 p.78 
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negative apologetics which is "a series of defensive manoeuvres through which a 
given community defends its doctrines from external attack".24 Plantinga's attempt to 
justify belief in God as properly basic is an example of negative apologetics.25 He has 
also made a notable defence of Christianity in relation to the problem of evil through 
his particular form of the free will defence.26 However, Griffiths points out that the 
Reformed position fails to offer a basis for positive apologetics in which a religious 
community "tries to show that its doctrines are superior, cognitively, epistemically, or 
ethically, to those of competing religious communities".27 
Plantinga offers a possible route for the justification of Christian belief that does not 
require a foundationalist epistemology at least in its Enlightenment form. However, it 
is not clear that he offers a basis for apologetics in response to the problem of religious 
pluralism. Perhaps the main reason for this failure is that the focus of Plantinga's 
concern is the minimal epistemic entitlements of the individual believer. Griffiths 
helpfully distinguishes between the epistemic obligations of the individual and those 
of the community to which he or she belongs: 
Many sincere religious believers in all religious communities simply lack the 
intellectual capacity to construct arguments in support of any of their beliefs, 
or even to bring their beliefs to full awareness, much less to enter upon the 
very demanding discipline of positive apologetics.28 
Therefore, it may well be the case that many believers are justified in adopting the 
central presuppositions of their faith as properly basic and are not obliged to show 
24 Griffiths 1991 p.60 
25 Notably Plantinga 1990 which is nothing other than a defence of Reformed 
epistemology in the face of criticisms from Ayer, Flew, Hume and others. 
26 Plantinga 1974 cf. Plantinga 1990 p.115-155 
27 Griffiths 1991 p.60 
28 Griffiths 1991 p.70 
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how those beliefs are superior to the conflicting beliefs held by those of other 
traditions. However, Griffiths points out that while his own NOlA principle need not 
be fulfilled by every individual believer it does need to be engaged in by representative 
intellectuals: "a community may have epistemic duties that need not be fulfilled by 
every member of it. ,,29 If a tradition as a whole is brought into conflict with the 
beliefs of a rival tradition then it is the tradition as a whole, rather than every 
individual belonging to it, that must engage in positive apologetics. Griffiths points 
out that: 
those who argue most strongly for the position that religious believers can 
fulfil all their epistemic obligations without entering into positive apologetics 
tend to come from traditions that emphasize the individual at the expense 
of the community.3D 
An example of this is found in the work of Clark who concludes his case for a 
Reformed epistemology with the example of the apparent non-foundationalist 
character of his grandmother's faith in God. Pointing out that she believes without 
reference to theistic proofs or public evidence, that her faith is typical and that she has 
no "noetic defects", Clark concludes that it is rational for her to hold belief in God as 
properly basic.31 Clark fails to make the distinction between what may be the 
epistemic obligations of individuals and what may be the epistemic obligations of the 
wider community to which they belong.32 
29 Griffiths 1991 p.70 
30 Griffiths 1991 p.70 
31 Clark 1990 p.157-158 
32 This also seems to be the point that Aquinas makes in claiming that although an 
"awareness of God, though neither clear nor specific, exists in practically everyone" 
nonetheless "Philosophic demonstration adds to this first knowledge of God and 
betters it, by characterizing him more specifically" (Summa Contra Gentes 3.38 cited 
in Aquinas 1992 p.9). Christianity needs philosophical expression but not all 
Christians need be philosophers. Likewise, the Christian positive apologetic need not 
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The project of developing an Augustinian Christian philosophy is very much in 
keeping with the attempt to develop a form of Christian apologetics not dependent 
upon modernism. Reformed epistemology is an attempt to state a theory of knowledge 
in which the theological context of Christian belief is not made subservient to a 
neutral mode of enquiry. However, Plantinga's work continues to be haunted by a 
commitment to a form of foundationalism which hinders his engagement with 
pluralism.33 In order to establish principles for a positive apologetic one must clarify 
the role of revelation as a norm and criterion for the justification of faith. Just such a 
clarification is found in the recent work of Frame. 34 
The Knowledge of God 
Frame begins his account with a discussion of the nature of the knowledge of God. 
Our knowledge of God is not the product of a special sensory capacity or qualitative 
mystical experience but is a result of the covenant relationship God makes with His 
people:35 
be one that all Christians are expert in presenting. 
33 This is reflected in the lack of serious engagement with pluralism in the Plantinga 
corpus. His continued use of the Pumpkinite objection is a crass example given the 
plurality of major, serious religious world views. 
34 Especially Frame 1987 (See also Frame 1994). We will not outline the 
"perspectivist" framework Frame uses. It is integral to his thesis that there are three 
perspectives on knowledge: the normative, the situational and the existential. Through 
this framework he seeks to integrate approaches to epistemology and apologetics 
otherwise seen as rival. Consideration of this schema is not necessary in order to 
outline the broader model of apologetics that he offers. 
35 Frame criticises Plantinga for not being sufficiently 'theological' in his philosophy. 
No doubt the Reformed epistemologists would share the content of Frame's 
theological commitments but he points out that this "has not always been evident in 
their writings." (Frame 1987 p.383) Plantinga fails to clarify the relationship between 
a basic belief and the narrative of scripture. 
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Knowing is a process that is subject to God's Lordship. Like all other 
proces~es, human knowledge is under God's control, subject to his 
authonty, and exposed to his presence. Thus God is involved in our 
knowin~, ju~t as He is involved in all things we know about. The process 
of knowIng Itself, apart from any information gained by it, is a revelation 
of God.36 
Prior to considering an epistemology of religious knowledge it is necessary to 
formulate a doctrine of revelation because the very possibility of knowing IS 
predicated on the initiative of God in self-revelation. Therefore, knowledge is not a 
matter of our striving to know God and exercising our cognitive faculties correctly in 
order to access Him. Rather, knowledge of God depends upon His revelatory activity 
in disclosure to us. Frame examines the basic Biblical material on the knowledge of 
God in order to arrive at the basic theme of Lordship. The primary revelation of God 
is His being Lord over all creation. It is this Lord who makes the covenant with us. 
Entering into this relationship within the covenant of the Sovereign Lord is the only 
starting point for the knowledge of God and, indeed, the proper knowledge of 
anything. 
Two important implications follow this "epistemology". The first is that human 
language is suitable for God-talk. It presents no barrier to God's revelation and so 
does not need de-mythologisation or to be relativised as limited, human knowledge. 
36 Frame 1987 p.41-42. That revelation of God is described as "The Word of God", 
itself a term common in scripture. Frame identifies the Word of God with the Bible as 
the basic presupposition of the Christian faith. This is problematic because it does beg 
certain questions. Helm identifies this kind of presuppositionalism as one that 
presupposes not only the truth of the Bible but its meaning as well (Helm 1992 p.147). 
There is no space here to discuss these issues but we take the Word of God to identify 
the narrative of Scripture as it is focused in the incarnation as the Word become flesh. 
We leave aside the issue of the relationship between text and revelation, its inerrancy 
or infallibility and the question of the canon of scripture. See Carson and Woodbridge 
1986. 
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The second implication is that the distinction between "fact" and "interpretation" is 
false. We shall consider these implications in tum. 
Human language is capable of God-talk because it is itself based on God's created 
order rather than simply being a product of human intellectual progress: 
A Christian epistemology will reject the premise that human language 
necessarily refers primarily to finite reality, because this premise is based 
on what we have called a non-Christian view of transcendence - that God 
is not clearly revealed in creation.37 
Indeed, Frame argues that human language is primarily about God. It is not firstly 
about neutral, natural "facts" with only a secondary or analogical application to 
supposed supernatural reality. All reality is God's creation and, therefore, even to talk 
about a table is, for the Christian, to use religious language. There simply is no 
natural/religious language dichotomy sustainable in the light of the Biblical narrative. 
There is no basis for a hierarchical model of language use in which God-talk can be 
classed as non-factual. This leads us to the second implication that we cannot 
consistently maintain a distinction between fact and interpretation. 
The problem for Christians who adopts this distinction is that they have immediately 
relativised the significance of revelation (one interpretation among many) and created 
a locus of authority outside of the Word of God (facts). This has been the victory of 
modernism in its push to establish the autonomy of human knowledge: 
The idea of 'brute fact' is an invention to furnish us with a criterion of truth other 
than God's revelation. Yet, as with all other such substitutes, it cannot even be 
37 Frame 1987 p.35 
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made intelligible. A 'fact' devoid of any normative interpretation would be a fact 
without meaning, without characteristics - in short, a nothing.38 
It is a simple tautology to affirm that all knowledge is interpretation. There are no 
'facts' accessible to us without the exercise of interpretation. This does not mean that 
we are locked up without access to 'reality'. This is because reality is itself an 
interpreted-fact and the issue is whether our reality is true reality. The answer to this 
question can only be settled by appeal to some standard or authority for knowledge. 
The only Christian standard is God's self-revelation: 
The desire for a 'fact' totally devoid of human interpretation that can serve 
as an authoritative criterion for all interpretations is a non-Christian desire, 
a desire to substitute some other authority for the Word of God. 39 
Given the pnmacy of God's self-revelation in justification there are important 
difficulties in developing a Christian apologetic. However, according to Frame 
epistemology is itself part of the problem, not part of the answer. The justification of 
belief is a much more organic challenge depending on who is asking the question, who 
is answering and so on. As we have already noted, there is an important distinction 
between the extent to which an individual Christian need provide reasons for belief 
and the extent to which the Church is responsible to provide an apologetic for 
Christianity. In the case of individuals, a whole host of related factors will shape what 
might count as justification and what might be the best way of presenting an 
apologetic for Christianity to unbelievers: 
Sometimes philosophers seem to be telling us that we cannot have any justified 
belief unless we have a fully articulated philosophy of belief, an epistemology. 
But surely that, too, is wrong. If we must be able to give a reason for every 
38 Frame 1987 p.71 
39 Frame 1987 pp.71-72 
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bel.ief, .then .we must be able to give a reason for every reason, and so the process 
of JustIficatIon would require infinite chains of reasoning. Justification would be 
a hopeless task.40 
Frame indicates how misleading a philosophical treatment of theological questions can 
sometimes be. To question whether God's existence can be proven cannot be 
discussed in isolation from the substantive question of whether God exists which in 
tum depends upon a context in which there is knowledge of God (revelation). To ask 
"Does God exist?" ought to be a question that is framed in the context of a particular 
tradition and a particular God. The danger of an epistemological approach to 
apologetics is that it empties revelation of its specific theological content in favour of 
a more general philosophical content. In contrast, Frame argues that the Word of God 
is the basic presupposition of all Christian 'epistemology'. It is a presupposition that 
should be acknowledged by Christians when in apologetic encounter. Therefore, 
Frame defines apologetics as a branch of theology, not philosophy: 
Apologetics may be defined as the application of Scripture to unbelief and as 
such may be seen as a subdivision of theology. It is important to understand 
that that definition makes apologetics a part of theology, not a 'neutral basis' 
for it. Too often writers on such matters have assumed that the work of the 
apologist is to reason with the unbeliever, using criteria and presuppositions 
that are acceptable both to belief and unbelief.41 
Because there is no autonomy or neutrality in apologetics it cannot be a bare 
philosophical epistemology that provides the grounds for apologetic encounter. The 
obvious attraction of such a possibility is that it would seem to provide a neutral 
methodology for solving conflicting truth claims. However, as we have clearly 
displayed in the work of Hick, once this step is taken the locus of authority shifts from 
40 Frame 1987 p.l 05 
41 Frame 1987 p.87 
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the Christian revelation to somewhere else. In the case of Hick it shifts to an 
Enlightenment epistemology. The result is that Christianity cannot have privileged 
access to truth. Instead, the only religion permitted this status is the great religion of 
the Enlightenment: Kant's religion within the limits of reason alone. In contrast, 
Frame retains the locus of authority in the Word of God - the revealed narrative at the 
heart of Christian theology. Therefore, even the methodology of apologetics will be 
constrained by this framework. It will not be neutral but properly biased toward the 
truth and reality which is the content of revelation. The purpose of apologetics is now 
to be construed as the act of telling the story of God's dealings with His creation in a 
persuasive way. The epistemological approach to apologetics focuses attention on 
piecemeal elements of Christianity (the existence of God, the problem of evil and so 
forth) whereas the narrative approach relates all particular questions to the context in 
which they have their meaning and substance. Obviously, questions must be 
answered, but the answers given by the Christian apologist will not assume that they 
may be answered without appeal to the authority and context of the Word of God. We 
shall close our discussion by considering the relationship of narrative to apologetics. 
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(d) Apologetics and Storytelling 
Apologetics Without Story 
Given the objections we have made to foundationalism various difficulties arise for 
the possibility of apologetics. If it were possible to identify tradition transcending 
principles that allow one to distinguish between words about reality and reality "itself' 
or, at least, truth conditions for such claims about reality then they would seem to 
provide a basis for the requirements of Griffiths' NOlA principle and engagement with 
pluralism. If there are no tradition transcending principles then apologetics can 
develop no clear connection or neutral principles between religions. However, this 
form of foundationalism relies upon the distinction between reality-as-interpreted and 
reality-as-it-is. We have seen that this distinction underlies the work of Hick and the 
modernist tradition of which he is a part. The distinction gives rise to many more 
problems than it solves. Apart from internal difficulties, it relativises the significance 
of theological reflection and rules out the possibility of divine revelation. The key 
advantage of the foundationalist claim for apologetics is that it provides a basis for 
debate between religions without which the role of the Christian apologist can only be 
to tell the Christian story. We may repeat the narrative that has formed the Christian 
tradition to those who will listen but there is no place for defending that narrative from 
objections or persuading non-believers that they should come to see the story as their 
own story too. 
We have already referred to two Christian apologists who dispense, in different ways, 
with classical foundationalism. 1 It is not clear that after foundationalism they must 
dispense with apologetics entirely in favour of storytelling alone. The choice is not 
1 Plantinga and Frame in Chapter 6 (c). 
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between foundationalism or the ant-realist rejection of apologetics. A fruitful 
approach to resolving this dilemma may be gained from considering further the role of 
narrative and metaphor in apologetics. In order to do so we shall first return to the 
work of MacIntyre. We have seen that his work, in contrast to modernism, invests 
great value in the role of a tradition shaping the thought forms of communities. We 
will now see that to prize tradition is not to devalue some sense of rational dispute 
between rival traditions and its attendant notion of realism. 
Tradition and Truth 
If traditions are self-contained contexts of intellectual enquiry constituted by particular 
beliefs and governed by tradition specific senses of rational and moral appraisal then it 
seems to follow that not only are traditions incompatible they are also incomparable.2 
No comparison may be made between them and so even the claim that traditions are 
incompatible cannot be substantiated. This is the problem of commensurability. 3 If 
the charge is correct then MacIntyre's entire thesis is based on an incoherence. His 
attempt to describe a narrative of the virtues in terms of 'rival' traditions assumes some 
form of commensurability. If his argument concludes that traditions are 
incommensurable then the very attempt to produce such a narrative cannot be valid. 
However, MacIntyre denies such an implication through his appeal to 'shared' 
standards and the possibility of 'translation'. 4 These are important concepts which he 
considers carefully. 
2 Mason 1994 argues that MacIntyre IS inconsistent on this point. For further 
discussion see Markham 1991. 
3 A useful discussion of commensurability is found in Burrows "Commensurability 
and Ambiguity" in Cohn-Sherbok 1992. He demonstrates the commensurabl~. term.s. 
such as those associated with liberation theology. may become a part of tradItIOns III 
the future as they accommodate new issues but they are problematic if r~ad back into 
the histories of traditions as if shared, comparable concepts had always eXIsted. 
4 This discussion parallels that of Lindbeck's concept of assimilative power. Lindbeck 
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Though all reasoning and description occur from the vantage point of a particular 
tradition, it "does not follow that what is said from within one tradition cannot be 
heard or overheard by those in another."s The possibility of one tradition overhearing 
another relies upon some form of common standards or meanings held by practitioners 
of both traditions. In practice this possibility is a commonplace reality: "Traditions 
which differ in the most radical way over certain subject matters may in respect of 
others share beliefs, images and texts. ,,6 The key word for MacIntyre's analysis seems 
to be "share". He does not have any need to resort to an elusive neutral language or set 
of standards in order to secure the possibility of translation. The shared standards that 
already overlap among pre-existing traditions provide all the tools necessary to 
facilitate translation. 7 
What those shared standards might be will vary in different dialogue situations.8 The 
points of overlap between Christians and Muslims will be substantially different than 
those between Christians and Buddhists. In fact, in the latter case, the points of 
overlap that are of direct religious significance may be few indeed. The less that is 
shared, the more difficult the work of translation. In the case of the traditions with 
prefers the term redescription to translation: "Intratextual theology redescribes reality 
within the scriptural framework rather than translating Scripture into extrascriptural 
categories." (Lindbeck 1984 p.118). This is a matter of the "direction of the 
interpretative activity" (Marshall 1990b p.74). In MacIntyre's terminology we might 
say that the world is being "translated" into scripture rather than scripture into the 
world. An account of postliberal apologetics relying on "wide reflective equilibrium" 
as a basis for redescription is found in Kamitsuka 1996. 
S MacIntyre 1988 p.350 
6 MacIntyre 1988 p.350 
7 Apczynski 1992 p.46 
8 Mavrodes gives theoretical consideration to a similar idea in terms of 'person-
relative' criteria (Mavrodes 1970). 
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which MacIntyre is primarily concerned they "agree in according a certain authority to 
logic both in their theory and in their practice. ,,9 Such an agreement makes the 
categorisation of disagreement a relatively straightforward affair. Insofar as there exist 
significant areas of agreement, MacIntyre gives the examples of "texts, modes of 
evaluation, whole practices, such as games, crafts and sciences", it will follow that 
"translation will generally be able to proceed almost entirely by same-saying." 1 0 
However, traditions may have little in common with each other and, insofar as this is 
the case, translation will be significantly more problematic. Translation may then be, 
at best, "more difficult and cumbrous" but, at worst, "the more possibilities of 
untranslatability will seem to threaten." 11 It must be a hypothetical possibility that 
traditions may have nothing in common and be strictly incommensurable. However, 
this 'threat' is of much less significance than it may first appear because traditions that 
are strictly incommensurable cannot be characterised as rival. Nothing could be 
compared or contrasted as competing claims and it follows that there is no contest to 
be settled, no rivalry to resolve. This potential threat can neither be solved nor 
formulated other than as a formal, logical possibility. Concerning the reality of 
religious pluralism the various traditions do seem to share enough overlap of the kind 
discussed by MacIntyre to facilitate both comparison and apologetics. 
It is also claimed that the denial of foundationalism entails anti-realism or ontological 
relativism. MacIntyre explicitly distances his own work from these implications. 
Without identifying the representative objectors he labels the relevant positions as the 
"relativist" and "perspectivist" challenges: 
9 MacIntyre 1988 p.351 
10 MacIntyre 1988 p.387 
11 MacIntyre 1988 p.387 
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The relativist challenge rests upon a denial that rational debate between 
and r~tional choice among rival traditions is possible; the perspectivist challenge 
puts In question the possibility of making truth-claims from within anyone 
tradition. 12 
It might be argued that these positions are implied by MacIntyre's denial that there is a 
neutral standing ground for moral and intellectual enquiry. Without that neutral 
ground there are, firstly, no reasons for choosing one tradition over another and, 
secondly, no sense that can be made of any claims to universal validity regarding 
moral prescription or ontological description. Relativism emphasises the first problem 
while perspectivism emphasises the second. Most often these two problems are run 
together as aspects of the same challenge. These objections share the assumption that 
terms like 'truth' or 'realism' retain a neutral mode of discourse and, in its place, true 
anti-foundationalism will claim that alternative traditions should be understood as 
"very different, complementary perspectives for envisaging the realities about which 
they speak to us". 13 
It is understood that traditions are in a constant change of development and yet, in 
order to retain identity, always continue a core element of defining belief and practice. 
One of the processes that a tradition will continually engage in is that of testing the 
correspondence of defining beliefs to the reality in which the tradition claims to live, 
move and have its being. MacIntyre points out that the development of a tradition 
always leaves it open to the possibility that a "radical discrepancy" may emerge 
12 MacIntyre 1988 p.352 
13 MacIntyre 1988 p.352. This description of the objection is similar to the kind of 
objection Hick would mount but the similarity is sup~rficial. ~n elemen~ of 
perspectivism is an important part of Hick's work b~t. hIS wor~ rehes o~ entIrely 
different theoretical foundations. Hick, contra perspechvIsm, retaIns the reahst. truth-
claiming status of key religious beliefs. 
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between "what the mind then judged and believed and reality as now perceived. 
classified and understood" .14 He describes this as a retrospective fonn of the 
correspondence theory of truth. Only retrospectively is one able to judge that beliefs 
of the past fail to correspond to the world. This presentation of correspondence 
carefully avoids developing another fonn of Enlightenment foundationalism. Truth is 
not a perspective outside all traditions through which all traditions may be judged. 
Truth and error can only be adopted and recognised as truth or error from within a 
tradition of enquiry. MacIntyre dismisses the notion of "facts" as a seventeenth 
century invention. 15 Facts are not "things" like wigs or telescopes, he argues, but, with 
reference to its derivation from the Latin tenn, more like occasions or events. They 
only exist in tenns of present traditions of enquiry. This description of truth leads 
MacIntyre to maintain a certain type of realist claim: 
One of the great originating insights of tradition-constituted enquiries is that false 
beliefs and false judgments represent a failure of the mind, not of its objects. It 
is the mind which stands in need of correction. Those realities which mind 
encounters reveal themselves as they are, the presented, the manifest, the 
unhidden. 16 
The assumption upon which this originating insight must rest is that there is a reality 
with which alternative or rival traditions deal. When a belief is found to have failed 
(retrospectively) to correspond with reality, then that constitutes a failure of the mind 
and not of reality itself. 17 Some fonn of realism must be a part of apologetics. 
14 MacIntyre 1988 p.356 
15 MacIntyre 1988 p.357 
16 MacIntyre 1988 p.357 
17 The concept of a tradition of enquiry is not dissimilar to Wittgenstein's notion of a 
language game. The charge of incommensurability is made against Wittgenstein on 
this point. In Wittgenstein's early work he argued for a picture-theory of language 
similar to that argued for by Hick (Wittgenstein 1961 (1922) p.22). His later 
abandonment of this theory followed his key insight that language must be understood 
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Disagreement assumes that more is at issue than different tastes or opinions. The very 
fact of disagreements highlights the implicit assumption that what we understand to be 
reality is not just 'reality for us' but reality as it really is.I8 
Narrative and Truth 
We have already seen reason to believe that metaphor does give us access to reality. 19 
The extension of this claim is the affirmation that tradition, as a community shaped by 
narrative, informs us about and enables us to live in reality. This highlights a key 
distinction between two forms of non-foundationalism. This distinction may be 
outlined with references to two alternative opinions regarding the implications of the 
structural role of narrative in knowledge. 
-- ----- ----
in terms of the wider activity or form of life in which it must be understood to operate 
(Wittgenstein 1958 pp.8-9, 48). Language cannot be properly understood in isolation 
from the types of activity of which it is a part. Hence, meaning depends upon the way 
in which words are being used and not on formal logical connections between names 
and objective reality. However, this need not imply the anti-realist position. Haymes 
point out that "a language-game is both continuous and discontinuous with other 
language-games." (Haymes 1988 p.5 see also Kerr 1989) There are connections, 
perhaps analogous, between words used in one setting and words used in another. 
Sometimes the theme of continuity becomes too dominant in a theology of religions 
and this creates the illusion that there is no radical discontinuity between traditions. 
For a striking example of this in the case of scripture see Smith 1993 and the 
discussion in Sinkinson 1994 and Sinkinson 1995b. 
18 Trigg argues these points along with his claim that communication itself assumes 
some form of realism in Trigg 1973 p.l53ff. 
19 Chapter 5 (d). Johnson develops the connections between the need to think in 
metaphors and the narrative structure of all human thinking. He makes the strong 
claim that all thinking and reasoning is shaped by narrative without adopting anti-
realism: "because there are shared bases for metaphors within a culture, and even 
across cultures .... some metaphors appear to be grounded in universal bodily 
experiences." (Johnson 1993 p.196) 
288 
Loughlin identifies this distinction in terms of textualist and narrativist theologians.20 
Textualism rules out apologetics because it rules out the realist assumption that there 
is something other than the system of signs we describe as language. Loughlin 
describes the textualist approach to meaning as simply the drifting from one word to 
the next as we define words with other words and, in this way, "Meaning is always 
one word away".21 According to the textualist, the significance of the priority given to 
narrative for Christianity is that 'text' or words take priority over God and his self-
disclosure: "God is wholly inside language, make-believe like everything else; God is 
language. ,,22 In contrast to the textualist case is the narrativist one. The narrativist 
agrees that it is a narrative, a story, that defines reality, self, God and so on. However, 
the narrativist resists the textualist desire to make textualism itself the master 
narrative. Rather, it is the Christian story that is the master narrative. It defines 
reality, self, God and so on and "teaches that really there is nothing whatsoever beyond 
God's story. It is the love of God that goes all the way down, really."23 Loughlin 
argues that accepting the nature of the Christian life and witness as fundamentally 
shaped by narrative is not to concede that such life and witness is just words or simply 
make believe. However, he is concerned to distance narrativism from modernity's 
preoccupation with foundations and epistemological realism. He points out that 
"Christian truth has never been a matter of matching stories against reality. It has 
always been a case of matching stories against the truth: Jesus Christ. ,,24 Loughlin is 
avoiding a neutral term like "reality" in favour of the theologically informed term 
"truth". Truth is not reality-as-it-is in contrast to reality-as-interpreted. Truth, 
20 Loughlin 1996a p.IO Examples of the former include Cupitt and of the latter, 
Lindbeck. 
21 Loughlin 1996a p.13 
22 Loughlin 1996a p.16 
23 Loughlin 1996a p.17 
24 Loughlin 1996a p.23 
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according to the Christian narrative, is revealed to us in Jesus Christ. Therefore, He is 
the ultimate statement of Reality. This claim leaves open the question of what role, if 
any, is left for apologetics. Loughlin is clear that Christianity cannot be relativised in 
the light of pluralism and his outline for verbal encounter is one of storytelling rather 
than apologetics: 
The Christian story comes first. It is the measure of all other stories. Deciding on 
its truthfulness is a matter of judging how good a story it is, and that .... is at least 
a matter of jUdging how well the story is told by its tellers.25 
This criterion for the truth of Christianity may seem very different from the proposed 
NOlA principle with which we have developed our understanding of apologetics. 
However, Loughlin must not be understood as reverting to the textualist case at this 
point. He remains a narrativist and that means that the story does absorb the world 
and so the telling of the story means the describing of the world in which our non-
Christian friends are also characters in the plot. Telling God's story is not simply 
talking at those who listen; it also involves presenting the internal rationality of the 
story and applying the story to apparent anomalies or objections. Loughlin notes 
approvingly the kind of apologetics offered by Barth and Frei. The world narrated by 
the Bible is "the one common world" for Frei who also presents Barth as one who 
"uses exegesis, ethics and ad hoc apologetics, in order to show how the biblical world 
is our world. ,,26 Barth is more normally understood to be hostile to the practice of 
apologetics.27 Loughlin finds a role for apologetics in keeping with Barth because he 
25 Loughlin 1996a p.161 
26 Loughlin 1996a p.38 'ad hoc apologetics' is defined by Hunsinger as "essentially a 
matter of clarifying the meaning rather than demonstrating the truth of a particular 
claim or set of claims" (cited in Loughlin 1996a p.38 n.29). 
27 Pinnock describes Barth as a voluntarist with regard to faith because "The gospel 
has to be accepted or rejected by an act of the will (faith). and nothing can be said to 
justify the truth-claims it makes by standard apologetic reasoning." (Pinnock 1986 
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sees the servIce of apologetics as one of explanation rather than justification. 
Certainly, this account of apologetics would seem more in keeping with the non-
foundationalist proposals we have considered. However, we will now return to 
Frame's work in order to present the case for apologetics to include the role of 
justification. However, the form of justification we shall suggest is one that is 
subsumed within the role of explanation or telling the story.28 
Apologetics and Truth 
Frame rejects the notion of neutral enqUIry In favour of an epistemology and 
apologetic arising from the Biblical narrative. This implies that apologetics will 
primarily involve explaining the story to those who do not believe. However, the 
process of the explanation includes the presentation of reasons. In considering the 
historicity of the resurrection and its use in foundationalist apologetics Frame 
willingly concedes: 
It is quite proper to point out that the resurrection of Christ is as well attested 
as any other historical fact. It is legitimate to ask why the apostles were willing 
to die for the belief that Christ had risen. It is legitimate to examine the alter-
native (unbelieving) explanations of the resurrection reports and to show how 
implausible they are. Using those sorts of arguments does not, in itself, 
compromise our biblical presuppositions. Indeed, though the evidentialists 
themselves would not grant this point, those arguments presuppose a Christian 
world view - a world of order, logic and value. They are intelligible only 
within the "broad circle" of Christian argument.29 
p.162) Pinnock argues that the supernatural work of the Holy Spirit in bringing about 
faith and the wisdom of human reasoning are not incompatible as Barth would claim. 
28 Oakes distinguishes between pure and impure narratology. Pure narratology is 
textualist but impure narratology claims that "narrative is inherently 'impure' because it 
makes a referential claim." (Oakes 1992 p.45) This distinction is parallel to that made 
by Loughlin though he would define "referential" in Christological terms. Our use of 
narrative here is impure and narrativist. Referential claims are at stake. 
29 Frame 1987 p.353 
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Frame's reference to circular argument is helpful at this point because it brings 
together the themes of narrative and apologetics. An obvious objection to this 
apologetic case is that it becomes mere circular argument: presupposing what it seeks 
to prove. Frame distinguishes between narrow and broad circular arguments.30 A 
narrow or vicious circular argument states something like "The Christian narrative is 
true because it claims to be true". Such an argument is tautologous and of no value in 
apologetics. However, a broad circular argument is one that takes into account as 
much 'data' as possible. This means that a good apologetic will describe features of 
life, the world and history and in that sense will be a case of telling God's story. The 
process of storytelling includes the redescribing of listeners within the terms of the 
narrative and the presentation of evidence that the narrative does reveal the world. All 
the facts, evidences and proofs that the Christian apologist offers will presuppose the 
Christian narrative to be not a world view but the world view. 
Conclusion 
At least two objections remain. The first is that such circularity is unfair as it grants to 
Christians a kind of non-rationalism it denies to anyone else. The second is that it 
creates a situation where dialogue can only be one way: a basis for telling the Christian 
story but not for hearing any others. We will conclude by offering a response to these 
objections. 
Non-foundationalist apologetics does not permit circularity for Christian argument 
while demanding foundations for non-Christian beliefs. The non-foundationalist 
claim is a claim about the nature of knowledge itself. All apologetic will be circular in 
30 Frame 1987 p.131 
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hi . 31· . t s Important sense. ThIS IS because ultimate loyalties are at stake. There is no 
neutral ground upon which to stand and analyse the pluralist world. If Christian 
apologetics involves circularity at this point then so too does any other attempt to 
provide reasons for ultimate beliefs. The work of MacIntyre has been to present the 
role of tradition and community in all forms of enquiry - even in those which deny its 
place. 
The question of how the Christian apologist is to listen to rival stories returns us to the 
question of dialogue and pluralism which we touched in our introduction to 
apologetics. 32 It has not been our argument here that apologetics is to be equated with 
dialogue. It is MacIntyre's concept of translation that provides the necessary 
background to apologetics and this is close to the work of dialogue. Indeed, 
translation "may have made possible a dialectical interchange between the two rival 
standpoints, out of which there may emerge a discovery of common standards, 
standards hitherto presupposed, but never before made articulate. ,,33 Translation 
involves listening and hearing in order to realise as fair as possible an understanding 
of one tradition by another. This is the important role of dialogue and a necessary 
prerequisite of dialogue. However, the conception of apologetics we have outlined 
has given rise to some significant complications for dialogue. Given the abandonment 
of foundationalism there must also be an abandonment of the idea that dialogue draws 
those of traditions closer together into a tradition-less space. Milbank has given a 
striking expression of this implication: 
As regards the general furtherance of the critical understanding of discourses (the 
31 Frame 1987 p.130 
32 Chapter 1 (a) 
33 MacIntyre 1994 p.297 
293 
minimum that religions can truly share in common) it will be better to replace 
"dialogue" with "mutual suspicion." As regards Christian theology and practice, 
we should simply pursue further the ecclesial project of securing harmony 
through difference and a continuous historical conversation not bound by the 
Socratic constraints of dialogue around a neutral common topic.34 
To replace 'dialogue' with 'mutual suspicion' is simply a more honest way of 
proceeding. Hick's attempt to provide a religious interpretation of religion is a covert 
application of a sceptic world view to the world's religious traditions. Christian 
apologetics is an overt application of the Christian world view to those traditions. 
This latter option more clearly provokes mutual suspicion than the former option and 
that is understood to be a great advantage for establishing meaningful relationships 
between religious communities. 
34 Milbank 1990b p.190 
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Conclusion 
Hick develops an apologetic for Christianity on a foundationalist epistemology. His 
defence of the rationality of faith is based upon the quality of religious experience he 
claims lies at the heart of religion. Underlying distinctive religious knowledge is a 
universal natural knowledge and a more general moral awareness. These former 
levels of knowledge are necessarily prior to religious awareness. Given this 
epistemology it is not difficult for Hick to make modifications which provide a basis 
for his pluralist hypothesis. His apologetic for Christianity has never relied upon any 
distinctive aspect of Christianity. Instead, it is an apologetic reliant on neutral 
categories of knowledge and behaviour which he assumes to be appropriate to all 
people. 
Hick's apologetic employs an analysis of knowledge in keeping with the movement 
known as the Enlightenment. According to this tradition, knowledge is separable from 
the community in which one exercises that knowledge. Therefore, those knowledge 
claims must be justified not by appeal to a broad range of tradition specific 
considerations but by personal factors which are universally applicable. For this 
reason the criteria compel Hick to adopt a pluralist position. This is because by these 
criteria no tradition may be privileged above any other. Instead all are subject to the 
same transcendental factors. 
The methodology utilised by Hick is part of a wider movement that has inspired a 
great deal of Christian apologetics. Much of that apologetic enterprise has been 
concerned with the justification of the historic Christian position though the 
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methodology itself is compatible with very different positions. 1 However, in Oul 
analysis of Hick we have noted a range of failings implicit in this methodology. Thes~ 
failures may be summarised in terms of three inter-related objections. The firsl 
concerns the ambiguity of the universe as an assumed truth which must precede 
religious belief.2 We have had reason to note the incoherence of Hick's attempt tc 
state this precedence within Christian theology.3 The very positing of this assumption 
involves Hick in relativising Christian faith in favour of a western Sceptic position. 
The second objection concerns the theoretical framework for religious knowledge in 
an ambiguous universe. That framewor.k is strictly dualist in its absolute separation 01 
the unknown reality from human interpretative faculties.4 That separation rules out 
any true knowledge of God known either through human speculation or divine 
revelation.5 The third objection concerns the role of language, metaphor and narrative 
in religious knowledge.6 Hick's dualism is also apparent here. Because he 
distinguishes the foundational role of experience and universal religious factors he 
must relegate language use to the secondary or dependent level of cultural garb. The 
strategy fails to take into account the formative sense in which narrative is embedded 
in tradition and shapes our very way of thinking and reasoning. 
In contrast we have argued that it is possible to develop an apologetic on the basis of 
the postliberal account. The situation of rationality within tradition and narrative does 
1 This is striking in the comparison ofNetland and Ward in Chapter 1 (d). 
2 The argument of Chapter 3. 
3 In particular this incoherence is apparent with the dist.inc~ion between the re~igious 
ambiguity of the universe for us and the lack of ambIgUIty for the great SaInts of 
religious history. See Chapter 3 (b). 
4 The argument of Chapter 4. 
5 The consequences of this step for any doctrine of revelation are considered In 
Chapter 6 (a). 
6 The argument of Chapter 5. 
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not spell the end of apologetic encounter. Indeed, in an age of pluralism it pennits an 
approach to other religions that does not demand their reduction into Enlightenment 
categories of thought as we find with the pluralist hypothesis of Hick. Instead, non-
foundational apologetics are able to recognise the differences and pursue apologetics 
on the basis that those differences are matters of great significance and not optional 
embellishments. 
Hick's work has been developed in line with his conviction that a pluralist society 
demands tolerance and respect among the practitioners of the world religions. The 
purpose of this thesis is not to undennine this conviction but to provide an alternative 
basis for it. Indeed, it is our concern that to require a commitment to agreement (the 
pluralist hypothesis) in order to live in tolerance and respect is to ask too much of the 
faithful believers in any religious tradition.7 The apologetic strategy outlined here does 
provide compelling grounds to listen carefully to rival traditions, respect their contrary 
rationalities and tell God's story in a way that will be meaningful to them. When 
"apologeomai" is used in First Peter this is certainly what is intended: 
Always be prepared to give an answer to everyone who asks you to give the 
reason for the hope that you have. But do this with gentleness and respect, 
keeping a clear conscience, so that those who speak maliciously against your 
good behaviour in Christ may be ashamed of their slander. 8 
7 Griffiths and Lewis point out how wrong Hick's demand is (Griffiths and Lewis 
1983 p.77) 
8 1 Peter 3:15-16. New International Version. 
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